FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER, 1925

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Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Subscription, $5.00 a year, post-free to any address in the world. Subscriptions, and inquiries regarding advertising, should be addressed to the Business Manager, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 25 West 43rd Street, New York, N. Y.

The Editors will be glad to consider manuscripts offered for publication, but no manuscript will be returned unless it is accompanied by a stamped and addressed envelope, and the Editors will take no responsibility for manuscripts that may be lost.

Entered as second-class matter September 12, 1922, at the post-office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879

VOL. IV., NO. 1.

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Printed in U. S. A.

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 4 OCTOBER, 1925 No. 1

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR

By Raymond Poincaré

IS IT possible that the power of a lie is even greater than it is pictured as being in the fine book of the Norwegian novelist, Johan Bojer? Its power sometimes disheartens those who seek to defend and bear witness to the truth. Those who have been closely connected with great events and who remember them in their minutest details feel that the truth must be obvious to any fair-minded person. But when they see the imagination of some and the dishonesty of others distorting facts out of all semblance to reality, they feel inclined to withdraw into themselves, to give up counting upon any man to refute such calumnies and to wait for time in its wisdom to reëstablish the balance.

This is a mistake. For falsehood is thus given an opportunity to outdistance truth and legend is allowed to take the place of history. In a recent book, Mr. Richard Grelling, an honest German who acknowledges the wrongs committed by his country, draws attention to the Reich's recent attempts to clear Germany of all responsibility for the World War, and at the same time makes short shrift of the assertions that have been given out in support of so astounding a thesis. It is unfortunately true that in friendly countries, and especially in the United States, the combined propaganda of Germany and the Soviets has sown confusion in the minds even of well-meaning men of high standing.[1] They have actually forgotten that it was Germany who in 1914 made the decisive and irreparable decision by declaring

[1] Only a few months ago Mr. Frederick Bausman, a former member of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, wrote in an English publication that "a decided change" had taken place in American public opinion concerning the origins of the war. He quoted a pamphlet of Mr. Albert Jay Nock of New York, articles by Professor Sidney Fay, the German publications of Siebert, the Bolshevik "*Livre Noir*", speeches made before the American Senate in December, 1923, by Senator Robert L. Owen, and the commentaries of Mr. Frank H. Simonds, Professors Seymour of Yale, and Wright and Bernadotte Schmitt of Chicago. He recalled, too, the classification of national responsibilities which Professor Harry E. Barnes felt himself qualified to make: the primary guilt rests upon Austria, then upon Russia, then upon France; Germany, according to Mr. Barnes, wished on the contrary to avoid war.

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war on Russia and on France, that it was Germany who violated Belgian neutrality, invaded France and devastated ten departments in the north and northeast, and that it was Germany who exhibited such barbarity on land and sea that the United States of America felt called upon to enter the lists against her.

On July 6, 1922, in the French Chamber of Deputies, M. Herriot, then chief of the Opposition, answering a communist deputy who had expressed himself as in accord with Soviet accusations against me, said: "The point at issue is whether the Republic (and I am thinking both of the country and the governmental régime) could be held in any way, through the acts of its ministers or through its President, responsible in the very slightest degree for the abominable crime of 1914. I for my part answer unhesitatingly, No! This question, I confess, troubled my conscience, as it has doubtless troubled the conscience of others. I now have read all the documents that there are to read, I have gone through, page by page, the "*Livre Noir*" which has so often been quoted in debates here in the Chamber, and I may say that the conclusions which I have drawn from its perusal are not those of my communist interlocutor. Germany so far has not produced a single authentic document with any real proof against us." M. Herriot then referred to the categorical avowal in regard to France's pacific intentions made by the German Ambassador at Paris, Baron von Schoen, who in a telegram dated July 29, 1914, reported that in the view of M. Viviani, President of the Council, the best expedient would be "prompt and immediate recourse to mediation, no matter in what form." "Viviani," added Baron von Schoen, "refuses to give up hope for the maintenance of peace, which is honestly desired here (Paris)." In conclusion M. Herriot pointed out that it was inconceivable that so many free countries, and in particular the United States, should have been so extravagantly deceived when they threw in their lot with France in the struggle for an idea, for justice. "The American democracy," he cried, "was under the guidance of one of the most conscientious and clear-minded of the world's leaders, a man who for many months had been searching for the truth, weighing the evidence and ripening his great decision. Can we forget that he stood here on our French tribune, forget that from this tribune he announced to the whole world that right and justice lay on the side of France?"

And were they, too, mistaken, those other countries who in

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turn ranged themselves by the side of France and Belgium,—Great Britain, Japan, Italy, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, and Uruguay? And the states who were oppressed and downtrodden before the war and whom the war liberated, Poland and Jugo-slavia and Czechoslovakia, were they too deceived? And if all these people were deceived, what is the diabolic power which led them astray? Can it reside in one man or one nation?

In the July number of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, President Masaryk of the Czechoslovak Republic, set over against each other the political and social characteristics of pre-war France and pre-war Germany—imperial Germany, prussianized, accustomed to confound the ability to use force with the right to use it, an entire stranger to democratic customs and unacquainted with liberty: France, steeped in the doctrines of the French Revolution, familiar through long usage with the ideas of justice and equality, and free from warlike aspirations. He was right. The republican institutions of France are indeed conceived in such a manner that no one man can substitute his will for that of the people. No President of the Republic can act without the counter-signature of a minister and every minister is responsible to the Chambers for his actions. It would be a simple matter to show, year by year and point by point, that, before the war as since, the foreign policy of France has been carried on in the open and in complete accord with Parliament.

I have been somewhat astonished to find over the signature of one of my American academic critics a number of remarkable misstatements concerning men and events in France. He speaks of "the Poincaré clique" and alleges that in 1912 there came into power "the advocates of a strong France, prominent among them Poincaré, Delcassé, Millerand, Joffre, Jonnart, and Tardieu." Now as a matter of fact Jonnart did not become minister until 1913, in a cabinet presided over by M. Briand, now Foreign Minister in the "Left" cabinet of M. Painlevé; M. Tardieu was not even a deputy in 1912 or 1913, but a mere journalist; General Joffre was chief of staff before 1912, and he remained as such until the war, but his attitude was never open to criticism and he never attempted in any manner whatsoever to exert any political influence. And, finally, the cabinet of 1912, the formation of which was entrusted to me by President

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Fallières, comprised men like M. Briand, who was its Vice-President; M. Léon Bourgeois, one of the most active partisans of international arbitration and one of my most faithful friends; and M. Steeg, today Minister of Justice in the Painlevé cabinet, who like M. Briand and M. Léon Bourgeois was closely associated with the policy of my government, and who has always assumed his share of responsibility and has referred publicly to a remark of mine made one day at the Council of Ministers: "Even if I knew beforehand that war would bring us victory, I should attempt the impossible to prevent it." As to my subsequent conduct as President of the Republic, it was that of the head of a state who belonged to no party and felt it his constitutional duty to act the part of an arbiter between conflicting elements and to maintain the same reserved attitude as the King of England or of Italy. This is of course the very essence of the European parliamentary system. In consequence of this policy, I had as ministers under me republicans of every shade, such for example as, in 1913, M. Doumergue, now President of France; M. Caillaux, M. Renoult, who was in M. Herriot's cabinet only a short time ago; M. Malvy, M. Viviani and later, during the war, a number of Socialists. I may perhaps be allowed to add, since Messrs. Barnes and Bausman propose to call me to account, that if when I left the Elysée both Chambers, regardless of party and on the initiative of deputies like MM. Briand and Painlevé, voted an act declaring that I had deserved well of my country, it was tantamount to admitting that at no stage had I governed with a clique. Enough of personalities. Let us turn to ideas and facts.

The dominant idea is this: up to the month of August, 1914, France in every situation gave proof of the sincerity and permanence of her pacific intentions. The dominant fact is this: there is always a chance of avoiding war so long as it has not actually been declared, and it was Germany who declared war.

Of course, France had not forgotten and could not forget that in 1871 Germany had torn from her side a living piece of flesh, regardless of the cries of the inhabitants and the solemn protests of the representatives of Alsace and Lorraine in the National Assembly. It is vain to say that it was the Emperor Napoleon III who declared war. Yes, he did declare it after the publication of the mutilated telegram of Ems; and I admit that in spite of this attenuating circumstance he deserved to suffer the consequences of his wrong-doing. France disavowed and dethroned

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him. It was quite comprehensible for Germany to force the defeated nation to pay an indemnity,—which she did to the tune of five billions of francs. But nothing can justify Germany's adding to this severe punishment an attack upon the liberties of an unoffending and defenseless population. The rape of two provinces which had been incorporated in France for over two hundred years and which wished to remain French was a crime against the law of nations. To have passed the sponge of oblivion over so black a page of history would have been on France's part a complete abdication, a renouncement of sovereignty and a cowardly abandonment of her children. But the fact that she continued to think sorrowfully of those who had been torn from her did not mean that she dreamed for a single moment of delivering them by force of arms. The republicans of 1870 who in the defense of their invaded country girt on the fallen sword of a tottering Empire were no lovers of military glory. Quite the contrary, they were averse to it both by tradition and principle. They were sincere friends of peace. They tried to prevent their country's defeat. Having failed, and having also witnessed the defeat of justice, they withdrew into themselves and gleaned what comfort they could from Gambetta's famous phrase, that sooner or later would sound the hour of immanent justice. This consolation was certainly theoretical rather than practical. Yet they remained satisfied with it and never brooded over the idea of a war of revenge, nor did any of the old republicans—Gambetta, Jules Ferry or Freycinet—ever, even momentarily, pursue a policy that was anything but absolutely frank.

The generation which succeeded them inherited these pacific sentiments and abided by them. Germany turned her energies more and more toward the Germanization of Alsace and Lorraine. In spite of her persistence she did not achieve what she was after, but even if she had succeeded in making Alsace and Lorraine into a loyal German colony, the immorality of the conquest would have remained the same, for the assimilation, coming after forcible seizure and having been brought about by compulsion, would have been but a different form and prolongation of the initial violence. It was not to be expected that France could give her approval to such an infringement of her national rights. But, however painful it might be for her, she loved peace too much and knew too well how deeply she would

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suffer from any war ever to allow herself provocation or even indiscretion. And of all her citizens the most peaceful were those who lived near the new frontiers. They knew only too well that a war would expose them and their families and property to invasion and devastation. That brilliant German publicist, Maximilian Harden, realized this when he told his compatriots: "You may if you wish represent M. Poincaré as an abettor of all iniquity, but when you say that he is responsible for the war, it would be all too easy for him to prove the contrary, even without the testimony of outstanding men belonging to different political parties in different parts of the world. Poincaré did not want his Lorraine to become a battlefield again. He wanted to be a President of Peace."

Germany, after for years insisting that economic competition and colonial jealousies with England were the cause of the war, has suddenly changed her tune and now asserts that France, the ally of Russia, was at fault in not opposing the Eastern ambitions of the Tsarist Government, in allowing Russia a free hand and thus participating in a policy that led to the cataclysm.

In advancing so fantastic an explanation Germany quite forgets to show that the Franco-Russian alliance was merely a defensive display, rendered necessary by the Triple Alliance. Between 1871 and 1891 the German Empire had laid a firm basis for its hegemony over Europe. To accomplish this it had concluded a series of accords: in 1879 an alliance with Austria, in 1882 an alliance with Italy, in 1887 the "reinsurance treaty" with Russia. German ascendancy had reached such a point that there was no longer any independence or equilibrium in Europe. Peace meant German despotism and European servitude. An instinct of self-preservation made Europe cast about for a corrective. The first result was the Franco-Russian alliance which was negotiated under the Presidency of M. Carnot by M. de Freycinet and M. Ribot. It was of a strictly defensive nature as Article I clearly shows: "If France should be attacked by Germany or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany. If Russia is attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to fight Germany." All the documents relating to the negotiations and to the conclusion of this alliance, as well as to the military and naval annexed conventions, have been published in their entirety in a

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"*Livre Jaune*" and they admit of no misinterpretation. Other agreements to free Europe and the world from German domination followed the Franco-Russian rapprochement: the Franco-Italian agreements of 1900, the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904, and finally the Russo-Japanese, Anglo-Russian and Russo-Italian agreements. No one of these treaties was aggressive in character, no one was directed against Germany, but they had been concluded without her and to this extent set a limit to her imperialistic ambitions. None the less, Germany's policy continued to be dominated by the arrogant spirit which since the war of 1870 had led to the Franco-German incidents of 1875 and 1887, and which between 1905 and 1911 had constantly poisoned affairs in Morocco. After the insult of Tangiers came the threat of Agadir. Instead of being stung into action by these repeated provocations, France, in her desire for peace, signed, under the very cannon of the *Panther*, the treaty of November 4, 1911, and in exchange for liberty of action in Morocco made important territorial concessions in the Congo. In the early part of 1912, as head of the French Government, I saw the treaty through the Senate in spite of the opposition of M. Clemenceau, and I put into application its provisions in spite of continued intrigues which German agents such as Karl Ficke carried out in Morocco with the connivance of the Berlin cabinet. The Resident-General, General Lyautey, reported officially in 1914 that Germany was acting in Morocco exactly as if she were still in possession of the rights which she had forfeited by the treaty of 1911 and that she thus was keeping alive the germs of war.

On top of all this, hostilities broke out between the Balkan States and Turkey. As soon as she received the first inkling of this danger France did her best to prevent it. But she was not in a position to muzzle the dogs of war which others had let loose. The Italian expedition into Tripoli (begun in September, 1911), the many difficulties which it encountered, the persistence of the local resistance with which it met, the broader scope given it by the Italian Government, the occupation of the islands of the Dodecanese entailing a threat to the Dardanelles themselves—all had fired Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro with the determination to obtain from a weakened Turkey the reforms so long and so imperiously demanded by the Slavs and Greeks of Macedonia. Never indeed had the Ottoman administration

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been so shiftless and so mischief-making; everywhere the Christian populations were complaining of the way they were being treated. On January 17, 1912, with the idea of continuing its detestable practises more freely, the cabinet of Saïd Pasha had dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and proceeded under army surveillance to hold fake elections and thus set up a veritable despotism. It was at this moment that in the minds of the Balkan statesmen there took definite shape the plan to liberate their Macedonian brothers from the oppression of the Committee of Union and Progress. Pourparlers had taken place some months before between M. Venizelos and M. Gueschoff, between M. Rizoff and M. Pashitch. It was decided to strike while the iron was hot, and the conventions constituting the Balkan League were concluded at the end of May. It was not until the following August that France learned their actual contents, but beginning in January, 1912, alarming rumors from the Balkans had reached the ears of the French Government and they at once got in touch with Russia with a view to considering the various eventualities which Europe might have to face sooner or later in the East. Russia gave us assurances that she would abide by the territorial status quo in the Balkans. As the clouds loomed more threateningly on the horizon regular daily conversations took place among the Great Powers, including of course Germany and Austria-Hungary. This exchange of views is contained at length in a voluminous "*Livre Jaune*", the existence of which seems to be completely unsuspected by students of the Soviet documents, and which shows day by day what efforts France made for peace. But the course of events moved so rapidly that the agitation in the Balkans had reached an alarming point before the Great Powers could agree on any concerted program of reform. In the face of the approaching danger the French Government felt that while recommending the utmost patience and calm in Sofia, Belgrade, Athens, and Cetinje, it would be advisable to ask the Porte to carry out certain reforms. But the Porte continued to promise everything and to do nothing. In order to prevent a clash between Austria and Russia, and to emphasize the unanimity of European opinion, we suggested that these two Powers make a joint appeal to the Balkan States to be wise and maintain absolute calm. Unfortunately on the very day when this joint appeal was to be launched by Russia and Austria, Montenegro suddenly declared war on Turkey.

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From then on, of course, the European concert of nations altered its goal; having failed to prevent war, they turned all their energies to limiting its scope and duration. The French Government did all it could in support of this policy by keeping in constant touch with the Great Powers and by helping to organize the Conference of London, so ably and impartially presided over by the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey.

In this European conference, which she had worked so hard to establish, France played the rôle of a moderator. The instructions given M. Paul Cambon by the successive French Governments—my own, M. Briand's, M. Barthou's, M. Doumergue's—bear witness to this constant pacific influence. In a speech delivered on June 22, 1916, M. Tittoni, then Italian Foreign Minister, who had been Ambassador in Paris during the Balkan crisis, could truthfully say: "Everything that Austria asked for after the two Balkan Wars she obtained with the consent and support of all the Powers. It was in this way that Albania was created at Austria's request, its King designated by Austria, Montenegro obliged to give up Scutari, Serbia forced to abandon her claim to an outlet on the Adriatic, and the frontiers of Albania toward Serbia and Greece drawn at Austria's dictation." These triumphs were referred to by Count Berchtold himself in a speech on November 20, 1913, in which, after mentioning specific instances, he concluded: "We carried out the essential part of our program and safeguarded the peace of the Monarchy." And if more proof were needed it is supplied by Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador to Great Britain and designated to represent his Government at the London Conference, when he refers in his memoirs to the continued, often indiscreet, support given by Berlin to Vienna's claims. He states that Russia did not wish to drive the Sultan from Constantinople and that Germany compromised the whole situation by trying to extend her control to the shores of the Bosphorous. He declares that the Hohenzollern Empire moved toward a conflict with Russia, "viewing the Eastern Question through Austrian spectacles." He adds: "We supported, against our own economic interests, Austria's political interests, which aimed at the strangulation of Serbia." And again: "Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with prudence, calm and tact. Whenever a question threatened to become dangerous, he would propose a harmonious formula which was always just and always

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acceptable. His personality inspired equal confidence in all the negotiating parties. We had indeed once more come happily out of one of the numerous crises to which our policies constantly subjected us. Russia had been obliged to back down on every point, for she had in no instance been able to obtain satisfaction for her Serbian protégés; Albania had been created a vassal state to Austria; Serbia had been kept from the sea. In short, the whole Conference was another humiliation to Russia's dignity. Just as in 1878 and in 1908, once again we opposed Russia's ambitions, although Germany's interests were in no way at stake." Lichnowsky then makes reference to the conciliatory attitude of his Russian colleague, Ambassador Benckendorf, recalling his German origin and that consequently he was supposedly German in sympathies. "He was careful," he writes, "never to take too intransigent a stand on any question; and was supported in this by the attitude of France and Great Britain."

In the face of such positive proofs, proofs which correspond exactly with the French documents and the actual facts, what weight can be attached to the Soviet publications and the commentaries resulting from them? Maximilian Harden has drawn attention to the fact that there is no way of distinguishing in the Soviet diplomatic reports between objective truth and personal prejudice. As Mr. Richard Grelling observes, no one knows if the texts divulged to Germany by the Soviets in 1919 have been reproduced whole or piece-meal, nor is it known whether the French, English and German translations are correct. Mr. Grelling has brought to light what appear to be intentional mistakes and contradictions in the texts as they stand. But even admitting the authenticity of these documents, we French politicians find it hard not to shrug our shoulders when we find that the statements taken so seriously emanate from M. Isvolsky. The French Government felt so little confidence in the Russian Ambassador that in August, 1912, I made energetic representations about him to M. Kokovtzev, President of the Russian Council, asking for his recall. Of course, as he was the representative of a friendly nation we had to put up with him, but we looked upon him as quite capable of serving his own interests and, if it suited him, of garbling our conversations in his reports. Traces of our mistrust are quite apparent to anyone who reads the "*Livre Jaune*" and the "*Livre Noir*", and I feel sure that anyone

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who will take the trouble to peruse, page by page, the five large volumes of M. Friederich Stieve containing the Soviet documents will come to the same conclusions as did M. Herriot. I cannot, owing to lack of space, undertake to go into all the details of this matter here. A summary of M. Stieve's books has already been published by a French diplomat, M. Romieu. I am looking forward myself to publishing a detailed, complete study on the subject. It will show how well-founded were Prince Lichnowsky's estimates of events, and how, in the East as elsewhere, France was a sincere and faithful friend of peace.

As an indication of France's too blind obedience to Russia much has been made of the recall of our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, M. George Louis, who, it is claimed, was sacrificed unjustly to M. Isvolsky's whim. We need only consult the "*Livre Noir*" to find that it was not M. Isvolsky but M. Sazonov, Russia's Foreign Minister, who, rightly or wrongly, objected to M. George Louis. M. George Louis' health and his rather unusual reserve made it hard for him properly to fill a post which required untiring energy as well as great social gifts. After thoroughly examining the complaints made against him, I nevertheless refused to inflict upon him a rebuke which seemed quite unwarranted, as he had always professed to be in complete agreement with the policy of the French Government. Later on, when I was no longer President of the Council and before I had become President of France, M. Briand, who had become Premier, and M. Jonnart, Minister of Foreign Affairs, decided that M. Louis' health was so impaired as to prevent his properly fulfilling his duties and he was placed on the retired list. A few months ago M. Jonnart published the reasons for this decision. It was made, by his and M. Briand's request, at a Council meeting presided over by M. Fallières and which I did not attend. Upon his return to France, more and more broken in health and perhaps a little soured in spirit, M. Louis had the ill fortune to enter a *milieu* made up in part of defeatists and adventurers. This accounts for his admitting to his inner circle a most questionable financier, Bolo Pasha, to whom Germany had paid many millions of francs and who (as the result of unimpeachable evidence secured by the American Department of Justice) was condemned and shot as a traitor. So taken in was he by Bolo that George Louis offered to vouch for his patriotism and probity.

After having during his lifetime given so sorry an example of

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his lack of discrimination, the ex-Ambassador entrusted to friends who approved his stand during the latter days of his life the task of showing after his death that he had been the innocent victim of a government's caprice. A journalist against whom M. Clemenceau brought a charge of intelligence with the enemy, who escaped across the frontier, who was condemned in default of defense, and who, returning to France after many years of exile, managed to secure an acquittal after the war was over, has published a correspondence attributed to M. Louis. This book was announced in Germany before it appeared here and no one has been able to verify its authenticity. If these conversations do really emanate from the pen of M. Louis, I fear that we are forced to conclude that his intellect had become even more clouded than his ill-considered testimony in favor of Bolo had led us to believe. The documents published under his name consist of conversations which he alleges to have had with politicians and diplomats from 1914 to 1917. They might justly be entitled "Dialogues of the Dead"; and if the interlocutors are no longer here to protest, the opinions attributed to them are contradicted by everything that they ever wrote while they were alive. Those few who still linger among the living have one and all been at pains categorically to deny their alleged remarks—as for example M. Stephen Pichon, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. Jules Cambon, ex-Ambassador to Germany; and M. Paleologue, ex-Minister to Russia. M. Daeschner, now our Ambassador in Washington, who in 1912 was my *chef de cabinet* and one of my most valuable collaborators, has found glaring misstatements in these documents. M. Daeschner knows better than anyone else how tenaciously we fought for peace and the purely political reasons which obliged MM. Briand and Jonnart to put an end to the mission of M. Louis.

An administrative incident of this kind could of course in no way influence France's diplomatic policies. With or without M. Louis, France's policies remained unalterably pacific and no sympathy toward imaginary Russian ambitions ever turned us from the paths of peace. And besides, the results of the Conference of London put an end to all of such discussions. In consequence at least in part of France's efforts, the status in the Balkans remained as Austria desired it and she expressed her complete satisfaction officially. Germany had been a contributing factor in this success of her "brilliant second." The Triple

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Alliance had been renewed by anticipation on December 5, 1912. On March 24 and 29, 1913, Emperor William II had stopped on the *Hohenzollern* at Pola and Venice and reviewed the Austrian fleet and visited the Italian. A few weeks later King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who was on very intimate terms with the Hapsburg Monarch and who shortly afterwards was to range himself on the side of the Triple Alliance, gave General Savoff the order to attack the Serbs on the Vardar on the night of June 29–30. Ferdinand of Coburg had received an assurance from Vienna that the King of Rumania, Carol I of Hohenzollern, would come to his aid in consideration of certain specific concessions. These rosy schemes of Vienna and her Bulgarian ally were frustrated by the head of the Rumanian Government, Také Jonescu, who launched the army not against Serbia but against the conspiring Bulgars. At the end of two weeks King Ferdinand was beaten and a new Congress of Peace met at Bucharest. It was then that Austria made up her mind to take determined measures against her small neighbor, Serbia, whose proximity was a source of constant anxiety. The Dual Monarchy was in truth a tyrannous and precarious system, based entirely on the supremacy of the Austrian Germans and the Magyars and the subordination of all the Slavs of the Empire. Vienna and Budapest instinctively distrusted the attraction which independent Serbia might exercise over her brother Slavs. Therefore in July, 1913, Austria-Hungary communicated to the Italian Government, as also to Germany, her intention to act against Serbia, and, in order to involve Italy, she defined this enterprise as "a defensive action." M. Giolitti and the Marquis di San Giuliano at once characterized the proposal as "an extremely dangerous adventure" and refused to have anything to do with it. This attempted attack of 1913 casts a sinister light on the events of the following year.

Nevertheless, the world was at peace at the time of the Sarajevo murder. The immediate determining causes of the war must therefore be sought in the conduct of the various European nations after this tragedy.[2]

Thoroughly dissatisfied with the Treaty of Bucharest and realizing that the national aspirations of the Southern Slavs

[2] An eminent French historian, M. Pierre Renouvin, has made a conscientious study of these causes in his lectures before the student body of the University of Paris. He has examined the arguments advanced in different countries with scrupulous care, he has given deep consideration to the claims of Germany's defenders, and has just published his conclusions in a remarkable book. It shows no trace of passion or resentment, but exposes to the pitiless light of day the guilt of the Central Empires.

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constituted a menace to the maintenance of her artificial and fragile Empire, Austria eagerly seized upon the assassination at Sarajevo as an opportunity to eliminate Serbia as a political factor. At first Germany did not disapprove of this dangerous scheme. Quite the contrary, on July 5 Emperor William II and his Chancellor knowingly gave their adhesion to Austria's plan. They pretended not to know the details of its execution; they took no part in drawing up the ultimatum to Serbia; but they knew its general meaning and scope, and, far from restraining, egged Austria on. The ultimatum was to be so drawn as to make Serbia's humiliation complete and Count Berchtold certainly hoped that a local war would result. I do not claim that Austria or Germany, in this first phase, had a conscious thought-out intention of provoking a general war. No existing document gives us the right to suppose that, at that time, they had planned anything so systematic. Perhaps they did fondly imagine that Europe would watch unmoved the annihilation of Serbia, that Russia would limit her interference to diplomatic representations, and that England and France would give way, as they had given way before to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, even so, the Central Empires from the beginning had taken into account the fact that the despatch of a threatening note to Belgrade might result in action by Russia and they were decided to run the attendant risks. They had of course staked everything on England's neutrality.

Their first thesis therefore consisted in saying: "This is a special quarrel between Austria and Serbia. The quarrel concerns them alone. No one has the right to interfere in it." Germany saw to it that Austria was left free to act. M. Sazonov suggested entering into negotiations with Austria. "No," said Austria, "my affairs are none of your business." The Great Powers suggested a conference. "No," said Germany, "this matter concerns Austria alone." And William added: "In a vital matter one does not consult outsiders." In order to prevent every attempt at mediation, Count Berchtold brought matters to a head by declaring war on Serbia on July 28. Did Germany ask Austria to delay? Did she advise calm and patience? Far from it. She allowed her "brilliant second" to declare war, in other words to perform the first irreparable act in the long and bloody series yet to come. Was not this the time to invoke the old maxim: *principiis obsta?* Obviously, neither Berlin nor

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Vienna could suppose the Russians would lightly pass over such an act of brutality against a small Slav state, particularly when the state in question had just replied to the ultimatum in the most conciliatory terms, and publicly condemned the crime of Printsip and Tchabrinovitch, and had promised Austria to take the most severe and reassuring measures. By their common action on July 27 Germany and Austria therefore did everything to make a European War possible. They had cast the fatal die. It could no longer be recalled by scruples or by any form of mere regrets.

It was because I feared the incalculable consequence of the first act of violence that on Tuesday, July 21, at a reception in St. Petersburg to the members of the diplomatic corps, I called the attention of the Austrian Ambassador to Russia, Count Szapary, to the sinister complications which an ill-considered act on the part of his country might precipitate. At this time I knew nothing, of course, of the contents of the Austrian note, but rumor had it that the terms were very harsh. The trip which I had undertaken in Russia, and which was to extend to Sweden, Denmark and Norway, had been determined upon in the preceding January by M. Doumergue's cabinet. It had been modeled on similar trips of all my predecessors as President of France. However tense the situation might be after the Sarajevo murder, the French Government had decided that it was wiser not to postpone my visit so as not to increase the anxiety of Europe. But, as proved by the German and Austrian documents published since the Russian Revolution, the two Governments of Vienna and Berlin had arranged to delay the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia until I had left Russia. I suppose that they wanted to avoid giving M. Viviani, my Foreign Minister, who accompanied me, an opportunity to consult with M. Sazonov. And indeed from July 23 to 29, except for a short stop at Stockholm, the President of France and her Foreign Minister were in mid-seas with only scanty information from often indecipherable radiograms.

In Paris, M. Bienvenu Martin, now president of the most advanced group in the Senate, filled the functions of Minister of Justice and Vice-President of the Council. He was in constant communication with Great Britain and joined in all London's efforts to avert war. But, as was of course to be expected, Austria's aggression had caused tremendous feeling in Russia.

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On July 29 Russia informed the Powers that she was proceeding to a partial mobilization against Austria. She hoped by this to prevent the complete collapse of Serbia, which would have entailed a revision of the Treaty of Bucharest. It is true that Austria assured the Government of St. Petersburg that she herself contemplated no territorial annexation, but she made no promises regarding the partition of Serbia and its possible distribution between her clients, Albania and Bulgaria. The Austrian Ambassadors in Rome and London had in fact given it to be understood that such a partition was contemplated. Russia's partial mobilization was therefore nothing but her reply to the Austrian declaration of war and to the strong suspicions engendered by it.

It is a fact that the attitude of the German Government underwent a slight change just at the end. Up to the close of the day of the 27th, Germany had given Austria wholehearted support which could only be interpreted as encouragement. Germany had clung tenaciously to the theory of localization—not to interfere and to let things take their course. Serbia was to receive one of those magisterial lessons which William II flamboyantly clamored for in his annotations. But on the 28th, coming to the sudden realization that things were not turning out as they had been planned, the German Government began to fear that its bluff was being called and made a tardy attempt to bring the run-away car to a standstill. On the 28th, the Imperial Chancellor advised Count Berchtold not to reject entirely the possibility of merely taking some security of good faith from Serbia. It was the fear of England which was bringing her to her senses. During the night of July 28–29 Germany pressed her new views rather more strongly. "If the war is to become a general one," wrote Bethmann, "it is absolutely essential that Russia should bear the onus of it." Vienna received these unexpected suggestions with great ill-humor. She had on the 28th broken off the direct negotiations begun on the 26th with Russia at the initiative of M. Sazonov because Count Berchtold was only willing to carry on "an academic discussion on generalities." Austria was no more disposed merely to accept securities of good faith from Serbia than to accept mediation. What was more serious was that the evasive answers of Vienna had had their repercussions in Berlin. The General Staff and the military clique surrounding the Emperor (for it was in

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monarchical Germany and not in republican France that a military clique held sway) had found new courage to combat the Chancellor's changed attitude. M. Bethmann-Hollweg at first resisted, but finally gave way during the evening of the 30th. He agreed to cancel the instructions sent to the Ambassador at Vienna, M. Tschirschky, and he contented himself with forwarding to the Austro-Hungarian Government a telegram from the King of England without comment of any kind upon its vital significance.

On the evening of the 30th, then, Germany, like Austria, went back to the policy of the mailed fist. At that time she did not know of the ukase ordering general mobilization in Russia. This mobilization was therefore not responsible for the German Government's return to the paths of war laid out by the General Staff; the responsibility rests upon the all-powerful military spirit of Berlin.

Could the Russian mobilization in any event be considered as of an aggressive nature? It must not be forgotten that, technically, a partial mobilization causes great confusion among the workmen on the inadequately manned railroads and thus makes a possible general mobilization more difficult. It must also not be forgotten that in Russia, whose immense territory was far less densely populated than Austria or Germany, mobilization and concentration were slow affairs. A head-start of several days' mobilization could not by any means put Russia on an equal footing with Austria. And in any event German superiority was assured. M. Sazonov had many times repeated, and the Tsar himself had written to "Willy," that mobilization did not mean war and that the army would remain with arms grounded. At the very worst, as a last resort, Germany could always have mobilized her army without declaring war and have then continued the interrupted parleys. She would thus have retained her advantage over Russia and yet not wrecked all chances of peace.

On the contrary, however, Germany hastened to bring about the irreparable. Why? Because such was the wish of the General Staff. And it is here that the real difference between the French and the German régimes becomes apparent. In France, when the threat of a general war seemed to call for mobilization, the General Staff requested the Government to order it. The Government answered that it preferred to delay a little longer.

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The decree was postponed twenty-four hours and General Joffre obeyed. Once mobilization was decreed, M. Viviani, so as to avoid any incidents which might lead to bloodshed and thus provoke war, decided, with the consent of the President of France, to withdraw the French troops ten kilometers from the frontier. The General Staff regarded such a proceeding with the utmost disfavor, as being likely to put us in a strategically bad position. The order was given nevertheless. The General Staff carried it out at once. They are accustomed to respect the civil government and do not try to usurp its prerogatives. In Germany in 1914 it was the General Staff who controlled everything, and they were the prisoners of their own plan of campaign. Moltke had prepared a sudden offensive in the west. France was to be invaded through Belgium, the civil populations were to be terrorized, our army was to be dealt with before England should have time to come to our assistance, and the more slow-moving Russians were then to be annihilated. On July 26 the German General Staff had already drawn up the Belgian ultimatum. The violation of Belgian neutrality was an essential part of the plan of campaign. When the Chancellor, under the sway of the military clique, finally characterized as a "scrap of paper" one of the most solemn treaties of our time, he merely gave a striking expression to the abiding conviction of the General Staff. In only one eventuality were France and Belgium to be spared—in the event of their remaining neutral. The Chancellor therefore ordered his Ambassador at Paris, Baron von Schoen, imperiously to demand neutrality from the French cabinet. Even should France be willing to tear up her defensive alliance and agree not to assist Russia, even should she express a willingness to withdraw completely from a struggle involving all the issues of the European balance of power, Germany was nevertheless to exact tangible guarantees. Baron von Schoen was directed to say: "Hand over to us, for the duration of the war, the fortified places of Toul and Verdun. We will return them to you later on when we have beaten Russia."

Germany has been so successful in plunging into darkness even the memory of these many facts that certain people actually believe that she is less responsible for the war than Russia or France. Did France draw up military plans for a sudden attack involving the violation of Belgian neutrality? Did she put herself deliberately, beforehand, in a position where she had to

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declare war and had to tear to shreds an international treaty bearing her own signature? Let no one say: "It was the German General Staff who drew up the plans, not the German Government." No, it was not the Government; but the Government was cognizant of the plans, had approved them, had assumed responsibility for them and knew whither these plans would lead if the general situation grew threatening. It is therefore of little import that the Government should have declared war only because it was committed beforehand to a certain line of action. The Government was not obliged to adopt any such program; it did adopt it, in spite of all risks. William himself foresaw the consequence, as is proved by the entry on August 1 of one of his all-too-famous annotations: "So if we do not respect Belgian neutrality, England attacks and Italy deserts us, that is the situation in a nutshell! So there is another betrayal by our Allies!" Why had Germany brought herself to the edge of such a precipice? Her fault was the price which she had to pay for a military and autocratic régime. Perhaps she would never have committed it had she ever known liberty.

Mobilization is not aggression. Else Austria, whose army remained mobilized during the greater part of the Balkan Wars, was the aggressor against Serbia. The aggressor is the one who renders inevitable the first shot, in other words the nation who first declares war. An aggression is even more clearly characterized when the nation who declares war suddenly breaks off negotiations which are under way and, taking advantage of its more rapid mobilization, is able, because of its precipitate action, to obtain strategic advantages over the nation which it attacks.

Imperial Germany is guilty because she did not try to prevent Austria from attacking Serbia. She is guilty because on the contrary she manœuvred so that Europe should leave Serbia alone face to face with its powerful neighbor. She is guilty because having for a time, through belated fear of Great Britain, gone back on her first counsels of violence and made feeble attempts at moderation, she returned, as the Scriptures say, to her vomit. She is guilty because without being forced by anything except strategic considerations she set a torch to the powder houses of Europe by declaring a senseless war on Russia and then on France. Against these unalterable truths the gates of hell themselves shall not prevail.

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THE SHANGHAI AFFAIR AND AFTER

By G.

NOW the storm that has raged along the Pacific coast of China—from Hong-kong to Tientsin, and up the Yangtse Valley, penetrating the almost impregnable gorges to the province of Szechuan—is subsiding into a drizzle; the causes, immediate and remote, that led to the unfortunate incident at Shanghai and set the whole nation aflame and the entire world pondering over a solution, are gradually emerging; and its effects, present and future, national and international, are approaching a stage which does not absolutely defy estimate and prophesy. We are in a position, then, to obtain a comprehensive view of the whole affair. For the last two months the march of events has been so rapid and yet so zigzag as to present an impression at once of progress and retrogression. From the maze of news reports the public has extracted little but confusion and uncertainty. Yet if one is able to grasp the fundamentals and quit roaming the by-paths of the mysterious oriental labyrinth the Chinese situation is not inexplicable. These fundamentals we shall first attempt to summarize. In the light of the findings, an estimate can probably be made of the bearings of the Shanghai affair upon the national aspirations of the Chinese and upon the international relationship of the world. Finally, we shall discuss the projected Customs Conference and the Extra-Territoriality Commission, upon the result of which depends so much of China's fate, America's prestige, and world peace.

I

In the present world it is impossible to achieve isolation, either by force or by peace. Thus, in the company of everything that is undesirable and perhaps wretched, industrialism, with its wake of quantity production at the expense of those who have to live and labor, is able to blaze the trail from Manchester to Shanghai. In the West exploitation has had to diminish, for the West has had enough of it—almost a hundred years. But East of Suez capital has found good soil. Through all the dust that has been stirred up by the killing of demonstrating students, through the flames that have been fanned ablaze by Chinese

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nationalism, we may see, indistinctly but certainly, the grim struggle between capital and labor, with the British and the Japanese bearing the full share of responsibility for capital—this time.

The conditions in the Shanghai Cotton Mills are deplorable. It was for the amelioration of these conditions and the increase of wages that the workers in certain Japanese-owned mills had struck. The strikers were arrested and later sentenced to imprisonment by the Mixed Court. The issue involved, therefore, comes to this: Has the worker the right to strike with a view to bettering his position? If he has it elsewhere, he ought to have it in China and above all in Shanghai, in the opinion of labor the world over, even in England. Mr. Brockway, General Secretary of the Independent Labor Party in England, said in a letter published in the London *Times* on June 15, 1925: "One step is both urgent and easy—the enforcement in the Treaty Ports of modern labor legislation. Where European flags fly, and European guns are responsible for keeping order, we ought to insist that capital shall observe European standards of humanity."

It is certainly no European standard of humanity to pay skilled labor 30 to 60 cents a day and unskilled from 7 to 50,[1] fully allowing for the difference in the standard of living. More pathetic is the picture of children of both sexes, between the ages of 10 and 14, toiling for a few pennies a day—and a day in these cotton mills means either twelve or fourteen hours. Even an innocuous Anti-Child Labor Law was blocked by the Shanghai ratepayers through the lack of a quorum, the Japanese intentionally abstaining from attending the meeting. Legislation along the lines of a Workman's Compensation Act is remoter than a dream.

Such a state of affairs may be concealed for a certain length of time, but not indefinitely. And its disclosure has called forth the sympathetic attitude of labor everywhere. Mr. A. B. Swales, Chairman of the General Council of the British Trades Union Congress, lodged a vigorous protest with Premier Baldwin against the use of British armed forces for the suppression of "the legitimate aspirations of the Shanghai workers."[2] Fifty labor delegates of forty-two nations, attending the International Labor Conference at Geneva, on June 5, 1925, sent a telegram to

[1] *Christian Science Monitor*, June 9, 1925.

[2] *Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., June 6, 1925.

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the Chinese laborers, expressing their sympathy because of the Shanghai incident.[3] More was expected of the American Federation of Labor, and more it did. In a letter addressed to President Coolidge, and published on July 13, Mr. William Green, President of the Federation, asked for the convening by the United States of an International Conference "to make plans to abolish extra-territorial rights in China." Further, he said: "Because of the fact that present political provocations have paralleled the coming of trade unions in Chinese industrial development, and the struggle of Chinese wage earners for industrial justice and civil rights is projected into the international problem, it is most important and necessary for fully balanced consideration of the whole question that representatives of wage earners participate in this inquiry. We urge that the initiative be taken by the Government of the United States in calling an economic conference to consider the Chinese situation, and that this provision for labor representation be incorporated in the conference invitation extended to the countries. Ratification of the Washington treaties by France makes a strategical opportunity for such action."

The significance of the attitude of the labor unions of the West can hardly be over-estimated. It is a sign of a world union of the proletariat. It goes far deeper than the mere rubles that have gone to Shanghai from Moscow for the support of the idle strikers; for, be it founded or otherwise, the accusations of Russian malice and motive enters into the latter transaction. Capital, in penetrating the East, carries with it the "superiority complex"; but labor comes only in the interest of its class and on terms of equality. Such a belief is substantiated by the words and deeds of the Laborites in the English Parliament. George Lansbury and Johnston did not heckle the Government just for fun; and Ramsay MacDonald came out with a direct statement that it was the Government's business not only to protect life but to secure a remedy for the serious political problems of China.

II

No incident that reaches the proportions of the Shanghai affair can be explained comprehensively unless all the phases are paraded before us; and the struggle against the tyranny of capitalism is only one of the phases.

[3] *New York Times*, June 6, 1925.

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Before proceeding further, it will simplify matters if we minimize the "inspired" news reports of Bolshevik complications and dismiss the idea of the alarmists that the present uprising is another Boxer Rebellion, an anti-foreign and anti-Christian movement. True may it be that the Bolsheviks have been aiding the labor unions of China and fomenting trouble; that they have a hold on certain radical elements of the students; that they have openly subscribed to the strike fund of Shanghai. But to link the agile Karakhan's activities directly to the Shanghai affair is not susceptible to proof, and is an insult to the initiative and patriotism of "Young China." Recall the student movements that have occurred during the last decade and their effectiveness in directing not only public opinion but also governmental policies. In the students we find the momentum; and there we may end the search, for nothing is behind the scene. This is no denial that many in China are prone to accept Russian sympathy as well as material assistance. "When a fellow *needs* a friend," he will take any who will sympathize with and assist him, be he communist or autocrat. In the words of General Feng Yu Hsiang: "The Bolshevik propaganda is blazed out to scare the Western public. I term it nonsense. When we appeal for justice and the Western Powers answer us with gunboats, it is natural that my countrymen will welcome any kind of allies."

This picture of helplessness is rather pathetic; it is, however, all too true. It is said that China can never become communistic herself, although she lends herself, at times, and through necessity, to the ends of communism. As to that, only time will tell the tale.

Just as many conscientiously believe in the presence of a red trail across the Siberian plains and through the Great Wall there even are some who have succumbed to the scare of a repetition of what happened in 1900. But the direction of the boycott against only British and Japanese goods is enough evidence that China has since learned to discriminate between friends and enemies. Her outspoken friendship for the United States and the latter's sympathetic response less than a month after the outbreak dissipates once and for all the idea that China still looks askance upon all white men alike and holds all of them responsible for the wanton acts of the subjects of certain nations.

Events of recent years seem to indicate that an anti-Christian

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movement is on foot; but these events are far more part of China's rising nationalism than a result of religious feeling. How can there be religious persecution in a country where Buddhism, Taoism, Mohammedanism, and Confucianism have flourished side by side for centuries? If there is any nation in the world that can pride herself on her religious tolerance, it is China. It is not Christianity to which many of China's intelligentsia are opposed, it is hypocrisy. Christian individuals and nations have not even attempted justification of acts that a heathen would not imagine doing. China needs no anti-Christian leaders or followers; she has enough of mercenary, haughty, and religionless Christians in the Treaty Ports to offset the arduous and self-sacrificing missionaries in the interior. Whatever the situation may be, it is certain that the Chinese people are demanding the punishment of Everson, who gave the order of "shoot to kill," not because he is a Christian. Religion has as much to do with the theory of relativity as with the Shanghai affair.

"The present situation is due to a complicated series of causes out of which one outstanding feature emerges—the growing power of the nationalist movement in China," said Lloyd George. Chamberlain admitted in Parliament the existence of an underlying cause, and he no doubt also meant nationalism. Nationalism means advocacy of national interest, unity and independence. More concretely and for China it means the revision of "unequal" treaties. For this every youth in China strives; for well he knows that it is already a difficult task for old China to rejuvenate herself without a burdensome yoke, hampering at every turn. At her very throat is Shanghai—an ever-tightening international grip. Many sore spots have to be eased before China can return to normal; the sorest of all, and needing immediate attention, is Shanghai itself—a city that manifests all that is undesirable in extra-territoriality.

Shanghai, speaking of only the International Settlement, has a population of approximately one million; out of this number about 22,000 are foreigners. But it has been, and still is, governed by a Municipal Council consisting of members of British, American and Japanese nationality, elected by foreign ratepayers. Three-fourths of the population, therefore, are paying taxes without a voice in the government of the municipality. It was not until very recently that an Advisory Committee of Chinese members was set up; the name itself, however, clearly

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indicates its power, or rather, its lack of power. During the recent strike the Advisory Committee resigned. Litigations of any kind in the Settlement go to the Mixed Court, which is only "Mixed" in name, for to all intents and purposes it is foreign controlled. It was this Court that sentenced the strikers to imprisonment. Its justice can be doubted on two grounds. The Court in the first place is a machinery of and for the capitalists; secondly, it is the representative of the foreign oppressor, cloaked in the robe of a judge who is by reason and inclination against the native oppressed. During the trial of the "rioters" of the recent Shanghai strike the Court was guarded by armored cars and machine guns, and a cordon of Sikh police was thrown around the premises. There will be no justice if there is intimidation of the judge; will there be justice if there is intimidation of the judged and the public that is outside the walls of the court-room? This Court, the Municipal Council, and above all the general attitude that is most prevalent in the foreign colony of Shanghai that China and the Chinese are only to be exploited and bullied but not to be associated with—all these have constantly been pricking China's pride, swelling China's hatred, hastening the progress of China's nationalism. However elastic Chinese temperament may be, it has its limitations, and it needs some outlet when it reaches fever point. The mine had long been set in place; the Sikh policemen on May 30 merely switched on the control pursuant to their master's orders.

People on the American side of the Pacific can hardly picture to themselves the city of Shanghai and its International Settlement; for such a parallel situation is not to be found elsewhere in the world. But if we can imagine Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and Germany appropriating for themselves a strip of New York City from river to river, between Wall Street and Times Square, and calling it their own, with Long Island as their residential section,—flying above it their own flags, policing it with their own soldiers and establishing there their own courts—we will understand why China calls it a grievance.

The West is only beginning to learn that power can be generated from agencies other than battleships, tanks, and bombing planes; Japan has learned it through her own Twenty-one Demands and all the infamy that was done at the Paris Peace Conference. Although, if responsibility were to be fixed, Japan would bear an unpleasantly large portion, the Shanghai trouble

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having started from mills owned by her nationals, she has throughout the course of the incident been riding the fence, with a slight inclination toward professing sympathy for China. Considering her traditional imperialistic and aggressive policy towards her continental neighbor, this is decidedly the most passive attitude Japan has ever shown. She desires no increase of China's hatred; she covets England's China trade—this is the whole secret in a nutshell. She has been pulling celestial chestnuts out of the fire for others to share; she has many a time burned her claws; it is time for Great Britain to do some pulling and to get burned. There is no other explanation for the action of a well-known Japanese publicist like Mr. Kawakami in championing China's cause,[4] or for the Japanese Government's unhesitating response to America's desire for customs and extra-territoriality conferences.

The power that is generated from nationalism is at once vague and definite. It is definite when there is an occasion. It is the power of nationalism that has united the north and south at a time when civil wars are imminent; it is the power of nationalism that has converted a local industrial unrest into a national anti-imperialistic movement; it is the power of nationalism that has tied up practically all shipping in the ports along the China coast; it is the power of nationalism that (as this is written) has been sustaining the general strike of 35,000 men at Shanghai for almost ten weeks and without signs of weakening; and it is the power of nationalism that is pressing for a justifiable settlement of the Shanghai affair and an equitable revision of unequal treaties. There is the reason for China's unwavering stand. It is the concourse of all contributory causes that has set the whole nation aflame and will keep it aflame until the victory of justice.

III

We have seen the causes—remote and immediate—of the Shanghai affair, and incidently the effect upon China as a nation. The international aspect is more complicated than it seems. And what enters most, though it seems subtlest, is the Russo-British relationship. With the exception, perhaps, of American questions, all questions of an international character revolve on this axis.

The most menacing to British interests in China is not the

[4] *Baltimore Sun*, July 10, 1925.

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competitor but the agitator, and the latter is Russia. Be it from the motive of genuine friendship or self-aggrandizement, Russia wants two things and decides to get them at all costs. First, she wishes China to fall in line with Russia regarding the theory of Government and State. Secondly, she wishes equality in China with all the other foreign nations. The first project would probably fail; for China lacks all the essentials that would help the establishment of Communism; and, above all, the lack of private capital that could be appropriated. Furthermore, the veneration of private ownership is too deeply intrenched to be uprooted. The flocking of radicals to the red flag is less an acceptance of the Bolshevik standard than the manifestation of dissatisfaction over prevailing conditions due to actions of the capitalistic nations. As to the second, Russia might meet with success. Russia has given up all her privileges; she wants others to give them up too. This attitude coincides with the national aspiration of China. Karakhan is, therefore, bound to have a following. What can be more repugnant than this to Great Britain?

At the very start of the trouble at Shanghai the British focused their attention on Russia and the Russians. The Dosser Case, the wholesale arrest of Russian communists and a Soviet colonel following the burning of the Nikka Cotton Mills, the guarding of the Russian Consulate at Shanghai, and other acts—warranted or unwarranted—indicate the Britisher's desire to stamp out Russian propaganda when the occasion comes.

While Shanghai was in the grip of the general strike and boycott, Moscow and London were flaying each other so severely that the tension was brought almost to a breaking point. The following words of Leon Trotsky hit the "imperialistic" nations —England in particular: "What is the use of sending to the East and to the West secret agents with Moscow gold in one pocket and poison and dynamite in the other, when such agents cannot accomplish a thousandth part of the revolutionary educational work done by foreign capitalists and by the foreign press in China."[5]

The most sensitive or the most guilty as a rule will answer a blow directed against the group of which he forms a part. Baldwin and Chamberlain did everything short of actually severing diplomatic relations with Russia. This might have

[5] *New York Times*, June 7, 1925.

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happened had not France and Japan been so non-committal. However we may discredit the talk of a triple alliance of England, France, and Japan, it is clear that England does not wish to play a lone hand, in spite of the fact that she has been doing so almost from the beginning. The rejection and suppression by Baldwin of the report of the Diplomatic Committee of Investigation, of which M. de Martel, the French Minister at Peking, was the chairman, was too big a stone to swallow. And the theory that the Moroccan War was due to Soviet agents apparently did not serve successfully as an anti-dose. Japan, as we have remarked, has decided to observe from the fence. And the United States, the traditional friend of China, finds no cause to change her course.

The policy of the United States Government and the attitude of her nationals in China certainly need to be viewed in perspective, for looking at them from close range we see nothing but incompatibilities. In the silence of official Washington, at the beginning of the Shanghai affair, we distantly heard the landing of American marines, the activities of American nationals —Viola Smith, Assistant U. S. Trade Commissioner, was organizing a women's defense corps; Stirling Fessenden, an American, was the Chairman (and still is) of the Municipal Council that was said to be responsible for the shooting; and Thomas F. Millard, in a warning tone, sent the following despatch: "Washington should prepare to meet an extension of anti-foreignism throughout China with its attendant peril to missionaries and residents outside of the ports." Most surprising of all, the American Association in China on June 25 sent the following resolution to the State Department: "The American Association in China urges upon the American Government energetic coöperation with the other Powers and the adoption of the strongest attitude and representation to the Chinese Government to suppress the present state of lawlessness directed against foreigners which, in our opinion, is due primarily to long-existing unsettled political conditions and aggravated by Soviet propaganda; and that China shall be held strictly responsible for losses of life, property and business incident to the present situation. Absolute observance of existing treaties is essential, until modified through the orderly processes provided by the Washington Conference."[6]

But on the American side of the Pacific we could at once see

[6] *Christian Science Monitor*, June 25, 1925.

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that public opinion was, as always, in sympathy with China. And what is more, American sympathy does not stop short at lip service. The Government of the United States proceeded to action along the same path that John Hay had once trod. Before his departure for the Orient to take up his post in China, the new Minister, John V. A. MacMurray, reiterated unequivocably the American policy of "optimism and tolerance." Senator Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, in the early stage of the Shanghai affair had scented "doctored" accounts, a fact which has since been more or less verified and which tends in a way to explain the incompatibility of the American attitude in China and that in this country. On June 10, a brief declaration was made by him openly, advising foreigners to keep out of China. Most significant of all is the statement issued by him a week later. He is opposed to intervention by United States; he is in favor of the withdrawal of extra-territorial privileges. In his own words: "I see no reason why the United States should be drawn into any controversy or conflict with Chinese authorities or the Chinese people. Doubtless the situation, as you say, is serious, but not serious by reason of any acts or policies of the United States, and it is not to be presumed that we will be drawn into controversies of other powers. The United States has not evinced any imperialistic designs in China, and I venture to believe the American people as a whole would like to see the national rights and interests of China fully respected. Personally I would favor the withdrawal of extra-territorial rights in China as speedily as practicable, and a policy adopted by all which would respect the territorial integrity and national rights of a great people."

This statement, indirectly at least, settles the policy of the United States. Although Congressman Porter, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, made no public statement, his past actions can be interpreted in no other way than friendliness to China. The return of the remaining part of the Boxer Indemnity was largely due to his efforts. And his spirit of coöperation with and assistance to China at the two International Opium Conferences held at Geneva last winter speaks louder than words.

In such a political atmosphere at Washington, and with the Washington Conference in the close background, Secretary Kellogg has had no choice as to the policy he should take towards

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China with respect to the Shanghai affair. The only question has been how to compromise American friendship, British hostility and stubbornness, and Chinese nationalism. As to France and Japan, they had become neutral before the United States entered the arena. What little opposition was later encountered in bringing about the consent of these two Powers to the calling of the Customs Conference and the Extra-Territoriality Commission was due on the one hand to misunderstandings in Paris and on the other to the desire of Tokio to camouflage her readiness in leaving Great Britain behind.

Before we proceed further, let us attempt some explanations for the divergence between the American point of view in China and in Washington. It has already been suggested that there have been certain agencies working towards misrepresentation. On the one hand they misrepresent America in China, and on the other they misrepresent China in America. Almost two months after the first shooting, on July 22, 1925, the following appeared in the Washington *Post:* "In the midst of the acute trouble in China and while the American attitude was a matter of speculation on all sides, President Coolidge was represented, in dispatches purporting to come from Washington, as placing the blame for the Shanghai shooting squarely on the shoulders of the defenseless Chinese students and hinting at America's readiness to join the powers in military punitive measures against the Chinese. Secretary Kellogg was reported as indorsing a plan whereby the powers would hold a united front to permit foreign business to prosper. Washington officials are described by the *Sino-Japanese News*, in a dispatch printed June 16, as not aware of any such plan as the Washington *Post* printed exclusively relative to a prospective plan of Secretary Kellogg to bring about a conference on Chinese customs and a commission to study the extra-territoriality question."

Secondly, the American attitude in China is due to commercial as well as racial solidarity between the British and the Americans —and other foreigners for that matter. They have one interest, and that is exploitation. Referring to the American Chamber of Commerce at Hankow, Senator Borah said it was part and parcel of the "imperialistic combine that would oppress and exploit the Chinese people." "They are perfectly willing," said Senator Borah, "to continue in connection with others these exploitations, and they care very little if they drag the American people

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into war and sacrifice thousands of our people. Any one who is familiar with what has been going on in China for the last ten years and the manner in which foreigners have disregarded and bruised the Chinese interests will have no doubt as to what is the real cause of the trouble in China at the present time. So far as I am concerned they are not going to hide the cause of the trouble. These interests, including the American Chamber of Commerce in China, are the real cause of this trouble. I venture to say that if the foreign interests in China will respect the rights of the Chinese people and deal with them in justice, if they would even give them the rights and respect the rights as they were defined in the Disarmament Conference, there would be no trouble in China with foreign powers."[7]

In quite an early stage of the Shanghai affair, Minister Sze manœuvred with a view to counteracting the British attempt to drag America into the whirlpool on her side. He requested that America should only act "concurrently" with the other Powers and for the protection of American property and life. This was no innovation; it was the policy of the United States during the Boxer Uprising. The next move consisted in overtures to America to assume the rôle of mediator. Finally, the Minister pressed for the carrying out of the Washington Treaties under American leadership.

The success of American diplomacy in this matter lies in bringing to the front the Customs and Extra-Territoriality Conferences and relegating the incident of the Shanghai shooting itself to the background. As affairs now stand, the Powers interested have agreed to a Conference on Customs Tariff and a Commission to investigate and report on Extra-Territoriality in China, and to leave the fixing of responsibility for the Shanghai incident to a judicial inquiry. This, on the one hand, saves the British from unceremoniously losing "prestige"—in China, they call it "face." On the other, it sidetracks Chinese fury. The whole nation, and perhaps it is not too much to say the whole world, is now watchfully waiting . . . for the results that are to be forthcoming from the Conference, Commission, and Inquiry.

IV

As a conclusion, a brief presentation of the facts with respect to the Customs Conference and Extra-Territoriality Commission

[7] *Washington Post*, June 28, 1925.

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seems not inopportune. Through a series of treaties beginning in 1842, after the Opium War, China is under the obligation that all imports, regardless of the principle of reciprocity or protection, are subject only to a maximum duty of 5 percent *ad valorem*. Due to the constant and continuous rise of prices and the few occasions when the tariff schedules were subjected to revision, China is in fact receiving about three percent. At the Washington Conference, a Resolution was passed, reading: "That the customs schedule of duties on imports into China adopted by the Tariff Revision Commission at Shanghai on December 19, 1918, shall forthwith be revised so that the rates of duty shall be equivalent to 5 percent effective, as provided for in the several commercial treaties to which China is a party." Part of the Second Article of the Nine-Power Customs Treaty read: "Immediate steps shall be taken, through a Special Conference, to prepare the way for the speedy abolition of *likin* and for the fulfillment of the other conditions laid down in Article VIII of the Treaty of September 5, 1902, between Great Britain and China, in Articles IV and V of the Treaty of October 8, 1903, between the United States and China, and in Article I of the Supplementary Treaty of October 8, 1903, between Japan and China, with a view to levying the surtaxes provided for in those articles."

Due to the inaction of the French Government, it had been impossible to effect such a revision. In July, however, M. Briand, having made a pledge at the international bargain counter that the Treaty would be ratified if the Gold Franc Case was settled as he desired, succeeded in pushing it through the Chamber. The Conference is now scheduled for the fall. The pathetic condition of China's finances needs no description; the cause is found in her diminutive revenues. Even if the results turn out to be all favorable to China, she will still have a Customs Tariff which is comparable to a toadstool at the foot of the wall that encircles the United States.

No emphasis has so far ever been laid on the fact that the Chinese Customs service is directed and manned by foreigners, except positions that no foreigner will take in China. The British Inspector General holds his position by agreement, but why all the foreign Customs Commissioners? The Chinese are often assailed for dishonesty; but there is the other side of the story. An inherent evil in an institution, be it "squeeze" or

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something else, is not really an argument against that institution's moral character. The perpetuation of a *foreign* Customs Service for China is dangerous to herself as well as detrimental to the sense of fairness and justice. It thrusts back the day of customs autonomy in China; it is a landmark of foreign domination; and it is an obstacle to good international understanding.

At the Washington Conference, another Resolution was passed stipulating that a Commission should be established, with the interested Powers represented on it, to deal with the question of extra-territoriality. The relevant part of the Resolution reads: "That the Governments of the Powers above named shall establish a Commission (to which each of such Governments shall appoint one member) to inquire into the present practice of extra-territorial jurisdiction in China, and into the laws and the judicial system and the methods of judicial administration of China, with a view to reporting to the Governments of the several Powers above named their findings of fact in regard to these matters, and their recommendations as to such means as they may find suitable to improve the existing conditions of the administration of justice in China, and to assist and further the efforts of the Chinese Government to effect such legislation and judicial reforms as would warrant the several Powers in relinquishing, either progressively or otherwise, their respective rights of extra-territoriality."

It seems that the abolition of the extra-territorial rights at present may even cause China trouble; but at the same time the spirit of the Washington Resolution would entirely be lost if the Powers should, without justification, delay indefinitely the relinquishment of those same special rights which have been relinquished by them in Turkey. The Commission could, after investigation, stipulate a definite period of time—be it three or five years, according to the findings of the Committee as to the present status of the Chinese judiciary system—at the end of which period extra-territorial rights would be given up. The Governments concerned should give such a report the most favorable consideration, in the same spirit that prompted them to accept the Washington Resolution. China's nationalistic aspirations would be satisfied and justice and protection would be insured to the nationals of the Powers concerned. Germany, Austria, and Russia have given up extra-territoriality; we have not yet heard complaints of injustice to their nationals. The

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system itself has its inherent undesirability both to the Chinese and foreigners; the sooner it goes the better.

Side-tracks lead nowhere; side-tracking Chinese fury may seem good tactics momentarily but it is not a permanent way of appeasing the ever-growing spirit of Chinese nationalism. We have studied the Shanghai affair and have learned that beneath the industrial unrest and the student agitation lies a deeper cause—the nationalistic movement. Such a movement cannot be satisfied with merely a 2½ percent customs increase nor with the constitution of a powerless Extra-territoriality Commission. It desires more, and more it will get. Nationalism, as I have said, means for China the general revision of all unequal treaties, which exist by virtue of neither the code of Western ethics, which reveres justice and fair play, nor the principle of reciprocity recognized by international law. For the twenty-five years that have just passed the United States has led the world in pursuing a policy of disinterestedness in China and helpfulness towards her; for the twenty-five years that are yet to come it is to be hoped that she will not only continue her traditional policy but also actively assist China in bringing about the realization of her legitimate national aspirations. This is the one and only means that will forestall consequences that are too grave and would be too regrettable for prediction or even imagination.

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DISSATISFIED GERMANY

By Archibald Cary Coolidge

PEOPLES, like persons, are subject to changing moods of contentment and of discontent, moods which in their consequences affect not only them but others. The discontented are prone to be sensitive and unreasonable, if not quarrelsome, and this in itself is a danger to peace. In the world of today most of the peoples appear to be reasonably content with their position and with the existing framework of the international comity. Some, however, are profoundly dissatisfied and accept the status quo only in so far and as long as they have to.

Naturally enough, this applies first and foremost to the European nations defeated in the World War. They have met with disastrous calamity and have fallen from high estate. It would be too much to expect them to be pleased with their present conditions. It is also plain that an increasing number of populations in Asia and Africa have awakened to a sense of grievance, unfelt a generation or two ago, and are demanding with increasing vehemence a recognition of their claims. As a connecting link between these two discontents, we have Communist Russia in its remorseless campaign against the structure of modern society, eager to promote trouble anywhere and everywhere. On the other hand, we may take comfort because the smaller, formerly more or less oppressed, nationalities of Europe, such as the Poles, the Czechs, the Jugoslavs, the Irish and others have passed from the dissatisfied to the satisfied category. The same is true of the French and the Italians, though reservations must be made in both cases.

In the Western Hemisphere all the countries, with the possible exception of Peru, have the good fortune to belong in the satisfied class. The most striking example of one that has good cause to be pleased with its lot is the United States.

Although, as the World War has shown, a quarrel in which one of the two parties is a small nation may set the world in flames, a small nation can hardly achieve this unaided. If Serbia had not been supported by Russia in 1914 she would have had to submit to the Austrian ultimatum or undergo chastisement which might have ended her existence as an independent state. Similarly Hungary and Bulgaria, however bitterly they

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may brood over the wrongs which they believe have been done to them, however determined they may be not to accept their present boundaries as final, can only nurse their secret hopes and bide their time. Of themselves they can accomplish nothing. We may sympathize with them or we may condemn them, but it is not on them that the future tranquillity of the world depends. It does depend to an alarming extent on the actions and attitude of certain more important peoples who at the present moment are profoundly dissatisfied. We are beginning to learn that this is true of China, we are unpleasantly aware that it is so of Russia, and few have ever doubted it as regards Germany.

That Europe cannot settle down without some sort of voluntary acquiescence on the part of the Germans is indeed self-evident. It is however equally certain, though this has sometimes been overlooked, that there is nothing to be gained by purchasing German acquiescence at the price of the permanent discontent or alarm of some other great people. Therefore the problem is to reconcile whatever may be their legitimate demands with the interests of the nations affected by them. English statesmen realize this, albeit unwillingly, and admit that the question of the rehabilitation of Germany cannot be separated from that of the security, and even of the mere sense of security, of France.

Among the many obstacles to a better feeling between these old opponents is the unfortunate relation to each other in which they have been left by the outcome of the World War. Ordinarily after a trial of arms it is not difficult for one side—the victorious one—to forgive and forget. This means that at least one of the parties most concerned is ready for a reconciliation. For instance, after 1871 the Germans ceased to hate the French, indeed they would have liked to be friends with them if the latter had been willing to accept the loss of Alsace-Lorraine as irrevocable. But in the World War, victorious France on whose soil it was fought suffered far more than did defeated Germany, of whom, besides, owing to her inferiority in population, she is more afraid than Germany is of her. In consequence, although the victor, she harbors the passions not to say the desire for retaliation which we are wont to associate with the vanquished, while the vanquished nation has been equally embittered by the treatment meted to her by the terms of peace and in the years that have followed. We thus find a mutual sense of injury, a distrust

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and a dislike so intense as to make us almost despair of a solution.

And yet the necessity of appeasement and of some sort of relations that shall be tolerable to both sides is so obvious that in the two countries not only international Socialists and unsentimental capitalists but sensible and moderate men of all kinds are striving for an understanding. During the last few months real steps in this direction have been taken. Now that the Dawes Plan has worked for over a year, that the episode of the Ruhr occupation is past, that the first of the three occupied Rhine zones is to be evacuated, and that Germany is to enter into the League of Nations and be a member of the Council, a corner has been turned. Although she has still to bear the penalty of defeat, and part of the Fatherland is still occupied by foreign soldiers, Germany need no longer feel that she is regarded as a criminal and an outcast. Her first and most passionate demand that she be once more treated as an equal will have been in some measure acceded to, and she can resume normal international life and intercourse and play her part in general questions.

Up to now, the Germans say, they have been treated as sinners or at best penitents on account of a war which was the fault of somebody else; the Peace of Versailles has loaded them with servitudes and they have been bullied and humiliated ever since. Even the Dawes agreement is a measure which has been imposed upon them and which they have accepted only under dire necessity. For them to enter the League of Nations without having a permanent place in the Council would have been an added indignity. If assured of their proper position there, and of equality in the Security Pact, they can feel for the first time since the war that something has been done to relieve them from the badge of inferiority fastened upon them, and that Germany will once more stand on the same footing as Great Britain and France.

In answer to all this there is much that might be said, but we need not go into the question here. Galling as it is to Germany to be treated as a defeated state, of whom her victors are still suspicious, as the allies were suspicious of the French after the fall of the great Napoleon, such things right themselves sooner or later—how soon depends on the attitude of the vanquished as well as on that of the victorious party. They need not present a serious peril for the future, but obviously the sooner this grievance is removed the better for everyone concerned.

Many Germans dream of revenge today, as many Frenchmen

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did after 1871, and whether we approve of them or not, it is not always easy for a broad-minded neutral to condemn without qualification the one more than the other. All that can be exacted of Germany is that she accept the Peace of Versailles as France accepted the Peace of Frankfort, a thing hateful in her own sight but a necessity to which she has bowed. The most loyal acceptance by a defeated nation of an unfavorable treaty of peace need not preclude cherishing the hope that circumstances will lead to changes some day. Such circumstances are apt to be due to violence, yet they may come from outside. It was not a Polish insurrection but the World War and the Bolshevik Revolution which led to the rebirth of independent Poland. Germany also has a perfect right to obtain whatever modifications in the treaty she can persuade the other signatories to agree to. In the League of Nations she will have a field for effective legitimate action in the furtherance of her purposes such as no beaten country ever enjoyed in the past. She will have friends from the start and she may be counted on not to neglect her opportunities.

Leaving to one side minor and temporary objectives, we may well ask what will be her fundamental desires and what are the obstacles in the way of her attaining them. The Germans, and especially the German nationalists, evidently want a great many things. There is, of course, every variety of hope and design among them, from the most modest to the wildly extravagant. Still we can see a consensus of opinion on certain broad issues, remembering, too, that many of the demands of the extremists can count on the sympathy of the moderates who do not support them only because they regard such dreams as unattainable, not as undesirable.

If we wish to sum up their aspirations in a phrase, we can say that the Germans insist on the necessity of a revision of the Peace of Versailles, which to them is the embodiment of foolish wickedness. In this they have the sympathy of their partisans everywhere and of a good many idealists of one kind or another. But the difficulties in the way of a sweeping, wholesale revision which would have to be agreed to by all who had a hand in the treaty would be tremendous. Probably no one would maintain today that the Peace of Versailles was perfect in itself, but, whatever its imperfections, it is now an important integral portion of the public law of Europe. Parts of it, to be sure, have already

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proved inoperative, and others will doubtless be modified before long, but to imagine that the Powers which forged it out after months of labor and prolonged if sometimes futile discussion will sit down together again at the council table, this time with the participation of Germany, and take up the whole treaty, article by article, and recast it or substitute another in its place, is a foolish, not to say dangerous, illusion. The mere attempt at such a proceeding would be a menace to the peace of the world. Everyone, of course, will admit that there are provisions in the instrument which may profitably be changed if such changes can be brought about peacefully and without injury to others. Doubtless there will be many of them sooner or later, perhaps indeed very soon, but unless there is another catastrophe they will come piecemeal and not by any all inclusive act of general consent.

A peculiar feature of the Peace of Versailles was the unwise provision by which the Germans were compelled to acknowledge that they were responsible for the war. They protested emphatically at the time but had to submit, and did so, but with no more feeling of being morally bound by such a declaration than a man has for a lie he is forced to tell to a highwayman whose pistol is at his head. On the contrary, from that day to this, they have made every effort to prove that the charge, to which they gave the apparent confirmation of their signature, was an outrageous calumny whose falseness they are exposing to the world. With this incentive their historical writers have in the last half dozen years done far more and on the whole better work than those of any other country in investigating the causes and origin of the conflict. As might be expected, not only have they convinced their compatriots more firmly than ever of their own innocence but they have made no small impression among neutrals and even in lands formerly hostile to them.

The practical conclusion which the German people draw from these investigations is that as forsooth the provisions of the peace treaty were based on their supposed guilt, these should be changed at once, now that their innocence has been demonstrated. All the penalties imposed should immediately be abrogated if not imposed on someone else. Of course no such thing is going to happen. The French, and indeed people in the Allied countries generally, still hold the Germans primarily responsible. No international investigation, any more than one

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by the American Senate, could do much besides add a little fresh material to the controversy, and thresh over the old straw of what we know already. Men will be discussing the rights and wrongs of it for centuries. At any rate it has little practical bearing today on the terms of the Peace Treaty. Even if the charges against Mr. Poincaré, who has of late been the favorite object of attack, were proved to the full, his responsibility would be no greater than was that of Bismarck for the war of 1870. How many of the Germans who are forced to admit (though they do not condemn) the fact that Bismarck wished for a war at that time and did his best to bring it about, have ever suggested that the French indemnity after defeat should have been remitted for that reason? But logic or no logic, we must none the less realize that one of the acute grievances of the German people is that they believe they are being punished for a crime when it has been demonstrated that they were innocent. Even in regard to Belgium, about which outside opinion is practically unanimous, few can yet bring themselves to admit any real guilt.

From the point of view of pure equity, perhaps the severest criticism which can be made of the treaty is the number of permanent servitudes, large and small, which it imposes. Such servitudes are not usually after a war and a defeat. The limitation of the Prussian army by Napoleon I, the prohibition of a Russian fleet in the Black Sea after the Crimean War, the obligation of the "most favored nation" clause imposed on France by the Treaty of Frankfort are well known instances. But permanent servitudes, unlike indemnities which can be paid and forgotten, constitute, even when they are no real burden, a perpetual irritant and reminder of former humiliation. In practice they have seldom been effective for long. They are too incompatible with the pride of a self-respecting nation to be borne indefinitely. Germany will never accept hers for all time. The best that can be hoped is that the two most important of them, the reduction of her army, and the demilitarization of the Rhine zone, may become parts of some general agreement of disarmament to which she will accede as an equal and that her remaining servitudes will gradually disappear of themselves or be obliterated by other compacts. But a good deal must happen first to reassure the French.

Turning to the economic field, though there is plenty that might be said about many of the provisions of the Peace Treaty,

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the crucial question at present is that of reparations. The Germans declare that the reparations demanded of them have been far beyond their capacity to pay. What their "capacity" really is neither they nor anyone else can know with certainty. What a country can pay depends not a little on how you interpret the word "can," whether applied to reparations or to Allied debts. It is now widely admitted that the first totals arrived at were too high and that the whole vastly difficult and complicated matter has been mismanaged. The amount has been reduced several times, and in the adoption of the Dawes Report we have the last and most hopeful attempt at a solution. There may have to be others later, but for the time being the Dawes Plan is being tried out in a fair manner by all parties.

It is when we come to questions of national sovereignty and territorial limits that we meet with the most nearly insoluble problems. Here again the Germans have complaints and aspirations which are common, if in varying degrees, to all their parties. Some of the subjects on which they have felt most acutely, such as the occupation of the Ruhr, the encouragement given by the French to the attempts to set up a Rhineland republic, and recently the delay in the Allied evacuation of the Cologne region, now belong to the past. They have also other grievances of a temporary nature. As they begin to recover from the war they become increasingly desirous of being masters of their own household and bringing to a close the desecration of the soil of the Fatherland by a hated foreign soldiery whose expenses they have to pay. This is natural enough, and we may expect that negotiation will lead to a shortening and perhaps to a speedy end of the term of the military occupation of the west bank of the Rhine fixed by the Peace Treaty.

Another thing that has aroused deep resentment throughout Germany and some fear as to the future is the special régime of the Saar region. We need not enter here into the question of this complicated arrangement and of how it has worked. There have undoubtedly been hardships and abuses and these have been magnified by propaganda literature. It is interesting by the way to note how much attention the Saar question has received from outside. Several works on the subject, all from the same point of view, have been written in English alone. The temporary plight of the population has attracted far more sympathy than has the fate of the Germans of the south Tyrol,

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who have been handed over permanently to Italy and are being subjected to a severe process of denationalization. But the world is usually quicker to blame the French than it is the Italians for actions of the same sort.

At any rate, although troubles about the Saar region may well continue till the end of the fifteen-year period and the plebiscite that is to follow, as prescribed by the Peace Treaty, if not longer, the situation should some day clear up of itself.

Far more serious and lasting than any of the above grievances are the feelings which Germans entertain and will continue to entertain as to the justice of their present frontiers. They may have to submit indefinitely, time may heal their wounds, but it will be a long time. Forty years and more did little to heal similar wounds in France. It would be folly to expect acquiescence of the heart at least in any near future. Even those Germans most opposed to trying again the hazards of war will continue to hope that through the League of Nations or by some turn in the wheel of fortune at least some of their lost lands and brethren will come back to them.

On the western frontier, it is true, many Germans, including the Government now in power, are prepared to make a great concession. They are prepared, in return for recognition of their claims elsewhere, to accept finally the reunion to France of Alsace-Lorraine. Although such a concession horrifies those of more nationalistic tendencies, we may accept it as having been brought forward in good faith and also as not being merely a painful sacrifice consented to as part of a profitable bargain. The experience Germany had for almost half a century in her recent possession of Alsace-Lorraine was unsatisfactory from beginning to end and was not an episode which she can look back upon with pride, or wish to repeat. If the Alsatians, German-speaking though most of them are, prefer to belong to France, of which they have given abundant proof, we can understand why public opinion in Germany, supposing it to be desirous of a termination to the centuries-old feud between the two countries should be willing to accept as permanent the frontier of 1915 which now corresponds to the wishes of the populations on both sides. The world can only applaud if this is the case.

To the east and the south the situation is different. The Germans demand that there shall be a rectification of their eastern frontiers, that is, that the continuity of their territory

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shall be restored, that they shall be given Danzig, that the millions of Germans under Polish rule shall be freed, that they shall get back the portion of Silesia which has been taken away from them, robbing them of valuable resources and arbitrarily breaking up a natural economic unity. There is no doubt that strong arguments can be put forth in support of their contentions, so strong indeed that they have appealed to many outsiders, and especially to the English. We can understand, too, that most Germans, one might perhaps say all, even if resigned to the peace settlement on their western border as lasting, cannot conceive of its remaining unchanged in the east. But how are changes to be brought about? Can Poland, a country as large as Germany and with a people noted for courage and extreme patriotism rather than for calm reason, be expected to make any considerable concessions? The two populations are so inextricably mixed up that, whatever the boundaries, there have got to be either a large number of Germans in Poland or of Poles in Germany. The present situation is the result of a thousand years of national contact, not to say conflict. The Germans may feel, and a good many others with them, that it is a smaller hardship for Poles to be reluctant German citizens than it is for people who belong to one of the great cultural nations of history and who speak one of the chief world languages to be exposed to denationalization in a state whose history and language have seldom had more than local importance in the past, and are not likely to have in the future. Yet, however much may be said for this view, we can scarcely expect it to commend itself to the Poles, any more than a somewhat similar view did to the Irish. The Poles also declare that for them to be shut off by foreign territory from the Baltic would be a worse hardship than it is for Germany to be divided by the Corridor. Their need "of a free and secure access to the sea" was recognized in the Fourteen Points (Number XIII) and was accepted by the Allies and by Germany herself. Supposing even that the economic arguments balance each other, the guiding principle should be that of self-determination, and the large majority of the population of the Corridor are and wish to remain Poles. As for Silesia, it has no necessary unity. The Austrian part was separated from the Prussian long ago and the final division between Germany and Poland was based on the votes of the districts—and thus the old arguments thrashed over so many times in Paris and elsewhere

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in the last half dozen years are repeated again without getting us further. In England public opinion is on the German side, in France on the Polish. But though England is utterly unwilling to guarantee Polish security, and is under no obligation to do so in regard to the frontiers of Poland and Russia, which were drawn in a way that did not meet with her approval, those between Poland and Germany, much as she may disapprove of them, were fixed by the peace treaties which she helped to make and to which she has given her signature. Still, treaties or no treaties, we need not expect just yet that the Germans will bring themselves to accept as final the present delimitation of their eastern frontiers.

The question of a union between the Germans of Germany and the Germans of Austria is even more important and immediate. The enthusiasm for it may wax and wane on the two sides of the line in accordance with varying political or economic conditions, but these are mere temporary factors. The motive of common nationality and history on which the aspiration rests is as strong and as justified as is that of any other people. United Germany is as legitimate an ideal as United Italy, and, in spite of the differences in creed, there is no more incompatibility between the Austrian and the Prussian than there is between the Neapolitan and the Piedmontese. Certainly they are more alike than are the Breton and the Provencal. It is a question, too, not of union but of reunion. Save for a short period, German Austria has been during her whole existence a political as well as national part of Germany, and still was so in the memory of men now living. To refuse her permission to return to the fold is to fly flat in the face of every principle of self-determination.[1]

Yet, on the other hand, who can wonder that France and Belgium, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia—and possibly Russia—would view such a consummation with the liveliest alarm and may go far in their efforts to prevent it? Their reasons are plain and cogent enough. They are convinced that they would be endangered by such an accession of power to the German state. Poland would feel that her already existing peril was increased; Bohemia with her large minority of dissatisfied Germans would be on three sides surrounded by a Germany which would threaten to engulf her, or at least absorb her German fringe; Italy, though

[1] The province of Vorarlberg might well go to Switzerland, with which it belongs better geographically, and to which its inhabitants have shown a desire to be annexed.

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better able to defend herself and possessing in the South Tyrol but a fragment—and a particularly unjustifiable fragment—of *Germania irredenta*, would find her possession of it more precarious than now and also would dread German approach to the Adriatic. The reasons of France and Belgium for opposing the annexation of Austria are too obvious to need pointing out. We may indeed doubt whether any other country in Europe wishes to see the rebuilding of a German state more populous than the Germany of 1914.

Such being the case, and self-preservation still being the first law among nations as among individuals, there would seem to be little prospect that the wishes of Germany and Austria will soon be acceded to, especially as the peace treaties have put obstacles in the way. But it is an awkward and dangerous thing to have one's security permanently dependent on a wrong done to another. Time and accident offer opportunities, and a cause which is dear to millions and which is right and natural in itself is apt to triumph in the end, witness the resurrection of Poland. Every one who is not threatened by German power will probably recognize the inherent justice of the German claim. Great Britain may feel sure enough of herself to sympathize with it some day, and even those whose security appears menaced may not be in a position to face the reprobation of the rest of the world by using force to oppose the voluntary coming together of free peoples who wish to restore their national unity. If the peril of future aggression and war could be eliminated, there is no moral ground on which the wish could well be opposed.

Some have suggested that a possible union or at least close association between Belgium and France might serve in the nature of a counterpoise. There is no immediate likelihood of such a consummation, for never has Belgium been so conscious of her individuality or so justly proud of herself as she is at present. She is a monarchy, not a republic, and the Germanic-Flemish element of her population, already the larger of the two, appears to be gaining ground on the French. Nevertheless, an ultimate fusion, more or less complete, of Belgium and France is conceivable. The idea has come up before and may come up again. Needless to say, the mere thought of it would horrify Great Britain, which has gone to war again and again to keep the French out of the Low Countries. Indeed the necessity of doing so has been one of the cardinal, fixed features of British

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foreign policy for the last two hundred and fifty years. Yet, if the French and the Belgians were in favor of a union of any kind, political or commercial, the British would have no more right to keep the French out of Antwerp than the French have to keep the Prussians out of Vienna.

One German demand which has attracted but little attention abroad stands a fair chance of partial satisfaction some day. Few of us realize that many Germans have not resigned themselves to the loss of their colonial possessions. On the contrary, they are still keenly interested in these territories where they believe they achieved much, and of which they declare they have been deprived by barefaced robbery on a trumped-up charge of misgovernment. On the first favorable occasion they mean to ask for at least some of them back, for a moral vindication if for no other reason. When once Germany has been admitted to the League of Nations, she can easily propose that the mandates of her former colonies be transferred to her hands from those of their present holders. Such a request may be heeded. She will hardly regain possession of Southwest Africa or of her Pacific islands—South Africa and Australia will see to that—but it is quite on the cards that England may sooner or later abandon Tanganyka to her.

To all the above the cynic may reply with the query whether, if the Germans obtain these various things they are asking for, they will then be satisfied or any happier than before? Perhaps not, but doubt of that sort should not prevent the performing of an act of justice nor interfere too much with what seems to be clearly expedient. If Germany is deeply discontented—and she is—this is reason enough for other countries and especially for her neighbors to take stock of the situation from the point of view of their own interests as well as that of the public welfare, and make up their minds accordingly. The demands of Germany may require too much sacrifice of the rights of others for them to be granted, but for the peace of the world they must be considered with the utmost seriousness, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that sooner or later some of them will have to receive satisfaction.

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POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE ARCTIC

By David Hunter Miller

UNTRAVELED air routes and undeveloped resources in the Arctic are now being thought of as valuable for the future, even the near future. For this, Mr. Stefansson is perhaps more responsible than any other one individual. That the French, in 1763, gave up Canada rather than Guadaloupe to the British, who accepted the former instead of the latter with hesitating reluctance, and that the judgment of Seward regarding Alaska had to wait a generation or so for its vindication, have been some of the effective historical arguments of the practical explorer, who is so often deemed merely a prejudiced dreamer.

The area of the earth's surface north of the Arctic Circle (66° 30′, as usually drawn; strictly it is 66° 31⅓′) comprises over eight million square miles. What States have sovereignty over this vast region? To what countries are we to assign the known and the unknown?

Let us think of the Arctic as in part known land, in part known sea and in part unexplored, and thus let us look at it on the accompanying map. This map, like most maps of the Arctic, looks "queer." It seems different from maps of regions with which we are more familiar. The reason is at once simple and perplexing. It is common learning that every ordinary map of any considerable portion of the earth is necessarily at best only an approximation of correctness, because it is a flat picture of the convex surface of an oblate spheroid; and an accurate flat picture of a convex surface is impossible. Then, too, on the usual map of the United States, for example, we draw parallels of latitude. We know that these imaginary lines of latitude run around the world; but on such a map they are drawn as straight, or perhaps as slightly curved lines, going from one side of the sheet to the other. But on the Polar map these same straight or slightly curved lines of latitude become circles around a central north; and it is this change that gives us to pause and to wonder.

Most of us, I am sure, think of "North" as being something like "up." North is almost always toward the top of the page. Are not North and South opposites? So a straight line of longitude on a Polar map which runs north and then, going straight

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on, runs south, is very bewildering. In early days, we were taught that "if I face east, the north is at my left hand"; so while, when we stop to think about it, we admit that the shortest air route from London to Tokio goes near the Pole—still it does seem like going out of one's way, doesn't it? Not unnaturally, a New York journalist recently wrote of Alaska as being southwest of the North Pole—it certainly seems as if it should be, since it is northwest of "here."

If we look at our map, opposite page 54, we see that the countries now having important possessions north of the Arctic Circle are Canada, the United States, Russia, Denmark, and Norway.[1]

Denmark's Arctic possession is the Island of Greenland, with its enormous area of over 800,000 square miles, though part of this is south of the Arctic Circle, the Island extending south to latitude 60°. There are some settlements at various points along the coasts of Greenland. But the interior is uninhabited, partly unexplored, and the island has been crossed from one side to the other only six or seven times by explorers such as Nansen and Peary, and more recently by Rasmussen and Koch. With an area thrice the size of Texas, the population is not more than fifteen thousand, mostly Eskimo. The island is under Danish administration and the title of Denmark, in part at least, is ancient and is now unquestioned. (Norwegian rights on portions of the east coast were adjusted by the Treaty of 1924.) The world generally, and the United States in particular, recognize that Greenland is a Danish land. In 1916 our Government formally declared, in connection with the treaty for the cession of the Virgin Islands, that it "will not object to the Danish Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland."

Spitsbergen (including Bear Island), with its valuable coal and other mineral deposits, is Norwegian. The history of this archipelago is instructive. Discovered as far back as 1596, the subject of many conflicting claims and much diplomatic correspondence in the seventeenth century, it came to be recognized as *terra nullius* and was formally so described in the Protocol of 1912 drawn up by representatives of Norway, Sweden and Russia. Still more formally, Norwegian sovereignty was recognized by the Treaty of 1920, a Treaty which the United States

[1] Sweden and Finland are partly within the Arctic Circle. Iceland lies just south of the line.

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ratified in 1924. While Russia is not yet a party to that Treaty, the Norwegian Government is in effective occupation of the region, and there can be almost no doubt that her title is perfect to "all the lands situationed between 10° and 35° longitude east of Greenwich and between 74° and 81° latitude north." It is reported that Norway, in a note to Canada, has made some claim to Axel Heiberg Land (and perhaps one or two other islands) based on the discoveries of Sverdrup. Now Axel Heiberg, while unoccupied by any one, is within the region claimed by Canada. Its northern tip, Cape Thomas Hubbard, was chosen for the airplane base of the MacMillan Expedition. The possibility of Norwegian title to land in this region becoming a reality is highly remote.

Future territorial expansion in the Arctic seems to be open only to the Canadians, the Russians and ourselves. All three Governments at this time are showing active interest in the situation.

The Government of Canada in recent years, particularly since 1919, has been devoting much attention to its northern lands and to the possibilities that lie still farther north. The Canadian Budget item for the "Government of the North West Territories" was less than $4,000 in 1920; it was over $300,000 in 1924; and it doubtless is still larger this year. In 1920 there were elaborate official investigations conducted by the so-called Reindeer and Musk-ox Commission. In 1922, a Canadian expedition on the ship *Arctic* established a police post, post-office and customs house at Craig Harbor on Ellesmere Island, with a personnel of seven men headed by an inspector of police. This post, in latitude 76° 10′ north and longitude 81° 20′ west, is one of the most northerly official stations in the world, being less than a thousand miles from the Pole. It is interesting to note that the 1922 expedition selected near the post "a site sufficiently level and smooth for an aerodrome."

Indeed, Canada has now established a periodic ship patrol of Ellesmere Island and neighboring lands. In the summer of 1924 a building was erected on the west shore of Rice Strait, near Kane Basin, north of Craig Harbor, in latitude 78° 46′. The intention is that the police at Craig Harbor shall make a patrol to Kane Basin during the winter. A second permanent post was opened on Devon Island and there is also one at Ponds Inlet on the north coast of Baffin Island, where the Hudson's Bay Com-

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pany has a station. This year the annual voyage of the ship *Arctic* commenced about July 1 as usual, and still other posts are to be established in this region. Melville and Bathurst Islands are mentioned as possibilities. A glance at the map will show that Ellesmere Island and Devon Island, with Baffin Island and Bylot Island to the south, form the eastern fringe of the Arctic Islands of Canada.

The Canadian Government has also been careful to preserve its rights in the matter of explorations, both positively and negatively. The Stefansson Expedition of 1913 received instructions to re-affirm any British rights at points which the Expedition might touch. Both Rasmussen and the Danish Government were formally notified by Canada in 1921 that any discovery of Rasmussen would not affect Canadian claims.

No relevant diplomatic correspondence between the United States Government and the Canadian Government has been published. However, the Prime Minister of Canada said in the House of Commons on May 11, when asked for the papers about Wrangel Island, that some of the correspondence might be regarded as confidential by the Government of the United States, indicating that on that question at least there had been some correspondence; and on June 10, in speaking of the Canadian claims in the Arctic generally, Mr. Stewart, Minister of the Interior, said: "A dispatch dealing with the subject was sent to Washington, to which we have had no reply."

The Canadian claims in the Arctic deserve special attention. They have very recently been definitely and officially stated by Mr. Stewart,[2] and are outlined on a map laid on the table of the Canadian House of Commons. They include everything, known and unknown, west of Davis Strait and longitude 60°, east of the meridian which divides Alaska from Canada (141°), and north of the Canadian mainland up to the Pole.

What is to be said as to the Canadian title to the islands now on the map within these lines, islands having an area of say 500,000 square miles? There is of course no doubt of the perfect jurisdiction of Canada over these lands under Canadian law. Statutes and Orders in Council include within the Dominion all of these territories; the national act and the national assumption of jurisdiction are complete; but we are thinking of their status internationally.

[2] They were foreshadowed almost in their present terms in the Canadian Senate in 1907.

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Baffin Island, the largest of all, with 200,000 square miles, is as certainly Canadian as is Ontario; and we may take for granted Canadian ownership of the other islands directly adjacent to the mainland. As Halleck says: "The ownership and occupation of the mainland includes the adjacent islands, even though no positive acts of ownership may have been exercised over them."

As to the rest, there are various shades of doubt—the doubt increasing generally with the latitude. We have seen that Ellesmere Island and Devon Island have each at least one officially established and maintained police post; that is actual, even if it is to be deemed only partial, possession. The other islands north of 74° are unoccupied, are generally uninhabited, and indeed have rarely—and some of them never—been seen or visited except by explorers of various nationalities. The very existence of the more remote of them was unknown a generation ago.

On the other hand, whereas Canada makes a precise and definite claim of sovereignty, no other country (aside from the rather shadowy "discovery" rights of Norway to one or two islands) has announced any claim whatever. Furthermore, the appearance of these islands on the map as a seeming northern extension of the Canadian mainland is a visible sign of an important reality—namely, that many of them are quite inaccessible except from or over some Canadian base. With her claim of sovereignty before the world, Canada is gradually extending her actual rule and occupation over the entire area in question.

It has been suggested that the Monroe Doctrine has a bearing upon lands in the Arctic. Speaking very generally, this is no doubt true. Historically, the Monroe Doctrine at its original enunciation was aimed in part against the extension of territorial claims by Russia in the north. It is well to remember, however, that the geographical extent of the Monroe Doctrine has never been precisely delimited. Monroe spoke of "the American Continents" or, in other words, North and South America. Does this wholly exclude Antarctica, and if not, what part of that region is included? Further, and more material here, what are the precise northern boundaries of the Continent of North America?

It is also frequently said that the Monroe Doctrine applies to "the Western Hemisphere." Now whatever this expression means in this connection it certainly does not mean half the

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sphere. It must rather mean something roughly equivalent to "the American Continents." Geographically, the Western Hemisphere is usually mapped as commencing at about 20° longitude west of Greenwich and extending to 160° east. This corresponds to the idea of a "western" half, because if the Western Hemisphere commenced any farther east it would take in part of Africa. But this western half of the globe, as any one may see by looking at an atlas, includes not only the Cape Verde Islands and the Azores and Iceland on the east, but on the west includes all of New Zealand and a considerable expanse of the Pacific beyond the Fiji Islands. Of course what all this means is that the word "hemisphere" is frequently used very loosely, as meaning not the western "half" but a large western "portion" of the globe, and it is in this sense only that it is to be connected with the Monroe Doctrine.

Assuming, however, that the Monroe Doctrine may be invoked in relation to Arctic islands, may it, or should it, be invoked as against Canadian claims east of 141° west longitude?

In answering this question we should think of realities. The Monroe Doctrine is a national policy established primarily for the benefit of the United States. It doubtless will remain unlimited by any precise geographical formula and undefined by any particular form of words. In more than one sense, Ottawa is very near to Washington. The international frontier between the two countries means more a tariff than it does anything else. To interpret the Monroe Doctrine as meaning that Canada could not extend her domains to the north would be to say that acquisition by Mexico of Axel Heiberg Land would be regarded by the United States with complaisance and Canadian sovereignty thereover with opposition. The absurdity of the conclusion demonstrates the falsity of the premises.

As to the islands now known and lying north of the Canadian mainland, the average American would have no objection to the Canadian title. Certainly we would prefer Canadian ownership to any other ownership. We do not regard Canada as a "European Power" despite her membership in the British Empire,—a much looser tie to London than it was even a generation ago. The only other possibilities would be something in the nature of *terra nullius*, an unsatisfactory sort of ownership by everybody, or else ownership by the United States. No public sentiment here would favor either, as against Canada.

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So while it cannot be asserted that Canada's title to *all* these islands is legally perfect under international law, we may say that as to almost all of them it is not now questioned and that it seems in a fair way to become complete and admitted.

The undiscovered lands are another story. We can make up our minds about them when we know what they are.

Russian claims in the Arctic have not been so precisely set forth. However, in 1916 Russia notified the Governments of Great Britain and the United States and doubtless other countries that it considered various islands near the Arctic coast of the Empire as forming an integral part thereof. These included the Henrietta Islands, Jeanette, Bennett, the islands of New Siberia and also, of particular interest in view of recent history, Wrangel Island and Herald Island. It is clear that the British Government now makes no objection to any of these claims. The attempt by Mr. Stefansson to make Wrangel Island British did not receive official support in London; the British have obviously decided to claim no Arctic lands west of 141°. The Russians took active steps to end the most recent occupation of Wrangel Island, and it is now unoccupied.

Wrangel Island lies about 80 miles from the Siberian coast and is perhaps of some value and habitable. Its early history is summed up by a leading authority as follows: "A Russian heard of it in 1824 but never saw it; an Englishman saw it in 1849 but never landed on it; an American landed on it in 1881 and claimed it for the United States." Except for Herald Island, which is a few square miles of barren rock, Wrangel Island is much nearer Alaska than any other island in the Russian Arctic. Possibly the United States may be interested in the future of Wrangel Island; but probably no country is concerned with the other Russian claims north of the mainland of Russia, so far as they have been disclosed; they are to be thought of chiefly in their bearing on future air routes.

The only known land in the Arctic which is not now the subject of a positive claim by some government seems to be Franz Josef Land,[3] a group of islands—uninhabited and of unknown value—lying just north of 80° and, generally speaking, east of Spitsbergen and north of Nova Zembla. From their location we must assume that they will be claimed by Russia,

[3] Before the World War, because of "discovery," it would have been necessary to think of Austria-Hungary as a possible sovereign, but hardly now.

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for they are in about the same latitude as the Russian claims some 300 miles to the east.

Recent dispatches indicate that the present Russian Government is pursuing its rights. It seems that the Soviet Government is making plans for a Polar expedition by air to explore the areas directly north of Russian territory, in accordance with a program drafted by Dr. Nansen; and also that an expedition is to be sent to the region that has been known as Nicholas Land, but now to be called Vladimir Lenin Land, on the 80th parallel and at about 100° east longitude.

We cannot say that the sovereignty of all the known lands in the Arctic is definitely settled internationally. We can say, however, that the sovereignty of substantially all of these territories is now either definitely known or definitely claimed. The next few years will bring some sort of occupation of most lands hitherto unvisited except by occasional explorers. And the probability is that few of the claims thus far made to lands hitherto discovered will be questioned.

More doubtful, of course, is the status of the unknown.

The United States has never officially made any claim to any known Arctic lands outside of our well recognized territory. The sole declaration we have made regarding Arctic regions is the renunciation of any possible rights based on discovery or otherwise in Greenland. As to the unknown territories, there likewise is no official statement; but there is significant action.

The MacMillan expedition must be regarded as in effect an official expedition of our Government. True, it was largely financed by the National Geographic Society; but it was mostly composed of Navy personnel, it was supplied with Navy airplanes and with Navy wireless, and it was as indubitably governed by instructions from the Secretary of Navy as it was formally bidden Godspeed by his representative. Nothing was lacking to give the party official character, national duties and international rights.

The announced purpose of the MacMillan expedition was to explore the unknown area of the Arctic, the "white spot" on the map; and there can be no doubt that behind all this preparation and action will be found a national policy, to be announced publicly in due course. This great unexplored region of the Arctic lies, generally speaking, north, northwest and northeast of Alaska. The area of this "white spot" on the map is some-

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thing more than 1,000,000 square miles—more than the area of Greenland.

This is another way of saying that the Arctic Continent, long believed in and long sought, does not exist. Even if all this unknown area were land, it would not be a continent; at the utmost it would be a large island, one-fourth to one-third the size of Australia. But though unexplored, it would be going too far to say that this area is totally unknown; and inferences regarding it, based on known facts, almost forbid the idea that it is all land. The Pole and its immediate surroundings are water and not land; and soundings made in that vicinity show that the water is very deep water, suggesting that no *great* land area is adjacent. On the other hand, data from observations of the currents, the tides and the ice lead some scientists to think it unlikely that there is no land in this region. It may well be that the "white spot" contains more or less land in the form of islands.

If the methods of exploration previously used were the only ones available, it would perhaps be some generations before such a vast surface could be even approximately charted; but with the airplane or the dirigible (and perhaps the submarine) the possibility is quite otherwise. The question is now more one of expense than anything else. With proper preparation and airplane bases, the difficulties involved in obtaining the necessary information—and these difficulties are still great—could be overcome in the course of a few years.

If the political situation in the unknown Arctic finally results in agreement among the British Empire (Canada), Russia and the United States, the legal aspects of the problem will become unimportant. In the meantime, however, they are very interesting and in some of their features novel.

In early days, the discovery of unknown lands was regarded as the primary source of national title. But the impossibility that discovery, without anything more, should constitute a continuing basis of sovereignty soon became obvious and "effective occupation" or "settlement" became a requisite. In recent years, a third element of title has come to be thought of internationally as almost necessary, and that is what Lord Stowell called "notification of the fact," usually by an express communication to other Powers.

Of course, no formula or statement yet devised has solved or

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can solve all the difficulties connected with sovereignty over newly discovered lands. If effective occupation or settlement is to be deemed the real test, certainly "settlement" in Arctic regions can hardly be regarded as precisely synonymous with settlement elsewhere. Greenland is admittedly Danish, but I do not suppose that any one would say that the whole of Greenland is settled at this time. But clearly (if sufficient money is available) there may be effective occupation of an enormous Arctic area by the establishment of a few posts, here and there, with airplane and radio communications, without there being much "settlement" in the ordinary sense of that word.

In speaking of "the occupation which is sufficient to give a State title to territory" Mr. Olney, as Secretary of State, wrote in 1896: "The only possession required is such as is reasonable under all the circumstances—in view of the extent of the territory claimed, its nature and the uses to which it is adapted and is put while mere constructive occupation is kept within bounds by the doctrine of contiguity." While these words were not written about the Arctic, they seem very applicable to that region, where—doubtless for some time to come—no possession will be more than "reasonable" and occupation will be very largely "constructive."

In thinking of these three elements of title we are apt to conceive that their order in time is naturally, first, discovery, then occupation or settlement, and finally notice. Obviously, occupation cannot precede discovery *by some one;* and it seems generally to have been considered, as by the Institute of International Law, that the international notice required was a notice of possession. But the official Canadian claim, so far as it relates to the unknown, is in the nature of a notice before discovery and before occupation. What Canada says is that if Arctic lands be found—found by any one—east of 141° and west of 60° (west longitude) and Davis Strait, they are Canadian or will be.

It cannot be said, however, that such a claim as this is wholly without foundation or precedent. It bears some analogy to the "back country" or "hinterland" theory regarding territory stretching away from the coast. More accurately, it may be said to rest partly on the notion of "territorial propinquity" which the United States on one famous occasion recognized as creating "special relations between countries." Claims to unoccupied territory on the ground of contiguity are not unknown,

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although it cannot be said that there is any well defined or clearly settled principle to support them.

Very naturally, Canada thinks of the islands now on the map north of her mainland as contiguous territory, natural geographical extensions of the country. Discovered, to a great extent (not wholly) by British explorers, separated from the more southern area and from each other by comparatively narrow straits, though largely unoccupied in any sense, these lands seem to the Canadians a geographical entity and clearly parts of one domain, their own. To project this sentiment still farther north, perhaps across a considerable extent of Arctic sea or ice, is less logical but seems equally natural.

However, assuming as we must, that the Canadian claim even to the unknown rests partly on the principle of contiguity, there is another feature of the Arctic map, as Canada would draw it, which is of peculiar interest to us. A definite western line to the Pole is fixed, so far as Canada can fix it, and that line is the 141st west meridian. Of course, to claim up to that meridian is to renounce anything beyond it. In other words, the British now say that they *now* admit the rights of the United States to all unknown lands north of Alaska. This proposed line of division certainly does not rest entirely on any principle of contiguity; however that principle may be described or limited, it does not favor any one point of the compass as against any other; northwest or northeast may be as well "contiguous" as north. Nor does the line rest on any agreement between Ottawa and Washington, or we would know of it. It may accordingly be supposed that the suggestion of this line has as its foundation some legal theory, and that it is not merely an arbitrary continuation of the Alaskan boundary north from Demarcation Point to the Pole.

It appears probable that the Canadian theory of the line of the 141st meridian up to the Pole is based somewhat on the history and the provisions of former treaties. Going back a century, to about 1820, the various territorial pretensions of Russia, Great Britain and the United States in the vast northwest were not accurately defined and to some extent were overlapping. In 1821 a famous Ukase was issued by Russia. This asserted sovereign rights over the waters of Bering's Sea and a large portion of the North Pacific and also claimed land on the west coast as far south as 51°. Protests against the terms of this

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Ukase were promptly made by both Great Britain and the United States.

Following these protests the United States and Russia signed a treaty, in 1824, by which Russia substantially abandoned any claim to sovereignty over "any part of the Great Ocean" (although this was by no means the last heard of such a claim). The two countries reciprocally agreed that their citizens should not form "any establishment" to the north and south of 54° 40′, Russia renouncing to the south and the United States to the north of that subsequently famous line. It may be said that the effect of this was to leave territorial questions north of 54° 40′ to Russia and Great Britain, and south thereof to Great Britain and the United States.

The Treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and Russia followed. We now know that the British cared comparatively little about the boundary; they were thinking of navigation and fishing and trade in the Pacific. The frontier clauses were the excuse and the mask for the rest of the treaty. Indeed, the British, if pressed, would have conceded 135° west longitude as the eastern boundary of Russian America, a concession which, if made, would have left all the Canadian Klondike within the United States some generations later. But the 141st meridian was agreed to, and in describing the boundary between the possessions of the two countries, "sur la côte du Continent et les Iles de l'Amérique Nord-Ouest," the provisions of the treaty here material, in its original text, read thus: "La même ligne méridienne du 141me degré formera, dans son prolongement jusqu'à la Mer Glaciale, la limite entre les Possessions Russes et Britanniques sur le Continent de l'Amérique Nord-Ouest."

It is to be remembered not only that in 1825, when this treaty was written, the northern part (at least) of the boundary fixed was a matter of little concern to the parties or to any one else, but also that the two countries were dealing to some extent with the unknown. A considerable length of the northern mainland coast, both east and west of what is now Demarcation Point, was unexplored in 1825 and was put down on the maps of that time by guess. Bering's Strait and its vicinity had been charted for half a century; but Point Barrow was not reached till 1826.

In 1867, by our treaty with Russia, we purchased Alaska for $7,200,000 and succeeded to the rights of Russia under the Treaty of 1825. The expression above quoted from the Treaty

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of 1825 was incorporated in the French text of our Treaty of 1867; and in the English text it is imperfectly translated as "the said meridian line of the 141st degree, in its prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean.

How far is "as far as the Frozen Ocean," or "la Mer Glaciale" of the Treaty of 1825? That the "Frozen Ocean" meant what came to be called the "Arctic Ocean" may be assumed; in the negotiations the words "Polar Sea" were used at least once; but this does not answer our question as to the extent of the line. What lands, if any, lay between the northern coast and the North Pole was not known in 1825, for it is not known now. Certainly if there had been islands adjacent to that coast they too, although then unknown, would have been subject to the same line. We now know that there are no such adjacent islands; there may be islands to the north, but if so they are some hundreds of miles toward the Pole. Indeed, the expression "as far as the Frozen Ocean" is vague enough (taking into account the previous Treaty of 1824) to make it at least arguable that the line runs as far as the 141st meridian itself runs, and that means to the North Pole (for the continuation of that line beyond the Pole is not the 141st but the 39th meridian).

It is also of interest here to notice what the Russian Treaty of 1867 says about our boundary to the west. The treaty ceded "all the territory and dominion now possessed by his said Majesty (the Emperor of All the Russias) on the Continent of America and in the adjacent islands, the same being contained within the geographical limits herein set forth"; and the western limit subsequently set forth in the text runs from a point in Bering's Strait on the meridian (approximately 169°) which passes midway between certain named islands "and proceeds north without limitation, into the same Frozen Ocean." (The Treaty French of this phrase is also worth quoting—"et remonte en ligne directe, sans limitation, vers le Nord, jusqu'à ce qu'elle se perde dans la Mer Glaciale.") These words "without limitation" are pretty strong words. They come very near to fixing the territorial rights of Russia and the United States, so far as those two countries could then fix them, up to the Pole.

So I think we may say that the Canadian theory is, in part at least, based on the history of these treaties. It comes to this: the areas round the North Pole, whatever they may be, form three or four great cone-shaped sectors—the Canadian sector

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from 60° west to 141° west; the American sector from 141° west to 169° west; and the great Russian sector running from 169° west to some undefined line in the neighborhood of 30° or 40° east longitude. The remainder of the circle, from say 40° east to 60° west, would, so far as this theory goes, be unassigned, but, very fittingly, that remainder seems to contain no land at all north of Spitsbergen and Greenland. Possibly a few islands close to the north Greenland coast are exceptions to this statement.

Whatever may be said by way of argument against this Canadian theory, it is certainly a highly convenient one. All unknown territory in the Arctic is appropriated by three Great Powers and divided among them on the basis of the more southerly status quo. Certainly if these three Powers are satisfied with such a partition, the rest of the world will have to be.

Looking at the matter from another point of view, the Canadian theory would give the United States (if we wanted it) a very large portion of the present unknown area. What this would mean in terms of territory we cannot now say; perhaps nothing; perhaps a frozen empire. We shall know more about it very soon.

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FASCISM IN ITALIAN HISTORY[1]

By Roberto Cantalupo

THE most thorough way to understand and judge Fascism is by dissociating Fascism as a political program from Fascism as a movement in the history of the Italian national revolution. It is my intention in the following pages to consider and appraise particularly this second aspect—or function—of Fascism as it is revealed in the history of my country.

The history of the Fascist political party, which is much simpler and shorter than that of the Fascist revolutionary movement, can be easily summed up. The recent political struggles in Italy had unluckily opened the way to parties anti-nationalist in theory as well as in practice, viz., the Socialists, the People's Christian Party (*Popolari*) and the organization of the Freemasons. For years Socialism had preached to the masses the principles of the economic class struggle pure and simple, totally disregarding the immense danger to the unity and strength of nations in theories which appeal to violence in order to assert the primacy of material requirements and which deny all the moral and historical values championed by nationalism in behalf of State and country. The People's Party, a spontaneous and vigorous post-war formation sprung from the ashes of the shattered Christian democracy, which had seemed dead since the disappearance from the scene of Pope Leo XIII, took up again some of the precepts of the radicalism of the last century. It did away with the balance between justice and humanity on the one side and the exigencies of the fatherland on the other, and aimed to restore the bond between the Catholics of the whole world, so as to bring them into obedience to the principles common to all believers apart from and above the obligations of citizenship. This was not the international Socialism of class struggle. It was a spiritual internationalism fatally tending to weaken the ideas of state and country. Finally, the mighty Masonic organization, as it exists in western Europe, made a forceful cosmopolitan appeal, strongest wherever Freemasonry assumes a financial or a directly anti-religious character.

In Italy of late these three elements had become in a certain sense a common peril through their common international spirit.

[1] Officially approved, as an expression of his views, by Signor Mussolini.

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Their activities seriously retarded the crystallizing of Italy's national unity when, precisely at the close of the World War, this conception was gaining clearness and intensity. Fascism as the motive of a political party of conscious, impetuous, abounding nationalism challenged these three internationalisms and fought them in the social, the spiritual and the political field. It was only natural that, having inaugurated this national crusade, the Fascist party should enroll a mighty host of followers, thousands of whom had seceded from the parties that the Fascists opposed.

This will explain the intensity of the political warfare now waging between the Fascist party and the internationally-minded groups. The triumph of either combatant may well be an important event in Italian history. The victory or defeat of the principles of the Fascist party will determine the rate of progress of these principles in other European countries. For Italy, however, the outcome of this contest is vital because Fascism is essentially a typically Italian movement. Such it remains whether we consider it as a political party or as a phase of our national revolution—and even more so in the latter case; for Fascism, though in the guise of a political party, is a capital factor in the formation of the modern Italian state. It is my belief that this standpoint should be accepted when writing the history of the Italian national regeneration which began early in the nineteenth century and continues to this day. From this angle Fascism stands out properly in the grandiose panorama of nineteenth century Europe. Observers often isolate the phenomenon of Fascism and reduce it to the proportions of a rebellious political group. Then it appears as a mere episode, lively, to be sure, but effervescent, in Italy's recent political struggles. We, however, who wish to give it its place in the history of Italian unity shall show the continuity, the inevitability, of the events during the last hundred years of Italy's existence.

From the time when Italy became a sovereign state, and even before she had established her capital in Rome, an element of disharmony was felt within her—the great disequilibrium between the immense heritage of artistic, religious, intellectual and social culture created by Italy for the benefit of the whole world, and the young state's organic weakness. From 1860 on, Italy began to feel the political, diplomatic, economic and psychologic consequences of this disequilibrium—a unique phenomenon, perhaps, in the history of nations. We Italians would

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speak to the world as representatives of an age-old civilization of which we had inherited countless works of artists and thinkers —a civilization that entitled us to a place among the foremost Powers in Europe—and all the while we were speaking in the name of a very young state, still administratively incomplete, still divided by the remains of a feudal structure, and lacking economic and military independence. To be sure, Italy possessed abundant civic and diplomatic tradition; but she was a novice in commerce and industry, weak in finance, and given to an agnostic tendency in religion which left her powerless at the moment when she needed the loftiest inspiration to help her conquer in the struggle for existence.

Among those Italians of that period who were endowed with visions of Italy's future there was intense concern over the extreme youthfulness of their country. Speaking on his deathbed to the young men to whom he was leaving his work of unification, Cavour said some plan to effect a perfect fusion between the south and the north was the most vital task on hand. Francesco Crispi, who next to Cavour foresaw most enthusiastically and intelligently the maturity of Italy, held that second only to the admitted economic inequality between south and north was the disparity between the resources of the new nation and the ambitions of its younger statesmen to claim a part in the future of the Mediterranean basin. The conference of victorious nations that followed upon the World War gave us the very latest instance of incompatibility between, on the one hand, our need and purpose to make ourselves felt in Europe and Africa with all the authority due to our standing as a nation and, on the other, the active opposition to this purpose of those Powers that have for centuries dominated the destinies of Europe.

Such are the historic origins of Fascism. It came as the manifestation of our nation's resolve to remove the disparity already referred to, to square our resources with our aims, our measures with our rights, our forces with our will, in a word, our policy with our civilization. This is what Fascism as a historic movement claims to undertake. Needless to add that if Fascism succeeds in reducing even in part the divergence between our cultural and our political status—for to abolish it entirely is the task of more than one generation—it will have made one of the best and greatest contributions to the history of Italian national evolution.

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This is why it cannot be maintained that Fascism is merely the creed of one among sundry political parties. As well brand as mere political parties the followers of Garibaldi and the liberals led by Cavour.

Undoubtedly the chasm between our very advanced civilization and our limited political efficiency was gradually closing during the years of the national revival—the *Risorgimento*—that immediately preceded the unifying of Italy. It behooves us to see how and why that chasm remained a considerable one even after Italian unity had been achieved. I think it was due chiefly to the over-rapid progress of events during the *Risorgimento*. The masses of the people and the small proprietors had been unaffected by the political vicissitudes of the petty vassal-states, most of them under alien rule, that subdivided Italy down to the beginning of the nineteenth century—subdivisions that kept in abeyance the initiative and the patriotism of their inhabitants. During that period of foreign domination, politics and public office attracted only those few aristocrats and men of affairs who could, albeit reluctantly, identify themselves with the foreign-born ruling element in each little state. The people at large neither opposed nor did they support their princes of alien race, although for centuries they had been fighting and conquering in causes not their own.

With the dawning of the *Risorgimento* the number of Italians who entered into public affairs increased greatly, and now although the masses largely remained unmoved by the political events that had convulsed Europe and were soon to convulse Italy, the aristocratic or intellectual minorities who began to take a part in public life assumed the defense of the great principle of nationality proclaimed in the words: "Liberty and Union!"

As events progressed and the splendid objective drew nearer, attended by important diplomatic events and by the glories of military and political successes, the rank and file of liberal patriots notably increased; but it still was only a small minority of the most high-minded Italians that foresaw Italy as a nation, the national capital at Rome and the birth of a Great Power. The great mass of wage earners, farmers and small tradesmen remained indifferent, or even to a slight extent upheld the interests of foreign domination. Thus was protracted the contrast between the desire of our leaders for the due recognition of a state with centuries of culture behind it and the modest means

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at their disposal for the assertion of modern statehood. Hence the prolongation of the *Risorgimento* as a spiritual and political phenomenon long after the attainment of its tangible aims.

Italians had been accustomed for centuries to identify government and state with personal and foreign domination. They were slow to adapt themselves to the new fact—a national state and government. The concept of liberty which before the *Risorgimento* had implied the negation and antithesis of government suddenly became one with government and state. Slowly, gradually, the meaning of the great national evolution, set in motion by the few choice spirits whose prophetic vision it had been, penetrated the minds of the people.

The great makers of a new and united Italy did more than all others to abolish the disparity between the high cultural level of Italians in the middle of the nineteenth century and their primitive political consciousness. This creative effort was a blend of cold intelligence and of chivalrous heroism, a blend of the best that the spirit of Old Italy could offer and of the latest and most spontaneous of youthful patriotic ardor.

At the close of the events that established the *Risorgimento* in 1870, and in the next few years thereafter, we find the political leaders of Italy continuing, though with less drastic action and less haste, the effort of their great predecessors. It was theirs to build up the strength of a new state that had come into being suddenly through a series of almost incredible events, to organize more thoroughly the nation's military, financial, administrative and economic systems, to secure popular respect for government institutions, and finally—a most subtle and difficult process—to win the loyal support of Italian citizens.

The period during which the Italian commonwealth grew in strength and consistency, amid the stress of internal political strife and of increasing international competition, lasted from 1870 into the first decade of the twentieth century. It was during this period that the earlier work of creative statesmanship began to show definite and hopeful results. On the other hand, it was fully apparent that there was no corresponding development of the public consciousness in the new citizenry. The first international questions with which budding Italy had to deal demonstrated that the people were earnestly, fervently patriotic, that they had fully accepted the discipline of the monarchical régime, but that they were nevertheless still falling

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short of spontaneous and effective participation in the activities of a modern state whose international rights and obligations were daily increasing and whose economic scope was enlarging.

This failure in participation on the part of Italian citizens was, if not the cause, at least a favoring circumstance of the growth of a vigorous, restless, militant Socialism, anti-national and anti-governmental. We can admit today, with the calmness of those who study the past, that our Socialist party cleverly preëmpted the vacant ground which separated the political listlessness of the Italian people from the difficult, toilsome and often feverish life of their juvenile state. We may say that after 1890 a day came when a weak state faced a powerful Socialism with definite political as well as economic objectives. For, besides reiterating Marxist doctrines with their standardized program for improving the condition of the proletariat, the Italian Socialists added something of their own. They sought to hasten by a quick revolutionary ferment the slow and incomplete evolution of statehood—a dangerous purpose because with our young and weak national organism it had fair chances of success.

The Italian Government had to face and solve without violence or serious disturbance the problem of its relations with a Socialism that had been undermining public authority for some decades. A strong conservative government would have fought Socialism in open field and might have routed it; a liberal, democratic government would have tried to rid Socialism of its anti-governmental and revolutionary content and reduce it to the relatively harmless place of an advanced party of the Left.

Forty years ago, however, Italian governments were too weak to adopt either of these policies. They endeavored to absorb Socialism, to regulate it and confine it within the bounds of the established order by pampering it and granting it privileges. This was a most unwise policy and the present generation has had to pay heavily for it. These concessions were only a confession of weakness. It has been said that an enemy must be either blandished or annihilated, but this precept, meant to apply primarily to the foreign relations of a state, or perhaps to the enemies of "The Prince," can be followed in the internal politics of a state only at grave risk. The Italian body politic not only failed to absorb Socialism but actually succeeded in making the state subservient to the Socialists, and Socialism more powerful than the state. In fact, the very people who had

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accepted a constitutional government joined hands with subversive anti-nationalists in paralyzing the commonwealth, although operating from opposite standpoints and moved by quite different aims.

The French monarchy had for a long time pursued some such policy as this towards the great nobles, granting them all kinds of privileges in order to secure their allegiance to the state and make them dependent on it. That was an attempt to win over the aristocracy: the Italian Government by a like system of favors and grants sought to win over the masses affected with Socialism. It was an absurd policy, manifestly predestined to failure. It had failed even before the war. The failure became a disaster when the war was over and the Italian Government found itself beset on every side by insistent Socialist demands for further favors. The country was in imminent danger of the plague of State Socialism. The Red coöperative unions were bleeding the Treasury white. Strikes became the only sure incidents in production. Thus, when the magnificent Fascist reaction broke loose it seemed, as in fact it was, a rebellion against the sluggish evolution of the national body politic—that disability that had hampered our national life ever since the birth of Italian unity—and at the same time an outbreak against the recent decline of the Government's rightful authority and its subservience to those who sought to exact the utmost farthing of spoils in the form of political, economic and class privileges, and then—torpedo it.

Italy's participation in the World War greatly helped her people to develop a national and political self-consciousness, and led therefore to the organization of the impressive legion of Fascists and their "March on Rome." Captained by Mussolini, a typical man of the hour—and this is his highest title and his best claim to embody the genius of the Italian people—the great mass of workers passed over from Socialism to Nationalism.

If Italy had not taken part in the World War, assuredly she would not have had her recent nationalist revolution, indeed it is more likely that she would have suffered a rapid degeneration. Our participation in the war was an event of signal national importance not only because of the diplomatic and territorial gains that resulted from it but for its symbolical and political implications. It is true that Italy desired to round out her territory with the Italian lands that Austria-Hungary had unjustly held for centuries; it is a fact that we wanted for our own benefit—

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and for theirs—Trent, Trieste, Fiume, and Zara, not merely because they are important cities, but because they were the last outposts of Italian population not yet included in the Italian realm; but above all is it true that from 1915 to 1918 Italy of her own free will offered to undergo the supreme test of national strength and unity, for the army of over five million men that went under fire bearing the standards of King Victor Emanuel fused her classes and her masses in one heroic crucible.

The war did indeed complete our unification not only by bringing back to us the upper Adriatic and the upper Trentino but by causing modern Italy, who had confined her military efforts for fifty years to petty African wars, to draw up for the first time in her history a mighty national army and to lead it to victory against the great and martial empire which for centuries had dominated the northern part of the Italian peninsula.

The Italian statesmen who held the reins of power in 1914 failed to understand the idealistic motives that prompted our young men to go into the war. The elders viewed the state as an administrator of government and of public finance and as a dispassionate slow-moving umpire in the contests between political parties. The younger generation saw it as combining and safeguarding the existence and welfare of every one of its nationals. Beyond all question the war has quickened the inner life of the state, has broadened the foundations of the national structure spiritually, economically, politically, and morally. The national consciousness and the authority of the Government have been greatly enhanced. The disparity already mentioned between Italy's high culture and her limited political experience and efficiency is at an end. War brought the nation the fairest conceivable prize.

When Fascism took upon itself to guard and exalt this prize, and appointed itself trustee of the common treasure of patriotic spirit, it encountered more or less scepticism as to the miracle that had been wrought and the opposition of the three groups described above, the Socialists, the Christian-Democrats, and the radical Masons. It was inevitable and logical that Fascism should proceed to quell these surviving internationalists, who had consistently tried to discredit the war and the victory, for the reason that Fascism stands for the newly-awakened national consciousness of Italy.

Having taken over the government of the nation by virtue of

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the now familiar events of 1922, Fascism went on to lay a solid foundation for its plan of national and governmental reconstruction. In this way this most extraordinary revolutionary movement harked back to its distant but undoubted origins in the Italian *Risorgimento* of half a century before, which was waiting completion by the Italian civic consciousness of our day. Down to 1921, Mussolini, the unique and forceful man who was to lead Fascism to its conquest of political power, voiced the principle of nationalism when he declared as follows: "The state is the legal embodiment of the nation. Political institutions are efficient to the extent to which they express and safeguard national interests." He said further: "The nation is not merely the sum total of its living nationals, still less is it an agency for the accomplishment of partisan purposes. It is an organism covering an unlimited number of generations in which individuals are but transitory items. It is the supreme synthesis of the material and spiritual values of the race."

For a better understanding of the theoretical content of Fascism as a motive force in Italian history, we must be more definite. Liberty cannot be only an abstract general idea: it has a concrete application to each of the varying circumstances of a nation's political life. The divine right of sovereigns—sacred and inviolable—is no longer recognized in these modern days; but neither is the liberty of the people an absolute and unquestionable right as it was proclaimed by the French Revolution. Modern statesmanship has found in the constitutional régime both an ideal and a practical mean between these two extremes. In the case of Italy the need of the hour is to preserve her as a constitutional state against corruption, decline and ruin. Such ruin might befall as the result of granting the citizens of a constitutional parliamentary state a degree of liberty incompatible with the functioning of such a state. Liberty within a state must serve to coördinate for the common weal all the energies of the nation. Granted that a people cannot be happy or prosperous or respected if the state to which they belong is not strong and respected, the so-called "reactionary" character of Fascism disappears. There arises instead the prospect of a great patriotic Italian democracy founded upon the willing spontaneous agreement of the people at large and the governing classes that all the national energies shall subserve the well-being of the nation.

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It is the interest of the people that their state shall be powerful and respected. If we admit that there cannot be civic happiness when the state is not thriving, the internationalist and class-conscious theories of Socialism which would set class interests above national receive a serious setback. In Italy it comes about of itself that any party which fails to uphold the principle of a nationalistic state but marks time in an anti-nationalistic attitude is thereby debarred from sharing in the new civic consciousness. Not otherwise did the young state in 1870 eject from its orbit the remnants of those political parties—especially of the Clerical Party of the Vatican—which had opposed the unity of Italy.

It would be a great mistake to believe that Fascism forcibly excludes certain political groups from participation in national affairs. This is not true. It should be remembered that Mussolini himself has invited the coöperation of parties of the Left. In June, 1924, he invited even the Socialists, but these parties have either failed to respond or have declined the invitation, and this because Mussolini imposes certain conditions indispensable to coöperation. The parties in question must accept the fundamentals stated above, for it is by virtue of these that Fascism will invigorate the body politic.

It is true that considerable numbers of the proletariat are still enrolled in the Socialist ranks; it is equally true however that they do not expect to remain there. Of more importance to us are the multitudes enrolled in the Fascist labor unions, for these accept two postulates. The first is that the interests of the nation are best conserved if the class struggle does not assume a form so violent as to disrupt the essentials of production and of civic life. The class struggle can be kept within bounds imposed by circumstances at any given moment, and it should lead not to a collision but to a combination of interests. The second postulate is that the swarming of workers into the Fascist labor unions is doing away with the traditional incompatibility between people and government to abate which was one of the unfulfilled longings of the *Risorgimento*. In Italy today the small proprietors who have definitely accepted the new ideas are reinforced by hosts of agricultural and industrial workers who are no longer indifferent or hostile but who have subscribed to the basic principle that governs the relation between a state and its people —a total and unconditional subordination and submission of individuals and classes to the state.

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We are thus in a period that is post-revolutionary, if we take that word in its usual sense, a period of reconstruction or rehabilitation of public order and of public authority indispensable to every modern state for the right ordering of political and economic life.

This renovation comprises also the safeguarding of Italy's heritage of religion that has been interwoven with her civilization for centuries. The Church of Rome, a marvelous piece of hierarchical organization that has withstood through the ages such tempests as have overthrown the greatest post-mediaeval states of Europe, accepts the hospitality of the Kingdom of Italy. An anti-clerical policy on the part of the Italian Government would be doubly baneful. It would encourage suspicion and hostility from which all religious organizations might suffer and it would proclaim to the world the inability of the Italian state to shelter the most ancient and venerable religious organization that Latin civilization has produced.

I call attention to this particular matter in order to show that the mandate of present-day Fascism is to restore in the hearts and lives of Italian citizens those high principles of public action that a long series of abuses due to socialistic aberration had seriously impaired. Fascism is not the mere temporary expedient of a political party, nor is it a world-wide political movement. It is the right solution of some of the fundamental problems of Italy today. It does not profess to be a formula applicable to the needs of all nations. Whether we look upon it as a party policy or as an historic movement, it remains a thing Italian, not incapable, however, of affecting the mentality of other European peoples.

What will be its fruitage, there is no telling at the present moment. But one thing is certain: the more firmly Fascism takes root in the historic soil of Italy, the better it will know how to assimilate and be assimilated by forty millions of Italians. Given its idealistic program, it is clear that Fascism will have accomplished its mission and attained its objectives when, having won over the entire population of Italy, it shall no longer be the cry of a party, but shall inform and permeate a Nation spiritually regenerated and unified by the ideals that Fascism sets forth and champions and with which it conquers today.

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SWITZERLAND'S POSITION IN EUROPE

By Hugh Gibson

IT IS a generally admitted fact that Switzerland, because of its central geographical situation, the character of its political institutions, the nature and composition of its people, has come to exercise upon the destinies of Europe an influence which is very great in comparison with its size and population.

I

The Swiss Confederation was founded at the end of the thirteenth century by the union of the three valleys lying at the foot of the St. Gotthard pass: Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden. That these peasant valleys were able to join together and survive was largely due to the growing importance assumed at that time by the traffic over the St. Gotthard pass. The pass had just been opened and was of great political importance for the communication of the Emperors between Germany and Rome; it is on this account that the Swiss valleys enjoyed the protection of the Empire and were able to survive in spite of the powerful and growing hostility of the Hapsburgs. During the fourteenth century Switzerland, in the heart of Europe, was the center of all the struggles for liberty against the dominion of the Austrian dukes. And later, when the Imperial throne was occupied by the Hapsburg family, all the enemies of the Empire turned to Switzerland for leadership.

On this account, and because of the development of infantry into the most powerful instrument of war, the Swiss, who were a fine type of infantrymen, became one of the greatest military and political forces in Europe. It must be remembered that the Continent was divided into fragments by feudalism and that no monarchical state had achieved its territorial unity. Under these circumstances, during the whole of the fifteenth century Switzerland was the most stable political element in Europe. This is seldom realized nowadays because of the preponderance given in histories to the development of the Great Powers. It is, however, an established fact. Their military power led the Swiss to play an important rôle in all the wars of this period. They changed the destiny of Europe in ending the domination of

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Charles the Bold, whose idea was to create a powerful state between France and Germany. They also dominated northern Italy. And it was only because of internal dissensions that their activity left so little in the way of permanent results.

During the sixteenth century the Reformation, which prospered in some cantons and failed in others, accentuated the internal differences and definitely ended the political power of the Confederation. But at the same time the Reformation gave the Confederation a new purpose and a new rôle. If Switzerland was not the real cradle of the Reformation, she soon became its home, at least for the French and Anglo-Saxon countries. The influence of Geneva was enormous at this time through the renown of its university and its reputation as a city of refuge for the politically persecuted, and the name of "Protestant Rome," which no longer has any particular significance, was at that time a living reality. But even while she was giving to the European Reformation a center and support, Switzerland was, by a curious contradiction, maintaining a certain contact between Catholicism and Protestantism. In spite of their quarrels, their hatreds and even their wars, Swiss Protestants and Catholics continued to sit together in the Federal Diets. The contact between them was never completely broken and it was thus that the preparation was laid slowly but surely for the spirit of toleration and understanding in which Swiss Protestants and Catholics now live side by side.

The differences of opinion between the Catholic and Protestant Cantons obliged Switzerland to remain aloof from European conflicts and, as a result, she remained in an untroubled state of peace throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This was of great benefit to her economic development. All the writers of the period remarked upon the extraordinary prosperity of the Confederation, as for instance after the Thirty Years' War. Switzerland was at that time an oasis in the midst of countries ravaged by unending warfare.

This long period of peace permitted the growth of public and private fortunes and the development of public instruction to a degree extraordinary in those days. Thus, in the eighteenth century, the Confederation brought forth Jean Jacques Rousseau and took up the philosophy which led to the developments of the French Revolution. For a time, at the end of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth, it was thought

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that Switzerland, having fallen under the French yoke, had lost its importance in the European system. This was far from the fact, however, and Switzerland was shortly to develop a new system of democracy and a formula of peace which had never before been tried, at least in Europe. By the adaptation of American ideas and by the evolution of her own traditions, Switzerland became in Europe the prototype of federalism.

The essential thing which we find in this development is the fact that Switzerland has in Europe a mission as a friendly intermediary. She serves this rôle, first of all, with regard to transit. Placed in the center of the continent, and traversed by most of the principal railway lines, the Swiss Confederation is a center for travel and communication. Most long journeys across the Continent in any direction lead through Switzerland, and by her geographical position she has inevitably become the intermediary in the relations between nations.

From this material contact there has also grown a moral contact. Switzerland is composed of Catholics and Protestants. Her inhabitants speak German, French and Italian; the striking thing about this is not so much the diversity of languages, which is obvious, as the resulting rapprochement for three great civilizations. If the three languages spoken in Switzerland were unimportant dialects, the international rôle of Switzerland would also be unimportant. It would be no more than a curiosity. But the fact that Switzerland speaks three of the most widely spoken languages in the world assures throughout the territory of the Confederation a contact between nations which, for political and moral reasons, often have difficulty in establishing direct relations. The task of Switzerland is to promote international good understanding and conciliation.

II

In the internal life of the country this mission is expressed by federalism. In Switzerland federalism is not a political form conceived by theorists; it is the result of historical evolution. It was born with the country and has grown in such a way as to meet the most important national necessities.

The Swiss Confederation was the result of a spontaneous generation. It was not formed, like most other European countries, upon an already existing basis or by the will of an individual or of a dynasty. Swiss history does not display this character-

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istic of a definite plan and a definite reasoning. It can perhaps be said that France was conceived much as she now is by a Louis XI or a Louis the XIV, but nothing of the sort can be said of Switzerland. When the three original cantons joined together they had no aim aside from the defense of their liberty. When they concluded alliances with neighboring cities, Lucerne, Zurich, Berne, they had no aim aside from the strengthening of their liberties. There was apparently at no time any idea of founding a country. Little by little Switzerland has grown, always by the same method of accretion.

Until 1847 Switzerland remained a pure Confederation of States, that is to say, she took five and a half centuries to make the step which the United States achieved at once.

If the example of Switzerland, which was greatly admired by the enlightened thinkers of the eighteenth century, served as an example to the founders of the American Republic, there is no doubt that the more highly perfected form of the American Government had a great influence upon the Swiss people in the middle of the nineteenth century. When the necessity of a common life, the encouragement of communications and transportation and the beginnings of industrial life constrained the twenty-two states of the Confederation to join more closely together in the form of a single state, it was in America that its founders sought models for their national institutions.

Through this double influence the Swiss and American Constitutions present striking analogies. But these institutions, far from being artificially imported, responded to national necessities and to tradition; that is why it was possible to adapt American institutions rather than to imitate them. The Swiss Constitution thus became an ingenious mixture of American and Swiss ideas. The exercise of executive power in the form of a Federal Council has no analogy in American experience, but the system of a Parliament of two houses and the establishment of the Council of States analogous to the American Senate had no precedent in Swiss history. This Constitution, born during the war of the Sonderbund, that is to say, in time of grave national crises, has been strong enough and elastic enough to permit a complete moral fusion of all the divers elements of the country.

From a religious point of view Switzerland is fairly evenly divided, Protestant elements being in a slight majority. From the ethnic and linguistic point of view the German-speaking

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Swiss make up about two-thirds of the population, the remainder being unequally divided between French, Italian and Romanche cantons. As regards both language and religion the cantons show great differences: the population of Geneva, Berne, Aargau, the Grisons and Appenzell is more or less divided between Catholics and Protestants; Berne, Fribourg, Valais, and the Grisons are cantons where the population is divided linguistically. However, this mixture has given rise to no real difficulties. The problems of language and religion, which so often lead to bitterness and violence, are met in Switzerland without real conflict as a result of mutual tolerance and by the good sense of the authorities.

After the World War certain elements in Switzerland hoped that federalism, an American doctrine, adapted to the needs of the European continent by the Swiss people, might serve as an example to other countries. Their mistake was that they desired to apply federalism as a prompt remedy for ancient racial and religious antagonisms, forgetting that the system had succeeded in Switzerland not as a remedy for conflicts but rather as an expression of good understanding. It took the Swiss people more than five hundred years to find a system responsive to their special needs. This system if applied arbitrarily to other races and other needs would probably give different results.

There are in Switzerland certain conditions, indispensable to the practice of real federalism, which are not always to be found elsewhere. There can be no real federal state except when all elements of the people are united by a common patriotism. If there is no diversity federalism is unnecessary. If there is no common patriotism, federalism is dangerous because it is bound to result in the separatism of certain elements. Useful lessons can be learned by all countries from the experience of Switzerland, but the Swiss system can hardly be applied integrally to other situations. Some other remedy must be found for the problem of minorities which undoubtedly presents serious dangers for the future,—at least until a better understanding and a coöperative interest exists between them.

III

The expression of the interior life of Switzerland is to be found in federalism. The expression of its international position is to be found in neutrality.

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Federalism was not born in a day nor founded upon the will of a single man. The same is true of Swiss neutrality. It was evolved slowly in the course of centuries from the same causes which gave birth to the Confederation itself. Its origin dates from the first years of the sixteenth century when the cities of Basel and Schaffhausen secured admission to the Confederation under the express condition that they would not take part in the quarrels dividing the cantons and that they would always remain neutral. These quarrels were at that time the struggles of the cities against the country, but in time the cause of the quarrels changed and attention was centered on the struggle between Protestants and Catholics. The neutrality which Basel and Schaffhausen had undertaken to keep had a purely internal character. The federal pacts, however, did not prevent the different cantons from acquiring alliances with foreign states; quite naturally the Protestants allied themselves with certain powers, the Catholics with others. Basel and Schaffhausen therefore remained neutral between these powers. Such is the origin of the institution of neutrality.

As internal dissensions continued to grow more and more acute, the Diet, which was composed of the representatives of all the cantons, was unable to adopt any firm attitude as between its members, with the result that whereas each of the cantons, with the exception of Basel and Schaffhausen, carried on an independent foreign policy, sometimes of a violent character, the Swiss Confederation as such could adopt no foreign policy. As a result the Confederation occupied the position of a neutral country.

This curious incapacity characterized the policy of the Confederation during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and especially during the Thirty Years' War. Switzerland was not in a position to take any stand as regards the Catholic and Protestant powers struggling for the domination of Germany, and when at the end of the Thirty Years' War her independence was recognized by the Congress of Westphalia, it was upon the basis of a perpetual neutrality. This principle dominated Swiss policies during the latter part of the old régime.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century this policy underwent a radical transformation, which its authors did not always understand. During the Napoleanic régime neutrality became a word without meaning which France used as it liked. After

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the fall of Napoleon the general interest of the victorious Powers and of the Swiss Confederation was to restore to Switzerland its real neutrality. It was thus that the Congress of Vienna decided that the neutrality of Switzerland should be guaranteed by the Allied Powers.

In order to be effective, neutrality of this sort must meet a double need, that of the neutralized power itself and that of the guarantors. Swiss neutrality fulfilled this double condition more than any of the examples of perpetual neutrality which were afterward established on the same model. The Swiss people looked upon this neutrality as an essential safeguard. They understood, in the light of history, that they could not undertake to carry on an active foreign policy without the risk of dissensions and disruption. The Allied Powers on their side felt that Switzerland, occupying a decisive strategic position, could not be allowed to fall into the hands of any one Power without threatening the continental equilibrium. Swiss neutrality thereby became the keystone of the political system of the balance of power on which rested the treaties of Vienna. The interest of the Powers in Swiss neutrality was sufficient to impel them to accept broad sacrifices. In order to assure the neutrality of Switzerland, the Allies restored her former frontiers and even extended them in certain places in order to enable the country to defend itself and to hold its territory against any adversary.

It seems doubtful whether at the time it was understood how profound a transformation the idea of neutrality had undergone by the fact that a purely voluntary neutrality had become a matter of contract and, from having been a purely political question, it now became a juridical question. Even at the present time this distinction is not always clearly understood. A great many still continue to affirm that Swiss neutrality is voluntary; that it is recognized but not guaranteed; and that consequently it in no way effects the sovereignty of the country. In other words they have not recognized that a fundamental change took place in 1815.

This misunderstanding had its effects on the policy of Switzerland during the nineteenth century. By a curious contradiction Switzerland has always interpreted its neutrality in a restrictive way but in practice has extended its effects. Swiss jurists have strongly affirmed the rights of the neutralized state and mini-

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mized the rights of the guarantors. They have eliminated from the idea of neutrality everything which might appear as a limitation of national sovereignty. But at the same time the Federal Council has always taken extreme care to avoid coming into conflict with any foreign state, to maintain a strictly impartial balance between all the neighbors of Switzerland, in a word to avoid doing the things which the jurists have always maintained were permitted. Now and then the opinion is voiced in the country that this interpretation of neutrality goes far beyond the real obligations and the real interests of the Confederation, but there is no avoiding the fact that the scrupulous practice of neutrality by the Swiss Government has given it a wide reputation for good faith and a moral position which the most skilful diplomacy would never have achieved.

Like all human institutions, neutrality has had for Switzerland good and bad effects. The good effects of neutrality are especially manifested in international relations. It is this neutrality which permitted the foundation of the Red Cross at Geneva in 1864 and its extension in 1906, and there is no disputing the fact that the Red Cross, which has done so much during the wars of the last half century, has greatly increased the prestige and influence of Switzerland. From 1914 to 1918 the international committee of the Red Cross and the organization for the care of prisoners of war which it created, made it possible for Switzerland to render to the world services which are still fresh in our minds. It is impossible to say what would have happened if these organizations had not existed, but it is safe to say that they served as an efficacious safeguard for the Confederation. Not only did they place all the belligerents under obligations to respect Swiss territory but, furthermore, they imposed upon the Allies a moral duty to assist the feeding of the country. The Red Cross was in its origin a purely disinterested and humanitarian institution, but indirectly it contributed greatly during the war to ameliorating the position of the Swiss people, shut in between four belligerent powers and in a situation of extreme difficulty. This is a comforting instance of good acts bringing their own reward.

The central position of the Confederation, the general confidence which it inspired and its impartial attitude during the whole war had their effect and the territory of the Confederation became a refuge for the immigrants of all countries. It had long

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been considered the natural seat for numerous international organizations such as the International Postal Union, the International Telegraphic Union and the International Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property. At the end of the war the prestige of Switzerland, its established neutrality and its recognized aloofness from foreign conflicts led to the establishment on its soil of the League of Nations.

We have said, however, that neutrality has had other less desirable effects. It has caused the Swiss people to lose interest in world politics. Unconsciously, the idea has gained ground that Switzerland cannot, under any circumstances, become directly involved in European events. The Swiss press, instead of discussing European events from a purely national point of view, has come to discuss them as from a distance. Before the war the Swiss press gave an impression that it was considering what went on in Europe from some distant part of the world and, as a result, the war found the Swiss people without any real practical preparation. Under the impression that Switzerland was not directly interested in these events, the different groups of the population accepted more or less passively the ideas which came to them from the countries at war. The German-speaking Swiss took their cue from Germany, the French-speaking Swiss instinctively gave rein to their French sympathies. It was the same in the Ticino, where the people speak Italian. And, on account of this very impartiality of which the Swiss people boasted, it found itself in a sense divided against itself. But the talk during the war of the chasm between the German Swiss and the French Swiss was an exaggeration. There never was any real chasm because the Swiss were never really divided as to the policies to be followed and as to the real interests of their country. There never was any doubt as to the attitude which the Swiss people would have adopted, unanimously, if the country had been attacked from any side. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Swiss were greatly divided in opinion as to the moral issues of the war and as to the repercussions which the war might have on their country.

It is thus that neutrality indirectly rendered more difficult the entry of Switzerland into the League of Nations. Some Swiss writers point out that this is a rather paradoxical result when it is remembered that the purpose of neutrality is the maintenance of peace, which is also the aim of the League of

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Nations. But a part of the Swiss people, carrying to a logical extreme the consequences of neutrality, felt an instinctive dread of any foreign commitments. It was only after a real struggle that the country decided to enter the League. This necessarily obliged the Confederation to abandon some measure of its traditional isolation. Furthermore, some elements which had sympathized with the German cause looked upon the League of Nations as nothing more than an organization for the application of the peace treaties and felt that the entry of the country into the League was a complete abandonment of Swiss neutrality.

The Federal Government declared to the Council of the League of Nations at that body's first meetings that it would be unable to ask the Swiss people to join the League unless there could be found some method for making full reservations for the neutrality of Switzerland. It was not easy to reconcile the League of Nations, whose aim it is to group together the peaceful states against any turbulent state which may trouble world peace, and perpetual neutrality, which seeks to permit a given state to remain eternally at peace, regardless of events. However, the Council of the League of Nations saw that a refusal on the part of Switzerland to join the League would have very serious consequences in Europe. Coming after the refusal of the United States, it would have meant that two of the countries most sincerely concerned with peace had remained aloof from the institution which was set up to assure it. For this reason the Council of the League of Nations, in its meeting at London in 1920, agreed under certain conditions to confirm the neutrality of Switzerland as instituted by the treaties of Vienna.

There is no escaping the fact that there is a profound difference between Swiss neutrality as originally conceived and practiced in the course of the nineteenth century and Swiss neutrality as it exists today in the League of Nations—a difference not only quantitative but qualitative as well. If a new war broke out on the Continent, for example, Switzerland could not avoid the economic consequences of the collective measures taken by the League of Nations; she would have only a strictly limited right to refrain from furnishing military aid and to refuse the use of her territory for military operations.

Be that as it may, Switzerland undoubtedly occupies a special situation in the League of Nations. Less affected than others by political conflicts, she has been able on various occasions to

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exercise an effective moderating influence. Her support of the humanitarian efforts of the League, her avowed aversion toward treaties of guarantee and in a general way toward measures which might involve the League in complications, have enabled the Swiss delegation to the Assembly to speak not only on behalf of the Swiss people, but also on behalf of a current of public opinion prevalent in all parts of the world.

IV

Fortunately the needs of Switzerland are in agreement with the general interests of Europe. They might be described as two things which are in reality only one—the balance of power and peace.

In the course of recent years a great deal of criticism has been directed against the European balance of power. This is perhaps because of the fact that the real significance of the term has not been well understood. The balance of power does not mean that the Great Powers of Europe must always be armed to the teeth ready to attack each other, it means simply that Europe fears the results of hegemony and cannot permit any one power to dominate the others. It is essential that a coalition of countries shall always be stronger than any single power. Whenever this condition ceases to exist, a single power is able to dictate to the others, that is to say to the whole world. The balance of power is therefore a condition essential to liberty and the maintenance of peace.

Switzerland is placed between three of the greatest powers of the Continent and cannot really be independent if any one of these powers is able to dominate the others. This was the case in the time of Napoleon. There were indications of a similar situation just before the outbreak of the Great War. Historical experience has shown that there is no liberty for Switzerland unless there is a reasonable balance between her neighbors. On the other hand, it may be said that any power which controls the St. Gotthard politically and militarily can impose its will upon the whole continent. Switzerland is in a strategic position, similar to that of Belgium. These are the strategic points of Europe and for this reason it is impossible that they should be allowed to fall into the hands of any one Great Power.

If the balance of power is necessary to Switzerland and to Europe, peace, which is essential to the balance of power, is still

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more necessary. It was said recently in the course of discussions over the protocol of Geneva that there is no British interest more important than peace. This formula may be applied accurately to all countries, but to none more accurately than to Switzerland. Shut in between Great Powers which are bound to be involved in any important war, without any outlet to the sea, Switzerland must necessarily feel the effects of any European conflict. During the Great War she was subject to difficulties which have not been forgotten. She has had a very clear vision of the fate which awaits her if a new war breaks out.

But peace is not a passive interest. Peace cannot be assured by the will for peace. There must be active work for peace. Peace can no longer suggest inactivity, it can only be the effect of an effort toward a definite end. Switzerland, which has so great an interest in the maintenance of peace, realizes that she must collaborate effectively to maintain it.

The real need of the present time is collaboration, and through her geographical and moral situation which have here been outlined Switzerland can facilitate this collaboration as effectively as any other country. To realize this it is enough to study the Swiss economic position. Here is a very small country which has less than four million inhabitants and which is far too greatly industrialized for its powers of absorption. As a result Switzerland produces large numbers of skilled workmen and very few unskilled laborers. This leads to a double consequence. The first is that the home market is not great enough to support the national industry, which is obliged to export on a large scale; the second is that Switzerland is obliged to bring in large numbers of foreign laborers to do the work that its own people are no longer willing to do and in return she is obliged to send abroad a large number of skilled workmen.

This is not a theoretical question. The essential Swiss interests are definitely threatened by the wave of protectionism throughout the world. This protectionism is only one of the consequences of the war, or rather of the general fear that peace is not adequately secured. There is a feeling in Switzerland that other peoples are barricading themselves behind prohibitive tariffs in order to guarantee their complete economic independence in time of war, that through fear of real war an economic war has been declared and that in this situation the Swiss people cannot live and prosper.

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There is a close relation between the interests of Switzerland and those of Europe. For this reason in times of crisis Switzerland has always been able to lean upon the pacific Powers, more especially upon the distant and disinterested ones. In 1815 she had the help of the Czar and of England, and later of England alone; during the last war it was England and the United States.

This is not the result of haphazard choice but of essential necessity. For this reason the Swiss people are not disposed to change their attitude; they could not even if they would. Switzerland has a European rôle to fill but she can fill it only by working with the Powers which have the same interests, that is to say, with distant Powers, and among them the United States. This *is the lesson of the past and of the present.*

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THE PAYMENT OF REPARATIONS AND INTER-ALLY DEBTS

By James W. Angell

I

WITHIN the past two years the status of the enormous inter-governmental obligations produced by the war has been fundamentally changed. In the summer of 1923 England made an agreement for the settlement of her debts to the United States. Some twelve months later the Dawes Plan came into operation, and now at last promises to bring order out of the reparations chaos. Finally, since the beginning of 1925 most of the Continental Allies have opened formal or informal negotiations looking to the regularization of their debts.

The world is thus entering on an era, almost certainly of prolonged duration, in which very large annual payments from certain governments to certain other governments will become a part of the normal course of events. The crux of the situation, in the first instance, lies in German reparations. If reparations payments actually reach the anticipated volume, the further economic problems created by the liquidation of the Inter-Ally debts will become comparatively insignificant. The *net* debt payments, regarded as a matter of governmental finance alone, will be largely or entirely offset by the receipts from Germany, and the direct burden they impose will really fall upon the German budget. But ever since the Treaty of Versailles the most serious doubts and forebodings have been expressed on this whole question, both in Germany and in other countries. It is said that Germany cannot pay reparations of substantial size without ruining her foreign exchanges and currency, and paralyzing her economic life; that similar results will attend the effort to pay off the Inter-Ally debts; and that the wisest practical course, whatever the ethics of the situation, is to wipe all of the larger inter-government obligations off the books and start afresh.

This latter view, however, seems to me largely if not wholly erroneous. Granted the exercise of certain monetary and banking precautions, which before the war would have been regarded as reasonable and ordinary, and granted a certain amount of sincerity on the part of Germany, it will be entirely possible to make reparations transfers of the desired size. Nor need dis-

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tressing or threatening consequences of a permanent character appear.

From the strictly economic point of view (it is impossible to inquire into moral and political questions here), there are three principal problems. First, can Germany accumulate a recurring net surplus of funds of the required size—600 million dollars a year or more—within her own borders? Second, can these funds be steadily converted into foreign currencies, without simultaneously endangering the German foreign exchanges and the German monetary system? Finally, can the creditor countries themselves receive the reparations transfers, except at the price of injuring some part of their own industrial or financial organizations?

The problem of taxation, so far as Germany is concerned, will be, intrinsically, much the least difficult. The path ahead may be painful, but it is clear. The reparations charges will hardly do more than take the place of interest payments on the cancelled national debt, if indeed they do as much as that. Their accumulation within Germany itself will require good faith on the part of the government, and a measure of sacrifice on the part of the people, but no insuperable obstacles of a strictly economic character are involved. It may fairly be doubted if the relative tax burden on Germany will be as great as that on the principal Allied countries, even with allowance made for their anticipated reparations receipts. There seems to be no serious question as to Germany's ability to meet it. This is not to minimize the political and psychological difficulties that will undoubtedly arise. But we must either make certain assumptions as to the honesty of Germany's intentions, or else abandon all hope of a peaceful solution.

II

The problem of transferring reparations payments out of Germany, on the other hand, is far more serious. It has been regarded with the gravest fear, both in Germany and in the Allied countries, and is often treated as the one insuperable obstacle to any productive settlement of the nominal German obligations. But that fear, much competent opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, is in very large part groundless. This conclusion follows from an examination of the various forms in which such payments must actually be made.

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Suppose Germany has placed the necessary funds in the hands of the Transfer Committee. Disregarding for the moment the technical operations of the foreign exchange market, the funds can then be transmitted to the Allies in one or more of three principal ways. Germany can export more commodities than before, relative to the quantity she imports; she can export securities and other titles to her property and income; or she can export her services. The export of specie may also be adopted as a temporary expedient, but evidently cannot be kept up long without undermining the monetary standard.

Of these, the export of services is not important. The transactions involved are reflected in such payments to Germany as result from the receipt of ocean freight charges, foreign tourists' expenditures within the country, remittances from Germans who are resident abroad, and so on. The net volume of the payments may indeed be large, but there is little historical evidence to show that they fluctuate in any very close relation to the movement of capital between countries.[1] An increase in the export of capital from Germany, such as the reparations transfers will involve, will not of itself affect them in significant degree. It will not lead to a material increase in their volume.

On the other hand, the export of securities and of other titles to property and income is of the greatest importance. Indeed, several writers have expressed the opinion that such exports are the principal way in which the reparations transfers will actually be effected.[2] With respect to the fairly immediate future, say the next five or ten years, there is much to be said for this view. At the present time Germany is an attractive market to foreign investors. She needs capital, will pay well for it, and can give reasonably good guarantees. But with respect to longer periods, it is much less certain that the importation of capital will maintain any very large volume. As the economic reorganization of Germany progresses, as her own savings, together with investments by foreigners, fill up the larger gaps in her supply of productive equipment, the earning power of funds placed with her will fall. Germany quite ob-

[1] See the writer's recapitulation of studies of such operations in the past, in "The Inter-Ally Debts," published by National Industrial Conference Board, New York, 1925.

[2] See A. A. Young, "War Debts, External and Internal" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March, 1924) and Professor Young's review of Moulton and McGuire's "Germany's Capacity to Pay" (*Journal of the American Statistical Association*, June, 1924). Also see G. P. Auld, "Starting the Dawes Plan" (address before Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Dec. 6, 1924; reprinted separately); and "The Transfer Problem" (*The Annalist*, June 8, 1925).

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viously needs new capital now, but there is no evidence to show that she is really starved for it. It will not take her very long, therefore, to fill the more pressing of these needs—and hence to offer a lower price for new supplies. Investors abroad will then begin to turn to other and more profitable fields, and the annual importation of new capital will dwindle. Indeed, it may be suspected that before many years have passed Germany will not only be increasing her own foreign investments, but will actually be exporting more capital (*apart* from reparations) than she imports.

There are two further difficulties in the way of making any very large and continued part of the reparations payments in the form of security exports. In the first place, the actual volume of new investment has hitherto simply not been large enough, if the available data are at all accurate, to warrant any very sanguine hopes as to its future growth. It might be expected that the substantial guarantees of financial and monetary stability provided by the Dawes Plan would cause this investment to reach large proportions. But the combined investment by England and the United States—probably the two principal foreign sources of capital—does not seem to have exceeded 150 million dollars in 1924; and the total of all foreign investment in Germany at the end of that year is estimated at only 300 million dollars (excluding the loans floated in connection with the inception of the Dawes Plan, which are not recurrent). Yet the standard reparations payment is 600 million dollars annually. In the second place, foreign investment in a country evidently leads to a subsequent outward flow of interest and profits and amortization payments. With a given constant rate of new investment, this outward flow would entirely offset the inward movement in fifteen years or so, and leave no surplus for use on reparations account. The rate of foreign investment in Germany would therefore have to increase steadily in order to produce a continued surplus of substantial size; a situation which will hardly arise, unless it be in the next two or three years alone.

III

It must be admitted that the extent of the future importation of capital into Germany is nevertheless problematical, and that the view just outlined is not necessarily more accurate than the one to which it is opposed. But this much seems clear and

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beyond debate: that by no means all of the reparations payments can be transferred in the form of securities and services alone; and that an increase in German *commodity exportation*, relative to importation, will therefore be necessary. In particular years this excess of commodity exports may prove to account for only a small part of the reparations transfers, but in other years, when the export of securities and services has temporarily or permanently declined, it will account for the largest fraction. In a sense it is the last resort, the elastic residual element which can always be brought into operation when other forms of transfer have proved inadequate. Yet how can an increase in commodity exports relative to imports be secured?

When an exporter sends goods to another country he receives a bill of exchange on that or some other foreign country in payment. He takes the bill to his bank and sells it—discounts it—in exchange for the currency of his own country. The bank's holdings of foreign bills are thus increased. At the same time the total volume of purchasing power in circulation in the country is built up in corresponding degree. If the exporter sells his bill for cash, the quantity of money in circulation is augmented; while if he sells it in return for a balance at the bank, the volume of bank deposits is enlarged. On the other hand, when an importer buys goods from another country he must pay for them in the currency of that country. He therefore goes to his bank and buys a bill of exchange, payable there or in some other foreign country. The bank's holdings of foreign bills are thus diminished, and the volume of purchasing power in circulation in the country is decreased. For if the bill is bought with cash, money is drawn from active circulation into bank reserves; while if it is bought with a check, the volume of bank deposits falls as soon as the inter-bank balances are liquidated. There is thus a continuous process of building up and tearing down. The banks' holdings of foreign bills, and the volume of purchasing power in circulation, are being continually increased at one end and continually diminished at the other.

In the absence of large international capital movements, these two forces of increase and decrease ordinarily operate to keep the volume of bill-holdings and the volume of purchasing power in circulation at what may be called "normal" levels. Although the levels are not fixed, they vary primarily in response to internal changes alone—with seasonal and cyclical fluctuations

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in trade and industry, with general economic growth, and so on. But an export of capital, such as is involved in the transfer of reparations payments, will break up this equilibrium for a time and shift it to a new position. Moreover, the new state of affairs will be such that the country's commodity exports will be increased relative to its imports.

Suppose that in a selected standard year the German Government has placed the required 600 million dollars in the hands of the Transfer Committee. Since German currency is of course not a legal form of payment in the Allied countries, the Transfer Committee will go to the banks and other dealers, and—like an importer, or anyone else having payments to make abroad—will attempt to buy bills payable in foreign centers. These bills will be claims either to Allied currencies, or to currencies that can be converted into them, and will therefore serve to liquidate the German obligation. But suppose further that the *net* export of German commodities and securities and services, in the selected year, has amounted to only 400 million dollars. The Transfer Committee will buy the foreign bills resulting from these exports, but will still be left with 200 million dollars of reparations not yet transferred.

If the Committee goes ahead and buys still more foreign bills with this 200 million dollars of German currency—as it should, —evidently the bills can be secured only by cutting into the average bill holdings of the German banks and dealers. The excess of current supply over current demand—the 400 million dollars of surplus available bills resulting from the net export of German commodities and securities and services—has already been used up. A further 200 million dollars can be drawn from the market only if the banks sell off bills more rapidly than they buy them: only if they allow their average holdings to fall.

In other words, the transfer of more reparations payments than can be accounted for by the current excess exportation of commodities and securities and services will cause a decline in the average volume of the banks' holdings of foreign bills. (The possible drawing of finance bills may postpone this process, but cannot prevent it. The finance bill rests on a loan operation, and must later be repaid.) Now such a decline in average bill holdings, it has already been shown, involves a corresponding decrease in the volume of purchasing power in circulation, relative to its "normal" levels. The decrease is ultimately effected

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at the expense of those who pay taxes. The taxes are larger than they would have been in the absence of reparations, and the proceeds go permanently out of the country. There has been no diminution, however, in the quantity of goods produced and offered for sale within Germany itself; and the decrease in the volume of purchasing power will therefore soon be followed by a fall in German prices. Or rather, prices will fall relative to the levels they would otherwise have reached. If the world price movement is upward they may remain constant, or even rise gradually. They will, however, be definitely below the levels in other countries. This difference in prices, by a familiar process, will stimulate German commodity exportation, since Germany has now become a good place in which to buy. Conversely it will check importation, since Germany is now a poor place in which to sell. The combined result will be an increase in the excess of exports over imports. Finally, the supply of bills of exchange will be increased by the increase in exports, while the commercial demand for them will fall, from the decline in imports.

This process—a decline in bill holdings, purchasing power in circulation and prices, and an increase in the "favorable" balance of trade—will go on until a certain point is reached. It will go on until the increase in the supply of bills, relative to the commercial demand, is great enough to take care of the new demand from the Transfer Committee itself. When that point is reached, there will be no occasion for a further impairment of German bill holdings, and hence no occasion for further disturbances in other directions. The process will thus be almost literally automatic. The very attempt to transfer reparations will give rise to a series of changes which will themselves make a final form of transfer possible. Most of the fears of both Allied and German economists with respect to the economic difficulty of effecting the transfers are, therefore, simply beside the point.

One fundamental condition, however, must exist. The process will be automatic only if the general monetary situation is kept stable, and only if the banks exercise the necessary precautions. The decline in the volume of purchasing power in circulation, as reparations work up to their full volume, will certainly cause distress. It may even produce a temporary crisis, and a depression lasting for some little time. Pressure will then be brought to bear on the Government to issue more currency, and on the banks to grant more credit. If the Government fails

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to maintain a gold-standard or gold-exchange basis for its monetary system, this pressure will be almost irresistible; while if the banks do not adopt a strong and courageous policy they will be unable to oppose the similar demand for increased credit. Yet to increase the volume of either currency or of credit in circulation (allowance being made for the "normal" seasonal and cyclical oscillations) would be tantamount to new inflation, since on the average there has been no increase in the number of commodities in the country—in the volume of production. In either event the buying of additional bills by the Transfer Committee will then operate to depreciate the currency and the exchanges, rather than to reduce the level of prices within Germany. For unless the increased demand for bills is allowed to produce a decline in the volume of purchasing power in circulation, and a consequent decline in general prices, no change will appear in the commodity balance of trade, and hence no increase in the supply of bills (relative to the commercial demand for them). Under such circumstances the transactions of the Transfer Committee will result simply in forcing up the price of foreign bills, to whatever point is necessary to displace a corresponding part of the commercial demand. If the pressure is at all severe the price will inevitably go beyond the specie point. The exchanges, that is, will depreciate, and will tend to carry the internal value of the currency with them. When this happens, under the provisions of the Dawes Plan, further transfers must of course cease.

But the exercise of ordinary banking precautions and a measure of governmental fortitude will suffice to avert the danger. The foreign exchanges are now tied to gold, and the budget is in balance, so that no genuine excuse for the issue of excessive quantities of paper money can be offered. With respect to the banking situation, a courageous and forehanded raising of the discount rate will suffice to check the demand for credit. It will also stop the probable tendency to a dangerous drain of gold, and will accelerate the necessary fall in prices. As the country's prices and general economic conditions adapt themselves to the new situation—to the effecting of large and recurring reparations transfers—the discount rate can be relaxed, and depression will give way to prosperity. As long as the transfers continue to be made, however, the volume of purchasing power in circulation will be relatively low, and German prices will be somewhat under the world level. In these conditions lie not the only

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possibility of effecting the transfers themselves, but also the possibility of maintaining currency stability and a healthy economic life within Germany itself.

There is, finally, one other and far from unimportant danger. If the Transfer Committee invests the surplus of funds in its hands in German securities on any very large scale, instead of attempting to buy bills with them—as it is empowered to do, within certain limits—it will defeat the very object in view. The purchasing power secured from taxation will then be turned back into internal circulation, instead of being withdrawn, and the essential (relative) fall in prices will be impeded or even prevented. Except as a strictly temporary means of alleviating pressure on the foreign exchanges, the Committee ought never to resort to investment within Germany. The sooner it forces the actual transfers up to the successive stipulated levels, the sooner will the necessary adjustments of prices and the trade balance be accomplished, and the initial distress terminated. The power to prevent exchange and currency depreciation, and the real responsibility for it, does not lie with the Transfer Committee. It lies with the German Treasury and the German banks.[3]

IV

The third and last problem involved in the payment of reparations by Germany is this: Even if Germany can accumulate the necessary sums within her own borders, and even if she can acquire a sufficient quantity of foreign bills each year to transfer these sums to the Allied governments—thus liquidating her legal obligations—can she continue to find markets for her increased commodity exports? And can the Allies receive these exports, without imperilling their own industry and commerce?

It is frequently urged that the inelasticity of the world's demands for imported products, and the erection of protective tariff barriers, will cause the whole transfer mechanism to break down. But a more optimistic view of the situation is justifiable. In the first place, by no means all of the reparations payments will be effected in the form of net commodity exports. The net

[3] Similar general conclusions have been advanced recently by F. D. Graham in the *American Economic Review*, June, 1925; and in less detail by B. M. Anderson in the *Chase Economic Bulletin*, April 28, 1924. Both writers pass directly from taxation, for reparations purposes, to the export of purchasing power from Germany when the reparations are transferred. They say nothing of the intermediary mechanism stressed here, which operates through bill holdings and the volume of purchasing power in circulation. Yet without some appreciation of this it is impossible to understand the process of transfer accurately or to devise means for controlling it.

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export of securities and services will play an important though not a dominating part. In the second place, the very conditions which will make the German balance of trade more "favorable" will make the balance of the other countries *less* favorable. Germany will be remitting large annual sums, and her prices will fall relative to the world level. The Allies will be receiving large annual sums, and their prices will rise. Their imports, in consequence, will increase relative to their exports. Moreover, it is at least logically possible that the entire change in the Allied trade situation will be concentrated on their exports alone. If they export less than before, by the full amount of their reparations receipts, evidently no change whatsoever need take place in the volume of their imports. They will not have to buy more foreign goods, and the question of the elasticity of demand will not arise. Finally, such additional imports as come from Germany may simply replace imports that were previously received from still other countries. This is the more probable, because German prices will be distinctly under the world level. Here again no increase in the total volume of the Allied commodity importation will be required. It will simply be a matter of substituting one source of supply for another.

Whatever its details, there is no escape from this process. Either there will be a net increase of importation into the other countries of the world; or a substitution of German products for those of her competitors; or—more probably—a combination of the two. The great weapon in Germany's hands, if she will use it, is that fall in her prices which the effort to make reparations transfers will itself entail.

It is also objected that the erection of protective tariff barriers will prevent Germany from acquiring the requisite export surpluses. That may be true as between Germany on the one hand and producers in the protected area on the other—say the United States. But as between Germany and a third country, such as England, both competing for whatever available market remains in the United States, it is not. Other things being equal, the price situation will be almost entirely in Germany's favor.

All this is not to say that irritation and even distress will not result in the other countries of the world in consequence of the severe new commercial and industrial competition from Germany; a distress that may well be felt most acutely in the countries which are the chief beneficiaries, directly or indirectly, of

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the reparations payments. But such considerations are outside of our present problem. Regarded as a strictly economic process, it will evidently be entirely possible for Germany to effect the desired reparations transfers under reasonable conditions, and for the Allied countries to receive them.

V

It is thus clear that, granted good faith and the exercise of reasonable financial precautions, the payment and receipt of German reparations need not give rise to insuperable difficulties. The accumulation of the stipulated sums in Germany itself is well within the capacity of the German budget, and the subsequent process of transfer can be made very nearly automatic. If the Treasury and the banks will at first permit, and later enforce, the requisite preliminary contraction in the volume of purchasing power in circulation, the pressure to effect the transfers will of itself bring about whatever increase in commodity exportation, relative to importation, is necessary. With the volume of purchasing power in circulation diminished, there will be neither an occasion nor an excuse for a new depreciation of the foreign exchanges, or of the internal value of the currency itself.

Substantially similar considerations apply to the economic possibility of transferring net international payments from those countries which are debtors in the Inter-Ally account. If weak financial or monetary administration in Germany, or bad faith, causes reparations receipts to fall below the amount of the net Inter-Ally debt charges, it will then be necessary for the Continental Allies to make payments from their tax revenues to England and the United States. Regarded as a problem in international transfer and bookkeeping alone, however, these payments will not give rise to any such difficulties as will the payment of reparations; and the process can be made equally automatic. The combined net totals annually receivable by England and the United States will probably amount to less than two-thirds of the standard reparations receipts; and the largest possible net payments required of any one country—those due from France—will come to less than one-third of the total German transfers.[4] If reparations reach any figure higher

[4] Figured at 3½ percent (the terms granted England by the United States) the principal of the German reparations comes to roughly 17 billion dollars. The total of the net Inter-Ally debts due to England and the United States, as of 1923, was 11.5 billion dollars (omitting the Russian debt), of which 5.2 billion dollars was due from France and 4.5 billion dollars from Italy. England's net credit balance, however, is small—less than 1 billion dollars.

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than two-thirds of the anticipated standard volume, all of the Allied countries will become net creditors in the combined international account.

The principal difficulty, and the principal distress, will arise rather with respect to the preliminary accumulation of revenue surpluses within the Continental debtor countries. In eight or ten years' time, even if reparations should fail to reach a substantial size, the budgets of these countries will be capable of providing the necessary surpluses, without the appearance of any increase in the present real burden of taxation. When their monetary and financial stabilizations are definitely completed, it will become possible for them to refund their enormous internal debts at much more advantageous terms—the charges on which are now much the largest single item in their budgets. A reduction in these charges will greatly augment the current revenue surpluses. Stabilization will also lead to the return of much of the capital which is at present expatriated. The consequent expansion of domestic business will enlarge the yield of taxation, without increasing its real burden.

But if the debtors are called upon to make large payments in the immediate future, before the budget situation has been gotten in hand and before reparations reach the full volume, their position may well become acutely dangerous. Even if budget surpluses could be secured it is doubtful if the governments or the banks are yet strong enough to enforce a material contraction in the volume of purchasing power in circulation. The pressure to make payments abroad will then fail to exert its automatic influences upon prices and the balance of trade, and instead will force down the exchanges. A new cycle of currency depreciation and collapse will appear, and will soon make further payments impossible.

The creditors in the Inter-Ally account, therefore, have every reason to defer the exaction of actual transfers—although they can reasonably demand a recognition of the debts, and a settlement of the terms of payment. If they wait, the direct burden will probably be borne very largely by Germany; and even if the German transfers prove to be inadequate, the process of payment will cause distress only at its beginning. If they do not wait, it is difficult to see how a new economic catastrophe can be avoided.

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THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY

By "Sydney"

SOME years ago a traveled Frenchman published his views on conditions in Australia under the title "*Socialisme sans Doctrines.*" Until recently the same description might have been applied to the attitude of the Australian people toward the immigration of colored races. It was the expression of a definite conviction but it was "without theories." The "White Australia Policy" was proclaimed and accepted by all political parties. No suggestion of a doubt about its wisdom or of the possibility of modifying it could safely be uttered by a political leader. But no reasoned analysis of the policy had been formulated nor had any attempt been made to trace its development through Australian history. An exception to this rule could indeed be found in the correspondence of Australian and British Ministers. It has been a fortunate circumstance in the relations of Australia and Great Britain that in the early days of the Commonwealth and even before the Colonies were federated Ministers have been found capable of taking a philosophic and detached view of the policy of exclusion and of expounding it in defense of restrictive legislation. But it was not thought necessary to formulate a detached explanation of the policy in public discussions. The White Australia Policy has not for many years been a subject of party conflict and has been accepted as an article in the national creed which it would be treachery to question.

The statutory restrictions on immigration into Australia are contained in an Act entitled "The Immigration Act 1901–20," which embodies a number of acts of the Federal Parliament, the earliest of which was passed in the first year after the Commonwealth was established. The method adopted is to enumerate a number of classes of persons who are styled prohibited immigrants. The list is a long one and includes persons suffering from any physical or moral blemish whose presence would, it is thought, be dangerous to the physical well being of the Australian people, to their standard of morality or to the stability of their institutions. The first class, however, is not described by reference to any characteristic of the would-be immigrant. It includes "any person who fails to pass the dictation test, that is to

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say who, when an officer dictates to him not less than fifty words in a prescribed language, fails to write them out in that language." The section is perfectly general in its terms. It does not particularize the class of immigrants to whom the test is to be administered nor does it specify the language to be used. It gives the officer or the authority which instructs him a complete discretion and places all races and all languages on an equal footing.

The object of the section has never been disguised. It is to give the Australian Government a means of preventing the arrival of immigrants from the closely populated Asiatic countries and thereby to continue a policy which prior to federation had been adopted by the separate colonies. The language of the section is worth attention, because it shows the desire of Parliament, while carrying out the national purpose, to avoid giving offense to the people of any of the countries affected. No nationality is particularized and no distinction is drawn between European and other languages. The history of the section is also important, for this circuitous method was adopted in deference to the wish of the British Government that Australia should avoid giving offense to any of its colored people, and in its subsequent amendments consideration was given to the wounded dignity of Japan. In practice, the Act gives the Australian Government a latitude which it would not have enjoyed had a more direct method of exclusion been adopted. It has the power to agree with other governments that their subjects shall not be submitted to the test, and it can make agreements with the countries not excepted that the test shall be put to certain classes only of their respective subjects. It is on these lines that the Immigration Act is administered today. The dictation test may be put to any immigrant whom the Government may wish to exclude but who does not come within the classes particularly described. Certain classes of travelers, such as merchants, students and tourists from Asiatic countries, may be and are exempted from its provisions by virtue of arrangements which are not treaties but "gentlemen's agreements" with their respective Governments. Every Asiatic laborer is excluded or would be if the nature of the test were not so widely known that few seek to enter Australia except by some ingenious device, which usually takes the form of an attempt to prove an Australian birthplace revisted after a long sojourn in the land of his fathers.

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Within the past four or five years the theory of exclusion has begun to be discussed and analyzed. A well documented history of the subject has been published under the auspices of the University of Melbourne. Physiologists have studied the effect on white people of life in the tropics, with a view to ascertaining whether the northern districts of Australia can be settled by any but Asiatics. Attempts have also been made to assess the economic value of these districts with a view to forming a scientific estimate of the loss, if any, to production caused by the exclusion of colored labor. The political and economic basis of the policy has also been set out in a number of magazine articles, among which an article which appeared in the *Round Table* for March, 1921, is conspicuous for the breadth and thoroughness of its treatment and the manifest conviction with which the policy is defended. More recently still Professor Gregory has published his "Menace of Color," which under a catchpenny title contains a mass of information on the results of mingling white and colored races. Professor Gregory has surveyed the whole world, but his opinions on Australia are particularly valuable because he has himself explored part of the continent and has gained the greater part of his information at first hand.

Many reasons have coöperated to bring about this examination of conscience. One of minor though real importance is that the Australian universities have become better equipped for the study of problems of economic development and of external relations. But the main reason is that Australians have realized the change which has taken place in their relations to the rest of the world and in particular to the other members of the British Commonwealth. Today it would not be (if it ever would have been) sufficient to ask the British nation to take a policy upon trust and to join unquestioningly in defending the people responsible for it. A nation burdened with debt and with taxes incurred in an exhaustive struggle may still be ready to maintain its obligations whether of interest or sentiment but could not be expected to do so without knowing that the claims upon it were founded not on selfishness but on justice and on an ideal in which all democracies are interested. A policy, participation in which may add to the annual expenditure on defense, must be explained with sufficient clearness to a democracy which is deeply and primarily concerned with the alleviation of poverty at home. Again, the new status of the Dominions, ill defined as

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it is, carries with it the obligation that the convictions and claims of one member of the partnership shall be justified to the others. More especially is this true of a policy which through injudicious defense or careless administration may be interpreted as placing the peoples of Australia and India in opposition. The possibility of misconstruction has been disclosed on many occasions. The spokesmen of British India at Imperial Conferences have acknowledged the right of each member of the Commonwealth to its own immigration policy while claiming equal treatment for their fellow-countrymen after admission. But the right has not been acknowledged so readily by other Indian leaders, and in the agitation which followed the settlement of the Kenya dispute two years ago Australia was denounced as an equal in guilt with other supposed contemnors of the Indian people.

The need for a clearer understanding of immigration problems has also been emphasized in the larger arena of international affairs. At Versailles the Japanese delegates maintained that to draw a distinction between the rights of the citizens of different nations to enter and settle such countries as they willed was a breach of the equality implied in membership of the League of Nations, and their arguments appear to have been accepted by a majority among the members of the League of Nations Commission. The same subject was discussed before the mandates were issued for the former German possessions in the South Pacific, and it was urged that all nations should enjoy equal rights of immigration into the territories. The mandates were then issued in a form satisfactory to Australia, but subject to the reservation of their right by the Japanese delegates to bring the subject up again. It was raised or was thought to be raised again at Geneva by the amendment to the Protocol proposed by the Japanese representatives. Probably the hostility to the protocol which was expressed in Australia was to a large extent attributable to a misunderstanding of the obligations already undertaken by members of the League, but it was undoubtedly an expression of apprehension of the danger of submitting the White Australia Policy to the judgment of an International Court of which the members would not be supposed to understand or sympathize with the reasons on which it was based. The investigation which has taken place under these conditions, though incomplete, has proved wholly beneficial. It has already answered certain widely held objections to the policy. It has

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shown in the first place that the intention to prevent the settlement of Australia by other than the white races was formed in the early days of the colonies and has been maintained ever since, that it has not been directed against any one country, and that it has not been inspired solely by the fear of economic competition. It has shown, again, that the charge of keeping a rich and profitable territory out of occupation and thereby curtailing the food supplies of the world is exaggerated, and it has at least furnished good reason for believing that the White Australia Policy so far from being provocative of war is a safeguard of peace.

Before 1900 Australia was a geographical and social rather than a political entity. It was divided into colonies, five of them endowed with complete rights of self-government under the British Crown and each independent of the other. These divisions had not been framed according to any rule, neither with a view to delimiting areas equal in size or resources nor to placing under the one government colonists who were living under similar conditions of climate or soil. Under these conditions it would not have been surprising if there had been considerable differences in the attitude of the different colonies towards Asiatic immigration and in the manner in which their several policies were carried out. Such differences did appear from time to time. The colony of Western Australia, the last to attain self-government, admitted Asiatic immigrants when the other colonies refused them. South Australia for a time attempted to differentiate between the northern or tropical districts and the remainder of the colony, and to admit Chinese coolie labor to the north while excluding it from the south. Queensland for a time employed on its sugar plantations laborers imported under indenture from the South Sea Islands and continued to do so until the establishment of the Commonwealth; and the same colony refused to join with the others in excluding Japanese immigrants, preferring to carry out a policy of limited restrictions under the provision of a commercial treaty made between Great Britain and Japan. In almost every instance internal differences of policy arose through a temporary scarcity of labor or from a belief that under certain climatic conditions continuous physical labor by white people was impossible. But, on the whole, differences of policy were remarkably few. From the earliest days of settlement there is evidence of a sense of the danger of allowing any considerable number of people to enter Australia differing

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in traditions and in their standard of living from the British inhabitants to such an extent as to be difficult or impossible of assimilation.

The sources of immigration varied from time to time. But whether the influx was apprehended from India, from China or from Japan, Australian governments, in some instances after a period of hesitation, have decided that it would be preferable to sacrifice rapidity of development in order to keep the population of the continent socially and politically homogeneous. There have been differences of method in dealing with the problem. One of the powerful inducements to the colonies to federate was their desire to attain uniformity in dealing with a common danger and to speak with one voice in expressing their views either to Great Britain or to Asiatic governments. Prior to 1896 legislation was directed almost exclusively against Chinese immigrants, the Chinese having from time to time, since the days of the gold discoveries in the fifties, threatened to invade the southern colonies in large numbers. At successive conferences legislation by the separate colonies against all Asiatic immigrants had been considered. In 1896 bills were passed in three of the states under the title of "Colored Races, Restriction and Regulation" Bills, which for the first time applied to British subjects as well as to aliens. It was then that the attention of Australian Ministers was most directly called to the importance of the form of a type of legislation which was to apply to sensitive and highly civilized peoples. Mr. Chamberlain, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, while expressing his sympathy with the "determination of the white inhabitants of these colonies who are in close proximity to millions and hundreds of millions of Asiatics that there should not be an influx of people alien in civilization, alien in religion, alien in customs, whose influx moreover would most seriously interfere with the legitimate rights of the existing labor population" urged them strongly not to put a slight on the feelings of the people of India which "is absolutely unnecessary for your purpose and would be calculated to promote ill feeling, discontent and irritation." In order to avoid these disputes, he urged them to follow the example of the colony of Natal and adopt the dictation test already described, with which the Japanese Government had expressed itself satisfied. The advice was followed by the three colonies already mentioned, who adopted a dictation test designed to

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keep out Asiatic immigration but referring to no people or race by name. It would have been followed no doubt by the other colonies, for there was at the time a widely spread anticipation that the defeat of China would be followed by increased immigration from the East. But at that time federation was on the eve of accomplishment. It was realized that control of external affairs and the maintenance of Australian interests in the Pacific would be a duty of the Commonwealth, and it was generally thought that the whole subject had best be left to the Commonwealth Parliament.

How the Commonwealth Parliament dealt with the subject has already been indicated. In the first Parliament elected in 1900 there was no controversy as to whether or no exclusion was justified, though there was considerable difference of opinion as to the form which legislation should take. The dictation test was adopted because the Government of the day itself appreciated the need for considering the feelings of other peoples and acknowledged the obligations of Australia to Great Britain, which in its turn sought to protect the feelings of British subjects in India and of Britain's allies in Japan. That object has been kept in mind ever since. Whatever indiscretions may have been committed by Ministers, officials or newspapers, there can be no complaint of the attitude of the Australian Parliament as expressed in its legislation.

The charge has been made against the Australian democracy that its motive for the exclusion of colored races was fear of competition. It has been said that the quality in the Chinese which provoked legislation against them was their thrift and their capacity for continuous work. Support can be found for that charge in the nature of the struggle against the Chinese when for a time they were used to break a seamen's strike, when their admission was urged as a means of obtaining agricultural laborers, and even in the attitude of Australian Labor Governments towards British immigrants. But it rests on a failure to appreciate the basis of Australia democracy, a failure which in part is shared by that democracy itself. Allied to the individual ambition for higher wages and a comfortable existence is the national ideal of a high standard of living for all, of an equal participation in the natural wealth and a genuine equality of citizenship not only as voters or as litigants but socially. Just as the White Australia Policy has been expressed in Acts of Parliament so

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this ideal of a high national standard of living can be traced in the establishment of systems of industrial arbitration, in the enactment of a minimum wage and in the decisions of the Courts appointed to adjudicate on industrial disputes. Whether so much industrial legislation will prove ultimately to have been for the good of the Australian people or whether it has not already sapped their powers of initiative and individuality are questions worth considering, but not in this article. The point here is that there is abundant proof affirmatively of the intention to maintain a high standard of living, and negatively not to allow a repetition of the contrasts of poverty and wealth to be found in Great Britain. Just as the American people in their early days decided to be free of European entanglements, so the Australian people have decided not to transport slum areas or the impoverished masses of the Old World. The Asiatic will tolerate surroundings which the Australian will not; therefore he must not be allowed to come in and depress the general average. The Japanese in his own country accepts the wage and tolerates the conditions of another era, therefore he is not thought capable of assimilation into the Australian industrial system. It may be said that the power of Australian trade unions is now so firmly established that they could successfully resist a lowering of the wage standard. That may be so, and it may be true that a low standard is not desired by employers, but it has to be remembered that the population of Australia is small and that the influence of any unassimilated aliens would be greater than in a largely populated country.

The political argument runs on parallel lines. Can any Asiatic people take part in the working of an advanced democracy? The Indian experiment affords no answer and will afford none, for even if it succeeds it will be the government of the many by the few. What little is known of the systems of China or Japan does not suggest that members of the coolie class are fitted for their place in a constitution under which all citizens have equal rights not only in law but in fact. Yet Asiatic immigrants must be given the franchise or remain an inferior class politically and socially, and if the exiles of an assertive and forceful nation are kept in a position of inferiority there will be a constant provocation to their fellow countrymen to protest if not to intervene in their behalf. A people jealous of its dignity or of a newly acquired status seems to regard the treatment of its emigrants

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by other countries as the decisive test of the attitude of those countries toward it. The Australian people may risk incurring the hostility of powers to whose nationals they refuse unrestricted admission, but the danger would be far greater if those nationals were admitted and treated as a class apart. There are tests which are thought to mark an unfathomable difference between Eastern people and people of European descent. Political equality is one. That each individual shall be an end in himself, that everyone shall count for one and no one for more than one, are axioms which are at the root of Western political institutions and are entirely inconsistent with the creed of China, Japan or India, different from each other as those creeds may be. Another test is the status of women. In the West the right of women to be treated as individuals and not merely as ministers to the needs or pleasures of men is regarded as one of the indicia of civilization. The West has "rounded Seraglio Point." In the East the position of women may be less clearly defined than it was, but it is on a totally different plane from that which women have gained in countries inhabited by white races.

It is futile to discuss whether the Eastern or Western type of civilization is superior or to question the claim of the East to a long and proud tradition. Pride of race, the belief that Australia must be kept as an out-post of the White Races and that Australians hold it as their trustees do not necessarily involve the idea of superiority. The two civilizations are evidently different, so different that it will be impossible for a white democracy to admit an influx from the East without danger to its institutions and to the standard which it has painfully established. A modern philosopher has told us that "Civilization is not even skin deep. It does not go deeper than the clothes." Yet the clash of civilizations may tend either to destroy the more restrained of the two or to provoke that which may bring about a return of both to barbarism. The same comment applies to the fear of intermarriage. It does not rest on a prejudice against any one people but on a belief that the offspring of two individuals of widely different ethnic origin will reproduce the faults of both. The generalization is wholly unscientific for it is founded on observation of one stratum only and is opposed to the conclusions of recent investigators. But it has given a great deal of support to the White Australia Policy particularly because the number of women among Asiatic immigrants is necessarily small.

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What have been the economic results of this policy? Has it hindered the development of Australia? Will it keep out of production any portion of the continent which could be developed if colored labor were admitted? It is impossible to generalize for a whole continent or for a whole people. It will not be argued now that colored labor is needed for the eastern or southern states. Their primary products are wool, wheat and butter. Little labor is required for sheep except at shearing, an operation carried out by highly skilled experts who follow the climate from one state to another. The areas used for wheat and dairy farming have greatly increased during the present century, but the demand for labor has not increased in proportion. Improvements in machinery have driven men from the land to the towns and there they have found occupations because the prosperity of the country has provided a market for their products. It is highly desirable that some of the estates in New South Wales and elsewhere be cut up into smaller holdings in order that room may be found for men fit and anxious to become farmers. But there is no suggestion that white men cannot live in health and comfort and there is no demand for cheap labor for the farmer. Much has been said of the concentration of Australians in their cities, particularly in one or two capital cities. Whether this is or is not an evil, whether it is not the result of a healthy economic tendency, cannot be decided offhand. It is certainly not the result of the inability of white men and women to live and work on the land.

A more difficult problem arises, however, in connection with those portions of Australia which lie within the tropics. Can they be settled by white people, and if settlement is physically possible will it ever take place? If the answer to either of these questions is in the negative, does the exclusion of colored labor seriously diminish the supply of raw products that Australia might give to the world? Before this question is discussed, it is necessary to deal with the possibility or the desirability of limiting an area in the north within which colored laborers should be confined and beyond which they shall not be allowed to advance. The attempt to confine Chinese labor within the northern area, the tropical area now administered with disastrous results by the Federal Government, was once made by the colony of South Australia and abandoned. It might conceivably be made again, for the physical difficulties of an illicit journey from north to

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south would be very serious. But any such experiment is open to the objection that if colored labor were admitted to a limited area pressure would at once be brought to bear upon the governments concerned to have that area extended by diplomatic action. Unquestionably Chinese immigrants would be welcome as domestic servants; but there is no reason to believe that domestic service would attract them in large numbers.

The capacity of white people to live healthy lives in the northern districts of Australia seems now to be acknowledged. On the coast during the wet season, which covers four or five of the summer months, the atmosphere is laden with moisture, the wet bulb reading being very nearly equal to that of the dry bulb. But even there healthy families are born and an examination of 500 children in Townsville, the port of northern Queensland, has disclosed no sign of physical deterioration. On the whole the children of the north of the second and third generation are said to be almost equal to those of the south, and they are generally larger in build than the children of Europe. From the interior, where owing to distance from the sea the atmosphere is drier, came some of the finest recruits who went to the war. The north of Australia has one great advantage in that it is not afflicted by the diseases which are known in India and other tropical countries. There is no native population saturated with disease, and for this reason settlers, and children particularly, lead a far freer life than in other countries with approximately the same climate. The most serious difficulty at present lies in the failure of the residents to adopt their mode of living to tropical conditions. They eat meat and drink black tea like the Australians of the south, and, as appears from a photograph in Professor Gregory's book, men wear hard hats and cloth suits on their days of leisure. No reasonable attempt has been made to adopt the style of housing to the climate as has been done in Java, with the result that the women are mentally and physically worse off than the men. It may be that a suitable type of building has not been developed in the north, because the residents have never contemplated remaining there permanently. It has indeed taken the closely settled populations of the south more than a century even to begin to develop an architecture suitable to its climate and surroundings. If the Englishman and his descendants cling to their northern habits in a district which they regard as a permanent home, it is not surprising that

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they are slow to adapt themselves to a region in which they see themselves as only temporary sojourners. One proof, however, of the adaptability of white men has been given. When the question was debated, as it was several times during the last century, whether indentured colored labor on the cane fields should be forbidden, it was said that if the Kanakas were to go the sugar industry would die. They did go, and the area under cane crop is now larger than ever. In 1905 when the last Kanakas were deported the acreage was 134,000, and in 1923 it was 201,000. Ten years ago a Commission to inquire into the condition of the sugar industry on its visit to the coastal districts of Queensland was met by farmers with families of healthy children in disproof of the current belief that settlement could not flourish in the tropics. But it must be admitted that physiologists and geographers who know these regions remain unsatisfied. They doubt whether even if improvements are made in buildings and modes of living, life in the tropics without servants will ever be tolerable to white women. In their opinion it may not cause any physical deterioration, but it may produce physical discomfort and mental irritation to an extent that will render permanent settlement impossible on any large scale.

Whether the north of Australia is capable of great economic development is another subject on which it is impossible to dogmatize. It is certain that as yet means of communication either with the south of Australia or the outside world are inadequate. To ascertain the most effective remedy the Commonwealth Government has during this year obtained a report on the northern harbors from an engineer of high standing, and has foreshadowed a program of railway development to complete the connection of the Northern Territory with the south. It is also proposed to constitute a new state or territory formed from the northern portions of Queensland and Western Australia, to be placed under the control of a Commission. The project would have the advantage of placing under one control tropical and sparsely populated regions which cannot be adequately represented in the national Parliament. It seems eminently desirable, but it cannot be carried out without the consent of the states affected and may therefore be abandoned. It is not to be expected, however, that a change in the machinery of government or even a great improvement in means of communication will attract a dense population. A large portion of the interior

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of Australia is arid and lacks the mountains and rivers which have made irrigation successful in the United States. The Professor of Geography in the University of Sydney says that the area of the Australian desert is second only to that of the Sahara, desert being defined as a region of ten-inch rainfall or less, where agriculture is impossible and only a sparse pastoral population is possible. Of this type of country there is in Australia over one million square miles, of which 140,000 is in the Northern Territory and about a half in Western Australia. Between the center of Australia and the north coast there are districts well suitable to cattle raising, but sheep apparently do not flourish beyond the twentieth parallel. The cattle do well on a rainfall of from fifteen to thirty inches, and in pre-war days when the industry was prosperous fortunes were made from them. But a cattle station is often as large as a European kingdom; the hands needed are very few. Water is obtained in many parts from artesian bores, but the cost of sinking the bores is sometimes more than the country is worth. The agricultural possibilities of the north at one time seem to have been much over-estimated. It was thought that any tropical country with a heavy annual rainfall must be fertile and that because the neighboring island of Java is generally prosperous the Northern Territory also must be capable of intense development. But these analogies have proved to be misleading. In Java the rain falls at the right time and the soil is of high quality. In the Northern Territory, where on the coast the average is sixty-five inches a year, the rainfall is concentrated into three or at the most five of the summer months and tends to destroy the soil rather than to fertilize it. Close inspection has now led to the conclusion that on the coast only alluvial pockets along the rivers and creeks have agricultural value, and that elsewhere the soil is too poor. It is not labor that is wanted to make a land of plenty, but better soil than can be formed from the sandstone ridges of the Northern Territory, more favorable winds, and a rain that falls in winter instead of at a time when evaporation is at its worst. Agriculture can be carried on of course, and cotton has been grown of an excellent quality. There would no doubt be some further production if colored labor were admitted, but the limit of production must quickly be reached and there is no inducement to an agriculturist, white or colored, to settle in the Territory if he could make a living in the south. High wages are and must be

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paid in all occupations, but so far they have not attracted a high class of labor. Good workmen can always make good wages in the temperate portions of Australia and while the prices of wool and of wheat are high the best fields for investment are there. The prospects of mining are at best uncertain. There are rumors from time to time of the discovery of great mineral wealth in the north, and the amount of alluvial gold mining was at one time considerable, but reef mining has been unsuccessful, and the rumors of new discoveries have not been substantiated.

The application of the White Australia Policy to the island of New Guinea must naturally depend on different considerations. A portion of the island has been governed as a territory of the Commonwealth since 1906, a portion is held under the mandatory provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and a third portion is administered by the Dutch Government with its headquarters at Batavia. The white population is and must always be very small; the black population is in a primitive condition just emerging from the Stone Age and possessing no form of organized government. There is no possibility of the establishment of representative institutions, with a franchise to be enjoyed by all the inhabitants. Nevertheless, the reason for forbidding the importation of colored labor to the two portions administered by Australia are equally strong to those which apply to the mainland. The policy of the administration has been to protect the natives from exploitation and from degeneration. It is inspired by motives of self-interest as well as of duty. In the Australian territory it has succeeded and its success is now acknowledged after years of criticism and misrepresentation. Today the supply of labor is adequate to the needs of the plantations and the natives are encouraged to grow copra and rubber themselves. But it is felt that if labor, either free or indentured, had been introduced, the natives would have been destroyed. They would have gone down before greater strength and efficiency; they would have been left with no substitute for their traditional occupations and the Australian administration would have failed in the object which it has publicly and consistently set before itself. The lesson learned in Papua has now been applied in the portion of New Guinea held under Mandate. The right to do so was not secured without difficulty and would not have been conceded by Japan but for the generous and skilful diplomacy of the British representatives on the Council of the

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League of Nations. But it is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant and it should work no hardship if it is administered on the lines of the system of "gentlemen's agreements" already in force in Australia.

A complete examination of the White Australia Policy would, it will be seen, involve a discussion of the whole recent history of Australia, both internal and external, and of its system of government. That would necessarily involve some criticism of the administration of the Commonwealth and the individual states, of their lack of interest in foreign affairs, of their failure to maintain a satisfactory scheme of immigration, and of their haphazard schemes of development. It is hoped, however, that enough has been said to show that the policy is not based on purely selfish reasons, that it is not based on a belief in the superiority of one people to another, that it is not directed against any one nation, but that it is an inextricable part of the social and political ideals of the Australian people.

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

THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF THE RHINELAND

The dotted area represents German territory occupied by the Allies under the Versailles Treaty.

The region north of the line A-A-A was to have been evacuated Jan. 10, 1925, and will presumably be evacuated before the end of the present year. The district between A-A-A and B-B-B is to be evacuated in 1930, and the remainder of the dotted territory in 1935.

Belgian, British and French zones of occupation under the Treaty of Versailles are so labelled, and are separated by thin lines.

The extensions east of the Rhine represent territory occupied by the French and Belgians, including "Sanctions" and other temporarily held zones, as follows:

1. Emmerich, occupied by the Belgians, now evacuated.

2. The Ruhr, occupied by Franco-Belgian troops, now evacuated. It is divided into the so-called "Sanctions Territory," seized in March, 1921, and the remainder of the Ruhr basin occupied in 1923.

3. Cologne bridgehead, occupied by British and French troops.

4. Coblenz bridgehead, formerly occupied by American troops, now held by the French.

5. Mainz bridgehead, occupied by the French.

6. Frankfurt territory, occupied by the French in April, 1920, and evacuated that same month.

7, 8, 9, 10, 11. Zones temporarily occupied by the French, now evacuated.

12. Offenburg, temporarily occupied by the French, now evacuated. Kehl territory, opposite Strasbourg, is occupied under the terms of the Versailles Treaty.

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THE RUHR OCCUPATION

By Nicholas Roosevelt

THE withdrawal of the last French and Belgian police forces from the Ruhr ends the effort of France to use a club in collecting reparations from Germany.

The Ruhr basin—about the size of the State of Rhode Island—furnishes nearly 80 percent of Germany's coal and coke. In it are located 65 percent of her ingot steel and rolling mills. The whole region is covered with a network of railroads, and is highly industrialized. Manufacturers throughout the entire Reich depend upon it directly or indirectly for raw material and half-finished products. It is the heart of Germany's industrial system.

Small wonder, then, that beginning with the armistice, the occupation of the Ruhr was discussed in French and Belgian circles. By controlling it the Allies could regulate the life blood of German industries. Some sought to use it simply as a means of making Germany behave. Others looked upon it as an end in itself. The former believed that only by an act of force could the Germans be persuaded to fulfill the treaty stipulations and make payments. The latter saw that if France could control and operate the coal mines of the Ruhr she would dominate the continental steel industry and so could prevent Germany from re-arming and could keep her industrially weak.

The first threat of occupying the Ruhr was made jointly by the Allies at the Spa Conference in July, 1920, when it was agreed and so stated in the protocol of July 16 that

"if on the date of November 15, 1920, it is found that the total deliveries [of coal] August, September and October, 1920, have not reached 6,000,000 tons, the Allies will proceed to the occupation of a new part of German territory, the district of the Ruhr or any other."

Germany met the demands, and so the threat was not carried out. In the spring of 1921, however, relations between the Allies and Germany had again become acute. The Allies were convinced that Germany was deliberately trying to sabotage the treaty and had no intention of carrying it out. At the London Conference in March of that year, Lloyd George made a bitter indictment of Germany, listing her violations of the treaty. At the last session he announced that

"having regard to the infractions [of the treaty] already committed

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and to the determination indicated in these proposals that Germany means still further to defy and explain away the treaty and to the challenge issued not merely in these proposals but in official statements in Germany by the German Government, we must act upon the assumption that the German Government are not merely in default, but deliberately in default. . . ."

Accordingly, he informed them, the Allies had decided to occupy the towns of Duisburg, Ruhrort and Düsseldorf at the mouth of the Ruhr, by way of sanctions. On March 8, 1921, the Allied troops marched in.

Germany was incensed, but showed no apparent willingness to mend her ways. Throughout 1922 the demand for further occupation of the Ruhr became stronger in France, the people being convinced that in no other way could the Germans be made to understand that the Allies were determined to collect reparations. In Britain this method of enforcing collection was not enthusiastically received, which fact helped to keep France and England apart. The climax came at the Conference of Prime Ministers held in London and Paris in December, 1922, and January, 1923, at which France and Great Britain were quite unable to agree. M. Poincaré there made known his determination to proceed with the occupation of the Ruhr, whether or not Britain sanctioned it. The original project was that a committee of "technical experts" should go in, to take over the control of the properties of the big industrialists, who at the time had great influence on the German Government and believed that they could successfully evade the payment of reparations. M. Poincaré felt that by showing them the futility of resistance it would be possible to persuade them of the necessity of fulfilling the treaty obligations. Belgium and Italy agreed to send such experts, but it became apparent at once that the military would have to accompany them to protect them and enforce decisions. In other words, from the very beginning the occupation took on the nature of a military operation. On January 10, 1923, the French and Belgian troops marched into Essen, Oberhausen and Mulheim. By the 16th the line had spread to include Bochum, Recklinghausen and Dortmund. In February it was extended to include Wesel and Dorsten. A customs barrier between the Ruhr and unoccupied Germany was enforced beginning January 18. Franco-Belgian control was complete. Nothing further was heard of the Italian "experts," and Italy,

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while giving moral support to France and Belgium, refused to participate in the military control.

The Germans at once spread the charge that France was seeking to annex the Ruhr and would remain there permanently. M. Poincaré denied this categorically, and in reply to questions put to him by American newspaper men on January 29, 1923, made the following explicit statement:

"France has no intention of holding the Ruhr permanently. She means to stay there until she is paid, or has assurances that she will be paid. . . . We intend to hold the mining and industrial basin until Germany fulfills its agreement. . . . It may be a matter of five years before Germany gives sufficient proofs of its sincerity of paying reparations, and may be considerably less if the German Government reorganizes its financial system on a sound basis and obtains a foreign loan which would be applied on the reconstruction of the devastated regions of France. But France is unanimously determined not to abandon its guarantees in the Ruhr until then."

By way of showing that he was fully aware of all the factors involved in this action, M. Poincaré added this significant paragraph:

"Paralyzing the mining industry in the Ruhr may inflict hardships on France as well as Germany, but Germany is the greater loser and France will show the endurance necessary to outwit the German Government. . . . French metallurgy is ready to suspend all operations, if necessary, to prove to the Germans that we are in earnest and intend to pursue our policy even if we suffer also."

In view of subsequent developments it is important to note carefully this concise exposition of M. Poincaré's policy. It shows clearly that he had foreseen the course of events, and knew what the results of his policy would be, both within and without Germany. France had counted the cost and was willing to pay.

The effects of the occupation were profound. In the Ruhr factories and mines shut down. Production largely ceased. The railroads and telegraph lines stopped functioning. On every hand the French and Belgians were met with sullen passive resistance, directed and financed from Berlin. There were only a few instances of violence and rioting resulting in deaths, but a good number of Germans were imprisoned for failure to comply with the orders of the occupying forces, and thousands were forced to leave the region. The German papers were full of

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stories of "atrocities" and depicted the fate of the evicted families in the darkest colors. The entire German people were united in fierce hatred of France.

During the first three months passive resistance thwarted French plans. The occupying forces had originally hoped to be able to supervise the work of the mines and mills. This was impossible as the Germans absolutely refused to coöperate. Neither threats nor deportation was of avail. The French then hoped to get out of the Ruhr the coal and coke reserves ready for shipment. But the refusal of the German railroad men to haul them blocked this move. The occupying forces then established the so-called Franco-Belgian Régie, and took over the operation of the railroads. Such was the complexity of the system that it was several months before these were functioning well. The French even considered operating the mines with non-German labor, but this attempt they never carried out.

From a financial point of view, France in the first months was getting little out of the occupation. Her industries were temporarily handicapped by the shutting off of the supply of German coke and coal and by the expense of importing these materials from England or America. Out of 114 blast furnaces in operation in France when the troops marched into the Ruhr, at one time only 74 kept their fires burning. French metallurgy, as M. Poincaré had foreseen, was making its sacrifices.

In the meantime, however, the Government of Chancellor Cuno misjudged the situation badly. It thought by passive resistance to break down the determination of the French, failing altogether to realize that the shutting down of the coal mines—part of the resistance program—could only have disastrous effects on German industry in the unoccupied territory. Furthermore it sought to peg the mark while at the same time printing paper currency in unlimited quantities. This meant that when the gold reserves were exhausted there would be utter chaos in Germany's finances, which, although giving her an appearance of bankruptcy and so strengthening superficially her argument that she could not pay, would ruin her middle classes. As a result unemployment spread in Germany, followed by an acute food shortage. The country suffered all the pangs of deflation, and was facing the certainty of ultimate defeat.

Outside of Germany, Holland lost much of her Rhine trade. Czechoslovak industries profited from the closing down of their

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

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THE RUHR: SUCCESSIVE STAGES OF OCCUPATION AND EVACUATION

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German competitors, cut off from their accustomed supplies of Ruhr coal. British coal and steel manufactures benefited for a few months from the withdrawal of a large part of German competition. But the economic structure of all Europe suffered from the general dislocation following upon the economic deadlock that had taken place, and by the strained political situation that resulted.

In Britain criticism of France was acute, and it became fashionable to ascribe all of England's troubles to the occupation of the Ruhr. Lord Curzon entered into a belated epistolary duel with M. Poincaré about the legality of the occupation—a question which was really largely academic save in so far as it encouraged the Germans to hope for active help from England against France and so stiffened passive resistance. M. Poincaré reminded Lord Curzon that England had twice signed an ultimatum to Germany threatening the occupation of the Ruhr—at the Spa Conference in 1920 and in the decision of the Supreme Council on May 5, 1921, and that on neither occasion had the British Government seen fit to raise the question of the legality of the action. As for the contention that the illegality resided in the fact that separate action of one or more of the Allies was incompatible with the proper interpretation of paragraphs 17 and 18 of Annex 2 of the Versailles Treaty, M. Poincaré pointed out that the British Government as far back as October 28, 1920, had justified separate action under these clauses. Addressing Parliament on that date concerning the right of the British Government to follow its own course in regard to the seizure of German property, the Chancellor of the Exchequor explained that in the view of His Majesty's Government

"section 18 clearly leaves to each of the respective Governments the task of determining what action may appear to it necessary by virtue of the said paragraph."

But time was playing against the Germans. Passive resistance was hurting Germany more than France. During the first few months it had succeeded in preventing the French from obtaining deliveries of coal and coke, and had greatly increased the costs of occupation. But the effect upon unoccupied Germany was too great, and coupled with inflation was inviting chaos and disaster. In September, therefore, Chancellor Stresemann, who had succeeded Herr Cuno, finally abandoned the policy. As a realist he saw that it was futile. Furthermore, he hoped that by

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so doing he might be able to negotiate favorably with M. Poincaré. To previous German advances the French Premier had always replied that there could be no discussion until passive resistance was abandoned. Now, however, M. Poincaré declined to deal with the German Government, thus losing sympathy abroad and stiffening German distrust of France. His critics felt that even a gesture of friendliness might have hastened a rapprochement. But he remained obdurate and harsh. Ignoring Dr. Stresemann's desires to meet him half way, he entered into direct negotiations with the Ruhr industrialists for the resumption of payments in kind, letting it be known that he valued the agreements with those who would make the deliveries more than he did the mere promise of a Government that had so often shown its bad faith towards France.

On October 9, 1923, M. Poincaré announced to the Reparation Commission that General Degoutte, representing the forces of occupation in the Ruhr, had concluded with two groups of German industrialists, the Phoenix and the Rheinische Stahlwerke, the first successful agreements for the resumption of deliveries in kind. Negotiations with Stinnes and Thyssen and their associates meantime continued, and by the middle of November a series of arrangements between the forces of occupation and the German mine owners and industrialists were concluded for the delivery of coal and coke. These are the famous "Micum" agreements, which take their name from the initial letters of the "Mission Interallié de Contrôle des Usines et Mines." Production in the Ruhr was gradually resumed. Tension slackened. The successful stabilization of the rentenmark by Dr. Schacht at last gave a fixed unit of currency again, enabling people to gauge their income and expenditures on a basis comparable to that of the old days of the gold mark.

Throughout this period the world had lost sight of the fact that the real object of the Ruhr occupation was to force Germany to come to some satisfactory arrangement about the permanent payment of reparations. The German Government, however, was fully aware of this, despite its efforts to make it seem that the French objective was annexation. Accordingly several feelers were put forward. On April 8, 1923, the German Chancellor let it be known that he was ready for a conference. On the 16th, in a speech before the Reichstag, Foreign Minister Rosenberg offered 30,000,000,000 gold marks. On May 2 this offer

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was put into a formal note, which was rejected on May 6 by Poincaré. On May 11 Lord Curzon also rejected it, and advised a new offer. On May 24 the German Minister of Finance, Dr. Hermes, submitted to the cabinet a plan for Germany to pay 50,000,000,000. On June 7 the German Government sent a note offering to pay 1,500,000,000 gold marks a year. This was rejected by Poincaré. The British considered the offer more satisfactory and sought to induce France and Belgium to consider it as a talking basis. Throughout July and August the differences between France and England kept these two nations from joint negotiations. On August 24, Chancellor Stresemann, having received no reply to the proposals of June 7, in a public speech renewed that offer and suggested that productive pledges might be furnished France. In another speech on September 2 he repeated this offer. Poincaré, five days later in a public address repudiated the suggestion of pledges, saying that he preferred to hold those which France had in the Ruhr. On September 28 Herr Stresemann repeated his offer again, urging that the fact that passive resistance had been given up was a sign of good faith. M. Poincaré, as has already been explained insisted that a mere announcement that passive resistance had ended was not conclusive. Deliveries must be resumed.

Early in October, Lloyd George on a lecture tour in America urged that the Allies take up the proposal of Mr. Hughes made in his speech in New Haven in December, 1922, for the appointment of an international commission to discuss Germany's capacity to pay. Ambassador Harvey echoed the suggestion. On October 12, 1923, Lord Curzon officially proposed that the United States Government join such a commission. Mr. Hughes replied on the 15th, making acceptance conditional upon full and unfettered acceptance by France, and upon assurances that the question of interallied debts would not be discussed. M. Poincaré, however, insisted that the experts should make no attempt to reduce France's claims against Germany, and that the occupation of the Ruhr should not be considered. In a speech on October 28 he elaborated his reservations, and on November 3 embodied them in a communication to Lord Curzon. On November 10 the American State Department let it be known that it refused to accept these limitations. In so doing it reflected the unwillingness of the British to see the work too rigidly circumscribed in advance.

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Towards the middle of November M. Poincaré became alarmed at the reaction to his attitude. On November 16 he suggested that the Reparation Commission designate a committee of experts. Negotiations between himself and Colonel James A. Logan, Jr., the American unofficial observer at the Reparation Commission, continued during the next ten days, and resulted finally in the acceptance by all the Powers, including the United States, of the proposal to appoint delegates to such a commission. Mr. Hughes made it known on December 11 that America would attend. Thus was the famous Dawes Committee called into life.

This committee ostentatiously refrained from discussing the Ruhr. It was tacitly accepted, however, throughout the conferences, that the region would be evacuated when and as Germany showed her good faith. At the London Conference in August, 1924, the evacuation of the Ruhr was provided for in a special agreement as part of the bargain which made the Dawes Plan effective. France and Belgium undertook to remove the customs barrier between the Ruhr and the rest of Germany by September 9. On September 22 the final restrictions on taxes and the movement of goods were withdrawn. On October 22 the economic evacuation was completed—that is, all restrictions of an economic nature were removed. The garrisons were gradually reduced, the railroads were turned over to German control, but not until July 31, 1925, did the last troops withdraw from the territory occupied in January, 1923. By the third week in August the evacuation of Duisburg, Ruhrort and Düsseldorf, which had been occupied in March, 1921, by way of special sanctions, was completed.

So ended the Ruhr episode. How much it paid in cash is a debatable problem, despite the official figures of the French Government which showed a net profit for the year ending January 10, 1924, of 479,195,000 paper francs and thereafter throughout the first seven months of 1924 of about 500,000,000 paper francs a month. A satisfactory accounting would have to make allowances for such items as deliveries and payments which Germany might have made had the region not been occupied, and for losses and gains of trade.

As a diplomatic weapon, however, the Ruhr occupation may be said to have been successful. It was an extreme measure. To the Germans it drove home the futility of further resistance. To the French it made clear the impossibility of jailing a debtor

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and yet making him pay. It thus clarified the atmosphere. At the time the Dawes Committee first met General Dawes remarked: "If the French were not in the Ruhr we experts would not be here." In other words, this use of a club made it possible for the Allies to discuss terms which Germany could and would respect. At the same time the desire of the Germans to get the French out of the Ruhr was so great that they were prepared to make big concessions.

In looking back it is striking how completely M. Poincaré's words of January 29, 1923, were vindicated. France, he declared, had no intention of holding the Ruhr permanently, but would stay until Germany gave sufficient proof of her sincerity in paying reparations and set her finances on a sound basis and obtained a foreign loan. These conditions have all been met with the exception that the loan, instead of being applied to French reconstruction, is being used to enable Germany to get on her feet and commence making payments. Perhaps the best gauge of the value of the enterprise is in comparing conditions in January, 1923, and August, 1925. Before the French went in, relations with Germany were strained. All efforts to reach a working agreement for the regular payment of reparations had failed. Germany was in default on certain deliveries in kind. Apparently she was determined to resist her obligations. Today Franco-German relations are friendly, the Dawes Plan for the payment of reparations is functioning smoothly, and Germany is paying loyally.

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COPPER

By James R. Finlay

PERSONS engaged in mining feel themselves prodded from time to time to defend themselves against a common half-truth, namely, that their business is so risky as to appeal only to gamblers and that therefore it is not quite respectable. The retort (it becomes impatient if one is asked to repeat it too often) is that there are only two fundamental industries—first, that which obtains supplies from the vegetable and animal kingdoms, *i.e.*, agriculture, hunting and fishing; second, that which obtains supplies from the crust of the earth, *i.e.*, mining. The first began with the pursuit of food; the second with the pursuit of tools.

Mining is younger than the pursuit of food, for all animals must have food, and all except man are without tools; but it is older than agriculture and goes back to the time when man first began to look for something that would help him to fight, or to catch, other animals—the time when he became intelligent enough to be called a man. The industrial centers of the old stone age were places where flints could be mined; and it was done on a large scale before even the dog was domesticated, when the wild horse and the mammoth were chased for food by men on foot, when the front of the Scandinavian glacier flowed to the heart of England.

Jumping from the dawn of human industry to its latest stage, we find that mining in the last century has made the greatest strides in its history. The use of the metal copper will show this as well as anything. In the decade ending with 1820 the world production of copper was 96,000 tons; in the decade ending with 1920 it was 10,883,000 tons, or 112 times greater than it had been a hundred years before.[1] In the same century the population of the world has increased by two or perhaps two and one-half times; the use of copper has exceeded it some fifty times over; and it has gained in some such proportion over the pursuit of food. It has not gained so much over agriculture in general because, outside of food, that industry supplies enormous quantities of products which go into modern manufactures in the same manner and probably in the same increase as the

[1] See Arthur Notman, *Engineering and Mining Journal-Press*, June 30, 1923.

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metals—for example, timber, rubber and cotton. But, for all that, the growth of mining over agriculture has been very great.

It is doubtful if the thinking public realizes the fact that the growth of mining and the dependence of civilization on its products marks the greatest event and the greatest change in human life and human work that ever occurred.

Copper was one of the first metals, perhaps the very first, to be used for tools and so to help in the production of other things. Its use probably began about four thousand years ago. There was the age of copper and of bronze which, if anything, preceded in ancient civilized countries the general use of iron. Yet as much copper has been produced since 1909 as in the preceding four thousand years. We speak of the present time as the age of iron, but the use of copper is growing faster than that of iron. In 1850, one pound of copper was made to 125 pounds of iron; in 1910, one pound to 72; in 1924, one pound to about 50.

But for the past seven years American producers of copper, and presumably those of the rest of the world, have been complaining of hard times: people have not been buying copper as fast as they could produce it. I have not set out here to discuss the commercial side of copper mining, but the fact seems worth mentioning just to show how a commodity can be over-produced on a large scale, in face of a powerful demand, as easily as when the output was very much smaller. And it will serve our end, that of giving a fair survey of the place in the industry in the world, to follow this matter up to see how it came about.

Patently, the glut of copper was a result, or at least a sequence, of the war, for it came on with the armistice and has continued ever since—that is, seven years. The depression or confusion caused by it was at its worst in 1922, when nearly all the American mines were closed down. Since then, the output in this country has been raised four-fold, no important mines are closed—in fact, nearly all are running at speed—and yet the market is no longer over-supplied. It can still be easily supplied and there is nothing as yet to force buyers to bid up the price, but we may see that the cycle of over-production has about swung through. Copper all this time has been, still is, and may long continue to be, cheaper by any fair standard than it was before the war; it probably is cheaper than ever before in its history. This fact has come as a surprise to the copper miners. In 1922, I was making an appraisal of the mines of New Mexico

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for the authorities of the state, and in my report made some remarks along this line which it may be interesting to quote, since they were made in the depths of a depression which it was important to gauge: "The commercial situation of this metal is confused; it seems to have lost the balance with other products which in former times was fairly permanent and was accepted as normal; its producers are reaching out, in the effort to understand its future, to general speculations, historical and economic, which a few years ago they would have put down as irrelevant and visionary. A persistent demand equal to the supply was for many years a solid fact; there seemed to be no practical reason for inquiring into the causes; one answer was sufficient—copper was scarce. This situation lasted until the armistice; since then copper has been a drug on the market; hardly any other first-class commodity has been so easily over-produced. . . . How much of the increased use of copper, even before the war, say from 1900 to 1910, was due to smaller wars, preparations for war, the growth of naval armament and the construction of plants to build that armament? The enormous consumption during the war suggests that these uses may have been very considerable."

Thinking the matter over since that time, I am led to believe that here lies the cause of the over-stimulation of copper production. Production would have increased greatly anyway through the spread of electrical, and all other mechanical, appliances. It was mainly in these ways, of course, that copper was used for war preparations. But these preparations afforded a stimulus of which the American public was quite unconscious. It accepted all the uses to which copper was put as normal commercial uses; but the result of the war made some of them abnormal.

Commercial efforts are seldom if ever made in answer to a comprehensive survey of the world's needs. The primary cause is the sight of profits. During the whole time we are talking about, say for fifteen years before the war, it was a commonplace that copper mines were more gainful than any others. Promoters had a steady stream of kingly fortunes to point to in the ownership of mines like Calumet and Hecla, Rio Tinto (Spain), Copper Queen (Arizona), Anaconda (Montana) and many others. When other deposits that had long been more or less known were made available by new processes between 1900 and 1910, all the re-

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sources of modern mechanical science and of finance were freely spent to develop them to the utmost. The war furnished for a time a channel for the gush of copper that resulted.

I cannot get over the wonder of the phenomenon that the world now wants and can have a hundred times as much metal (for copper is only one among all the others) as it got a century ago. It shows the strength and depth of the new powers we have called into play. Perhaps still more striking is the fact that mankind, even today, employs or knows how to employ only a small part of these forces; that the gulf between those who do so employ them and those who do not is widening; and that it is doubtful whether any but the most favored races ever will employ them. The great revolution in life has been worked out by one stock or group of people only, the people of northern and western Europe, including Italy, and their offshoots which now spread to America and other parts of the world. Other peoples, like the Japanese and Chinese, have been clever enough to wish to learn to do likewise and no doubt will go far in the long run, but it is fair to say that as yet they have contributed little to the methods, and their success has been chiefly by imitation or under guidance. As for the masses in some of the white nations, like the *mujiks* and the self-landed proletariat of Russia, they continue to show themselves thoroughly without insight into the true revolution that has been brought about in the western nations, and in their hands power-using industries have gone to rack and ruin: their "revolution" has been a going backward. Thinking to make themselves rich by taking away the wealth of others, they have stopped the production of goods; they have made the rich poor and themselves poorer. After six years of this the Bolshevik Government announced with satisfaction that the production of metals had reached five percent of what it was before the war! For every twenty pounds of copper that Russia made in 1913, she was getting one! In other words, they have gone back at one stroke to the habits of a hundred or a thousand years ago. I believe that the masses of most other nations would do the same. To my mind this is the great fact in world politics today, so much greater than any other that the jealousies between nations like France and Germany seem childish by comparison, and will steadily seem more so.

One might ramble on with these reflections for some time, but it will perhaps be better to set down some specific details regard-

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ing the place of copper in the world of today. The principal factors to be considered, I should say, are: first, the growth of methods which make copper cheap; second, the ownership of mines; third, the ultimate supply.

1. One hundred years ago Chile was one of the chief copper producers of the world. After passing through a decline which brought it to a place of insignificance, it has in late years again became a great producer. By glancing briefly at how they formerly got copper and how they get it now, we shall see how the art has gone forward and why miners are richer than they used to be.

About 1835, Charles Darwin, then on his voyage in the *Beagle*, made various notes on the copper mines of Chile. We may quote from him:

"It is now well known that the Chilian method of mining is the cheapest. . . . A few improvements have been introduced in some of the simple machinery; but even to the present day, water is removed from some mines by men carrying it up the shaft in leathern bags! The laboring men work very hard. They have little time allowed for their meals, and during summer and winter they begin when it is light, and leave off at dark. They are paid one pound sterling a month, and their food is given them; this, for breakfast, consists of sixteen figs and two small loaves of bread; for dinner, boiled beans; for supper, broken roasted wheat grain. They scarcely ever taste meat; as, with twelve pounds per annum, they have to clothe themselves, and support their families. The miners who work in the mine itself have twenty-five shillings per month, and are allowed a little *charqui*. But these men come down from their bleak habitations only once in every fortnight or three weeks."

Again, on May 4, 1835, he proceeds, with regard to some mines near a place called Los Hornas, south of Coquimbo: "Captain Head has described the wonderful load which the *apires*, truly beasts of burden, carry up from the deepest mines. I confess I thought the account exaggerated: so that I was glad to take an opportunity of weighing one of the loads, which I picked out at hazard. It required considerable exertion on my part, when standing directly over it, to lift it from the ground. The load was considered under weight when found to be 197 pounds. The *apire* had carried this up eighty perpendicular yards—part of the way by a steep passage, but the greater part up notched

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poles, placed in a zigzag line up the shaft. According to a general regulation the *apire* is not allowed to halt for breath except the mine is six hundred feet deep. The average load is considered as rather more than 200 pounds and I have been assured that one of 300 pounds (twenty-two stone and a half) by way of a trial has been brought up from the deepest mine! At this time the *apires* were bringing up the usual load twelve times in a day; that is, 2,400 pounds from eighty yards deep; and they were employed in the intervals in breaking and picking ore. Their bodies are not very muscular; they rarely eat meat once a week, and never oftener, and then only the hard dry *charqui*. Although with the knowledge that the labor was voluntary, it was nevertheless quite revolting to see the state in which they reached the mouth of the mine."

This is enough to show what it was like to gain copper by hand labor. But it was only the beginning of the process. Once out of the mine, copper was packed by mules or *burros* to the seaport, thence carried some 9,000 miles by sailing ship to Wales, there to be smelted, refined and sent to market by boat or by wagon. How much copper was gotten by each man, then, when we divide it by the number of overseers, miners, water carriers, *apires*, *arrierros* (mule drivers), stevedores, sailors, smeltermen, refiners, wagoners, etc., etc., etc., when the utmost that one man could merely carry out of the mine was a little over a ton a day, and that by exertion that passed for a wonder? My observation of industry leads me to make a remark which may be taken as cruel: those *apires* were well paid with their pound a month and their morsels of dried *charqui*. That method of getting copper would not give them even half as much today; even if they broke their poor backs carrying their heavy loads, if they had only eight figs for breakfast instead of sixteen, they would still fail to make copper cheaply enough; they would be victims not of hard work or oppression, but of the stupidity of trying to match their food against the power of coal, oil, or water, their muscles against engines of steel and brass, their skill against the training of armies like those of Standard Oil.

Remember the *apire* with his 2,400 pounds a day. I have seen an engine hoisting, by itself, 20,000 tons a day, or 40,000,000 pounds—its attendant wandering about a great room looking at instruments or out of the window. This copper ore came from a depth of 600 feet, in the deserts of North America, where in

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the time of Darwin copper was mined even more crudely and scantily than in Chile. In the same mines you would find, instead of peons with leather water bags, a little electric pump not much bigger than a bushel basket, with no one to watch it, turned on like a light in your bathroom, pumping a thousand times more water than any army of peons could bail out, and from far greater depths.

It is by such changes that copper has been made cheap and plentiful. During the last twenty years, particularly, the mining of it has been industrialized: it is no longer very much a question of the finding of new and rich veins, but of the manufacture of very large low-grade masses of copper-bearing rock. Many such are known to contain from 50 to as high as 700 million tons, running from 20 pounds to about 45 pounds to the ton in the crude state. And it is not only the application of capital and organization that has brought these great supplies into the market; some improvements in the art of treating the ores have since 1910 made almost every deposit about 25 percent richer than it was before. The greatest of these is the new process of oil flotation—a very simple thing, nothing more than churning up the ground ore in water with a little oil; the particles of ore float to the surface in the froth and are swept off, while the worthless, though lighter, rock sinks to the bottom. By means of this a mine like Utah Copper obtains now some 16 or 17 pounds of copper from an ore that only contains 20 pounds in its crude state, while formerly it got only the same 16 or 17 pounds from rock running more than 30 pounds. It is safe to say that there are many times more of the 20-pound rock than of the 30-pound rock (to say nothing of the 40-pound rock which twenty years ago was thought to be about the lowest that would pay) and it can be dug out more freely and easily, thus more cheaply. This, be it remembered, is only an example to show what has happened in nearly all the copper mines of the world. With about the same capital and equipment they can either turn out say 25 percent more copper or they can get the same amount from leaner, more plentiful and cheaper ores: they can make copper cheaper.

2. The great source of copper is a strip bordering the Pacific Ocean. There are two active districts in Chile, one in Central Peru, three in Mexico, fourteen in the United States, two in British Columbia, two in Alaska, and two in Japan, to mention

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only the important ones; and of these the farthest from salt water is only 600 miles, and nearly all are within 200 miles. These mines produce nearly three-quarters of the world's supply today. We might almost call copper mining an ocean shore industry.

Next in present importance, as well as in importance for the future, is the Katanga field in south-central Africa. Next is the Lake Superior field in central North America. Then follow scattering producers like Rio Tinto in Spain, Mansfeld in Germany, and several mines in the Ural region of Russia.

Of the copper mines of the western hemisphere all but one (Bolea in Lower California, rather insignificant, owned by the French) are owned and managed by American citizens and equipped by American machinery. The product of these mines is two-thirds of the world's total. The African fields are controlled by English and Belgians, the English influence preponderating. England also owns the Spanish mines and thinks she owns those of Russia, although the Soviets have taken them over. The Japanese own their mines, and the Germans theirs. But British or Americans control or own the vast majority of the copper mines of the world, mostly in their own territories, but a good fraction on foreign soil. Canada and the United States alone produce at least half of the world's copper, but this share may get a little smaller as South America and Africa (chiefly the latter) raise their output.

I cannot see any political problem in the production of copper. The share of the Anglo-Saxons in it is quite in line with their share in other metals and industrial products; that is, they control, or make, nearly or quite as much of the iron, lead, gold, cotton, timber, shipping, railroads, factories, etc., as they do of copper. Perhaps this fact is not generally known.

3. The supply of copper is not likely to come to any sudden end. True, if we carry forward the curve of increase as it has progressed in the last century we arrive at an output of about 170,000,000 tons for the year 2025, an amount which it would surely tax the earth's crust to yield. But the very greatness of the figure hints that it is fanciful. If all the peoples of the world should want as much copper as do the white races the demand would rise to perhaps double what it now is, say to 3,000,000 tons a year. We may imagine, without too much rashness, that it may reach that; but I would not bet on it.

A fair guide to what is to be expected in copper production is

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found in the case of iron and coal, which seem to have passed the peak of increase. Perhaps copper already has also. For two generations the outputs of both coal and iron doubled each decade, but they do so no longer. The peak of shipments from Lake Superior—66,000,000 tons—was reached in 1916. Judging by earlier rates of growth, the shipments this year would have been over 100,000,000 tons, but they will not pass 50,000,000. There has been, indeed, some increase in the making of steel, but a small one; and it seems that old metal, scrap, is displacing a lot of iron ore. The same thing may be seen in the output of coal. The wants of each person in the United States for power and machinery have been about satisfied; and hereafter any increase in demand for coal and iron will be only in step with the growth of population, in other words it will be arithmetical, not any longer an increase of numbers multiplied by an increase per head. It is most likely that the same thing will happen with copper. That metal is used freely, a little more per person each year, because it is cheap. It is the cheapest metal on the list. In 1912 a pound of copper would buy 23 pounds of pig iron, now it will buy 11; then, it would buy 3½ pounds of lead, now it will buy 1¾. What is true of other metals is just as true of wheat, cotton, lumber and transportation. But in general copper is used in just proportion with other metals in the making and spread of power-using devices, and the need for it will not grow faster than the need for others. Thus I think the great upward swing in the curve of copper output is a thing of the past; that it either has already followed, or soon will follow, the course of coal and iron; that the upward swing of demand will neither continue nor be resumed; in short, that from now on the increase of demand will be, by comparison with the past, extremely slow.

It therefore is not too short-sighted to measure the future supply of copper by the amount needed yearly now. There is apparently enough "in sight," that is, fully developed or reasonably assured, to last some 35 years, as follows:

Two great mines in Chile have a billion tons containing over 2¼ percent copper, and should, after allowing for losses, yield in time 20,000,000 tons of refined copper. A group of similar mines (porphyries) in the United States can be counted on for 10,000,000 tons more; making a reserve of 30,000,000 tons from this type of ore alone, in America alone. Other kinds of mines, including those of Butte, Lake Superior, Jerome, Bisbee, and

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Cerro de Pasco, have not so much "blocked out" but they have yielded more in the past than the "porphyries" and may do so in the future; but counting only on what seems reasonably assured it is easy to reckon up 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 tons additional. Thus we get, say, 42,000,000 tons of refined copper in sight or assured in this hemisphere alone, from ore now commercial, of the same kind and grade now being worked.

The eastern hemisphere, twice as large as the western, does not seem to be so rich in copper in proportion to its area; but in the long run the shortcoming may in large measure be made up in Africa and Siberia. The "Societé Miniére du Haut Katanga," a Belgo-British concern, has 4,500,000 tons of metallic copper "in sight," of what in other districts would be held to be very high grade ore, 6 to 20 percent copper. This showing makes it seem likely that Katanga is really the greatest copper field ever opened. Where there is so much high grade ore there is certain to be very much more low grade in the same mines, and, if I am not mistaken, only a few of the copper outcrops have been worked upon; so that altogether it seems modest to put this field down for 10,000,000 tons of sure copper. Then there are the well-known mines of Spain, Germany, Russia, and Japan, with some in Australia. Let us put down their total reserves at 3,000,000 tons; making 13,000,000 for the eastern hemisphere.

We thus come to a supply of some 55,000,000 tons for the world, enough for 36 years at the present rate. If that were all the copper to be had from the crust of the earth, one might well fear a shortage in another generation; but that is not the case. As a matter of practice, the reserves are very large; copper miners do not wish to see them added to; it is too patently easy to fill the market. Present explorations carry only a dim idea of the amount of copper to be had ultimately, for several reasons which I shall touch on briefly.

In the first place, there are still large areas in all parts of the world that may contain new copper mines. I have heard of good showings in Siberia; in Africa further finds may be taken for granted; in America there are places where good ore bodies may be covered up by younger rocks and may sometime be found.

Secondly, as the total supply of metal increases the amount of scrap increases and the need of new metal from ore becomes less. This fact is seen vividly now in the iron trade; scrap is mentioned much oftener in iron quotations than it used to be. Copper may

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follow the same course. It is less destructible than iron, more valuable and better cared for. The time may come when the back yards of industry will be all cluttered up with old copper and the need of mining fresh metal may fall off greatly.

Thirdly, no copper district in the world, so far as I know, has been worked out. It may have been shut down because it could no longer hold its own with other mines, but it can still produce copper. The great porphyry mines which have more than half of the reserve copper of the world "in sight," run, as said above, from 1 to 3 percent in copper. Below 1 percent (twenty pounds per ton) they are not commercial, they will not pay. But what of the amount of copper actually there? That is another matter altogether. It is known that vast amounts of leaner ores are to be found, have actually been found, in every field in the world. The total is unknown because nobody, as yet, wishes to measure such stuff; but just to give some inkling of the amount of copper that may be had from such sources, when the world wants it badly enough, I made a rude estimate that a single district in Arizona might furnish (from ores yielding 5 to 10 pounds copper per ton) something like 30 times as much as it has yet given up from commercial ores—indeed, about as much as the total output of the world to date. In Lake Superior a single vein, the Allonez Conglomerate, has never been commercial, but it is 50 miles long and in very large part will doubtless yield 5 to 10 pounds copper per ton—very likely twice as much as the entire past yield of that region. And it is only one of many such veins. It is not unlikely that beds of copper ore such as may one day be payable extend clear under the basin of Lake Superior, for it is said that the very beds that are worked on Keweenaw Point may be seen on Isle Royale sixty miles away, and they have been tried for mining.

Thus, in my judgment, when the world is willing to pay a little more for copper, enough to persuade the miners to work ores running 15, 10 or 5 pounds per ton, instead of 20 pounds, it will be able to get all the copper it wants for as long a time as is worth thinking about.

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THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE PEASANT

By Vladimir Zenzinov

WHAT is there new in the peasant policy of the Soviet Government? The history of the Soviet Government's method of dealing with the peasants is a brilliant illustration of the truth of the Latin proverb,"*fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt,*" that is, "fate—or better still life—leads those who do not resist it, and forcibly drags along those who try to oppose it."

Let us examine the facts. Until 1917 the attitude toward the peasant adopted by the Bolshevik fraction of the Socialist party was definite, and one befitting orthodox Marxists. The Bolshevik program embodied the conceptions of a commonplace variety of Marxism, according to which the peasantry were, first and last, a class of petty bourgeoisie, alien and antagonistic not only to Socialist ideals but to all social progress. The proletariat were the sole organ of the Socialist ideal, that is to say of the future. Accordingly the party was built up on exclusively proletarian lines. Its program, so far as the peasant was concerned, was restricted to political demands; for any economic improvement of his condition was in their eyes not only without object but even objectionable. Theoretically the peasants, being established on the land and possessing some means for its exploitation, would have to go through a process of differentiation in the course of which the petty holders among them would be absorbed by the larger ones. In conformity with this theory of common Marxism, something analogous to the evolution of industry was due to take place in the villages. Strengthening the petty peasant would mean hampering the inevitable social progress. The only thing the Socialist party could do for the peasant—said the Bolsheviks—was to help organize the paid agricultural laborers. Such was the Marxist doctrine professed by the Bolsheviks in its purest form.

For twenty years and more the Bolsheviks had been waging a tireless theoretical battle against another Russian Socialist party, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, whose chief distinction from the Bolsheviks and from the Marxists in general was this: The Socialist-Revolutionaries in their theoretical conceptions made no distinction between the proletariat and the peasantry; they

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considered both united in one laboring class, and argued that the socialist program and the socialist movement must be the common cause of these two armies of labor. This theoretical discussion between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks went on incessantly.

In 1905 the Bolsheviks were forced to make large concessions in this question. The peasantry, of whom they had thought up to this time as a purely reactionary class socially as well as politically, showed that they were a powerful revolutionary force. Indeed, the movement of 1905–6 which compelled the early concessions of the Government,—"the first revolution," the manifesto of October 17th, the Duma,—was largely a peasant movement. The Bolsheviks grasped this and made a change in their tactics in regard to the peasants, but only in their tactics, not in their program. To be sure, they officially proclaimed the slogan "nationalization of land," but they did not conceal that this slogan to them was only a tactical move, by which they wanted to lead the peasant to political revolution. As before, they deemed the paid laborers, the proletariat, to be the only class able to carry out a Socialist revolution. The peasant in revolt, demanding land, was to them at this historic moment only a traveling companion on the road to revolution.

A great gulf separated the Bolsheviks from the Socialist-Revolutionaries who proclaimed as their watchword "the socialization of the land." To the Socialist-Revolutionaries, "the socialization of the land" was a specific variety of nationalization. The difference consisted in this: while in "nationalization" the State becomes the legal owner of the land, in socialization the people acquire the supreme right to dispose of all the nationalized land, in accordance with a special legislative provision. Besides, the Socialist-Revolutionaries conceived of "the socialization of the land" as a far-reaching social reform creating favorable conditions for socialization and the introduction of the coöperative principle in all the other branches of industry, agriculture and city affairs.

Then came the year 1917. Contrary to the ordinary conception, the real revolution at that time was not made in the cities, but in the villages. The essential content of the Russian revolution was the tremendous, elemental process which took place among the peasants and resulted in the disruption of the landed estates, the expulsion of the landed proprietors, most of

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them belonging to the nobility, from their villages, and the forcible appropriation of all private and state lands by the peasants. The thing that many had foreseen as inevitable, namely the satisfaction of the peasant's age-long thirst for the land, took place in an elemental way. The ideas of the Socialist-Revolutionaries on this point were identical with those of the peasants—"the land must be excepted from the exchange of goods," as they put it, and "the land is the Lord's own, or nobody's, it's a sin to buy it and a sin to sell it," as the peasant was wont to say. Consequently, they hoped to have this wholesale seizure legalized in the Constituent Assembly by a fundamental law on the socialization of the land. This was to be worked out by deputies from all the people in the highest legislative and administrative organ of the country, and the rules thus established would regulate the use of land throughout the country, converting the peasant's primitive conviction of his right into a law obligatory for all citizens.

History, however, disposed differently. Power was seized by the Bolshevist party and the Constituent Assembly was dissolved. But in 1917, as in 1905, the Bolsheviks grasped correctly the significance of what had happened. They saw that the only way for them to keep in power and to strengthen themselves in it, was by staying on the crest of the revolutionary wave. With the greatest haste—literally on the morrow of their *coup d'etat*—they promulgated a decree which contained a project of socialization of the land previously prepared, but not yet definitely worked out, by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. This decree did not regulate the agrarian question on a country-wide scale, but simply sanctioned and ratified the wholesale seizure and partition of land already carried out by the peasants. By this means the Bolsheviks achieved their purpose. They neutralized the peasant politically. He was satisfied in the essential thing, his age-long craving for the land, and therefore he remained indifferent to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly to which he had sent an overwhelming majority of deputies, indifferent also to the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, although it meant a power entirely alien to him.

The Bolsheviks themselves never attempted to conceal the true character of the peasant policy they adopted in the first days after their *coup d'etat*. No less a person than Lenin himself several times publicly acknowledged in speaking and writing

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that the Bolsheviks had taken their decree on the socialization of land from the Socialist-Revolutionaries. "Nine-tenths of the peasants," he wrote, "have gone over to our side within a few weeks because we adopted an agrarian program that was not our own but that of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and put it into execution. Our victory consisted precisely in the carrying out of the Socialist-Revolutionary program. That is why it was so easy." "Indeed, why shouldn't we borrow from the Social-Revolutionists whatever was really good?" he used to say with a cunning smile. In doing so he never denied that to the Bolsheviks it was but a means of attracting the peasant or at least neutralizing him politically. As before, it was a matter of tactics, not of the program. As far as the theory was concerned, the proletariat still kept complete hegemony, the Bolsheviks kept assuring themselves and others that what they were bringing into being was "the dictatorship of the proletariat."

What was the further peasant policy of the Soviet Government?

At first, it bore a perfectly consistent and typical Marxist character. All the Bolsheviks wanted from the peasant was for him to help aggravate the class struggle. For this purpose the famous "Committees of the Destitute" were created all over the country, made up of needy peasants and farm-laborers. Usually these committees included as instructors typical city proletarians professing Bolshevism. The Committees of the Destitute had but one purpose, namely, to sequestrate for the benefit of the city population and city proletariat the grain produced by the more well-to-do peasants, whom they contemptuously called *kulaki* ("fists," the old name for the village usurer). Lenin called this process "prying bread out of the villages with bayonettes." The result could be easily foreseen—civil war on a vast scale throughout the country. The aim of Lenin's teaching was achieved. Trotsky, his faithful pupil, used to say at that time, "Bolshevism is organized civil war." It lasted for three whole years over the entire boundless expanse of Russia. It brought ruin, curtailment of areas under cultivation, the nightmare of the famine of 1920–21, and never-ceasing peasant uprisings which the Soviet Government drowned in rivers of blood by means of its well organized police forces. This could not continue indefinitely, for even the fanatics of civil war had their eyes opened, especially after such threatening events as the

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wholesale peasant revolt in the government of Tambov and the sailors' revolt in Kronstadt in the spring of 1921.

The peasant policy of the Bolsheviks had to be revised. This was done by Lenin who, with his characteristic crude frankness, explained the reasons for such a revision. In April, 1921, he made his famous speech on the product tax, thereby initiating the New Economic Policy. In this speech he pointed out directly —and others did it after him—that peasant unrest and the Kronstadt revolt made it imperative "to take immediate and decisive steps to better the condition of the peasant," and to abandon "the system of war-time Communism by which we practically took from the peasant all his surplus, and sometimes what was not his surplus but part of his necessary subsistence."

Then began the period of the so-called New Economic Policy, which so far as the peasant was concerned took the less onerous form of a product tax. The Soviet Government had at last divined that if you want to get eggs you must not kill the hen that lays them. The Committees of the Destitute were relegated to the background. The Government began to look toward the so-called middle peasant. There was talk about the union of the indigent and of the middle peasant. These two elements should combine together and with the city proletariat, of course under the guidance of the Communist Party, in order to combat the power of capital in town and village. The wealthier peasants, the *kulaki*, remained the enemy to be annihilated by the joint effort of all Communists.

The period of war-time Communism passed definitely away; the domestic life of Russia fortunately ceased to be disturbed by foolish foreign interventions; and attention was turned first and foremost to the economic reconstruction of the huge country that had been ruined first by the World War, then by a still more devastating civil war. Gradually one clear and simple thought came to dominate the consciousness of the country: the destinies of Russia depended entirely on the reconstruction of peasant industry.

After what the country has been through, the specific gravity of the peasantry has increased in proportion enormously. This fact penetrated the Bolshevik consciousness with difficulty, but it could not help penetrating at last.

And now we are witnessing a great object lesson. Apparently forgetting all of their Marxist dogma, the responsible Soviet

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leaders are beginning to reiterate the ABC of an economic policy which, from their lips, sounds as if it were a new gospel. Intensification of village production is the aim to which every effort of the Soviet reconstruction campaign must be bent. The Government must by all means help increase the welfare of the diligent, prosperous peasant. It is necessary to abandon the careless and demagogic persecution of the *kulaki*. The state can no longer commit itself to the village paupers as was done during the period of war-time Communism, because that would be a kind of "defeatism in production." Also, peasant agriculture cannot get along without hired labor. Such are the orations uttered nowadays by the most responsible Soviet statesmen, men like Smirnov, the Commissar for Agriculture (*Pravda*, April 5 and 7); Kamenev (*Izvestia*, April 14); Rykov, the President of the Council of People's Commissars (*Izvestia*, April 30), and many others.

These pronouncements are a complete refutation of the former Bolshevist peasant policy which was directed exclusively to the instigation of class war in the villages. Instead of staking on the pauper, the Government now stakes, if not on the *kulak*, at least on the well-to-do peasant. If the speeches that Kamenev Rykov and Smirnov make nowadays had been made a few years ago, the culprits would have been brought before the revolutionary tribunal and dealt with as counter-revolutionists and enemies of the Soviet Government. Not long ago a well-to-do, prosperous peasantry, and the accumulation of capital in the villages, would have appeared as deadly sin in the eyes of the Marxist Bolsheviks. Today their leaders openly agitate in favor of these things in the press and at every conference and congress.

More than that, these appeals do not remain mere propaganda. They are being made the cornerstone of a practical peasant policy. On April 18 the Soviet of People's Commissars decreed "Provisional rules for the hire of auxiliary labor in agriculture." These new rules mean a break with the entire recent past of the Bolsheviks. They sanction officially hired labor in peasant agriculture, and at that, they set no limitations to the number of persons hired. Thereby they not only permit, they assist in the development of capitalistic relations in rural economy. It must be especially noted that the employer of this hired labor (the former *kulak* and "exploiter") does not in any degree forfeit

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his franchise at the Soviet elections, whereas originally, according to the Soviet Constitution, only laboring people enjoyed such franchise.

We hear very different talk today. The Bolsheviks now unanimously declare that they do not wish to aggravate the class struggle in the villages. In accordance with this new policy a very special theory is being evolved of harmony of interests between the peasants of all levels. *Pravda* (May 3) says squarely that "in view of the desirability of strengthening the productivity of the peasantry, we must in every way facilitate the hiring of laborers in the interests of the poor." The former apostles of class hatred now begin to preach one of the commonplaces of classic political economy: the quicker capital is developed the more profitable it will be for labor, for it will be so much the easier for the labor that is for hire to find employment.

So it came about that life has made sport of the Bolshevik Communists. When at last they grasped that the foundation of Russia's welfare lies in the development of the productivity of her peasantry, and that there is no other way to the economic reconstruction of the country except by raising the general standard of village life, they became *plus royalistes que le roi même*. In this connection a speech which Bukharin made before the political workers of the Party in Moscow on April 17 is very characteristic (*Pravda*, April 24). Naturally it was not at all an accident that Bukharin was the man to speak on this delicate question. He belongs to the left wing and heretofore was known as the most extreme of Lenin's pupils, a passionate enemy of capitalism, and apostle of world-wide Socialist revolution. And if it was he who stepped forward to expound the Communist Party's new peasant policy, it shows how definitely they have adopted this stand, for nothing but party discipline could have forced him to speak as he did.

Great, indeed, is the distance traversed by the Marxist Bolsheviks from their original conceptions of the peasantry as a homogeneous reactionary mass, politically as well as socially; of the theory of fanning the flames of class war in the villages; of a policy of deliberately ruining the peasant, relying on and organizing Committees of the Destitute! After eight years of government experience, they have learned that all this policy was nothing but cheap demagogy, and that the economic policy of a state demands something different. In a country where the

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peasant population is in a huge majority, no policy can be effectual that is not based on peasant interests. To be sure, the Bolsheviki understood this somewhat late, namely after their "dictatorship of the proletariat" (which, essentially, has never been anything but a dictatorship of the Communist Party) had ruined the peasant. But they have at last understood that their power will have no economic foundation unless they secure command of the national economy, and that this can be only peasant economy. Hence all this recent flirting with the peasant, all this swing of the pendulum in their economic policy, with hymns of praise to the *kulak* and exhortations to accumulate wealth. The hopes of obtaining foreign loans have collapsed; the reconstruction of industry under the existing general conditions is also not to be counted on. From one kind of demagogy the Bolsheviki have gone over to another.

It would be too cheap a satisfaction merely to point out that, in the eighth year of their control, the Bolsheviks have abandoned their old Marxist attitude toward the peasant, which had always been a cabinet theory, far from real life. Better late than never. While remaining politically opposed to Bolshevism, yet one may admit that the latest peasant policy of the Soviets is gradually becoming a healthy one, inasmuch as it pursues the practical purpose of developing the productive forces of the country, and primarily of the peasantry. But this is still very far from a practical settlement of that question, so vast and so fundamental for Russia's future. A German proverb says: Whoever has said A must say B. And of course, the Bolsheviks will never be able to say B as long as they remain Bolsheviks.

What do we understand by making the interest of the peasantry the foundation of policy? Certainly it is something more than mere coöperation in the enrichment of the peasant, for which Bukharin appealed. It means an appreciation of the fact that it is the Government's duty to meet half-way and satisfy the social and political demands of the peasant. In other words, more than purely economic measures are required. He must be granted the freedom of individual and personal initiative and the opportunity to intensify his productivity by hiring labor. He must have the right of free, unhampered coöperative association, with a voluntary—not as heretofore obligatory—membership, the right of free election to the administrative machinery —not appointment from above, as has been the practice all

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these years. But is this then enough? Freedom of economic determination is inseparably linked up with civic rights and with the possibility of influencing and determining the social and political life of the commonwealth. The peasant must feel that he is a full-fledged citizen with rights equal to those of the city dwellers. In his village he must feel that the central power is closely related to him, and he must trust it and be assured that it stands watch over his interests.

Can the peasant thus regard the Soviet Government? To formulate this question is to answer it in the negative. The Soviet press itself is full of facts which prove this. It harps upon the lack of connection between the peasant and the Soviet power, upon the distrust and even animosity of the village masses toward the Communists, upon the chasm existing between the villages and the cities, which latter, in the opinion of the peasant, are inhabited only by Bolsheviks. For some years now the Bolsheviks have been talking of the "*smychka*," or close connection between town and village, yet the affair has not made a step of progress. The attempt at a so-called revival of the village Soviets, by which the Bolsheviks tried to give the village the possibility of somewhat greater self-administration, had very sad results: *Pravda*, of March 29, informs us of the election results in 406 *uiezdy* (districts), which means 94 percent of all the *uiezdy* of central Russia. 78,864 persons were elected to the village Soviets, of whom only 4,764 were Communists, that is six percent (at the previous elections they were 11.6 percent).

The Russian peasant as he is today and the Soviet Government as it now exists are two incompatible things. This is a matter of common knowledge to all who are familiar with the actual state of affairs in Russia,—on which there can be no dispute.

It would be difficult to over-estimate the consequences of the events which have occurred in Russia during the last decade. The sum total includes the disappearance of the landed proprietor and the abolition of large estates, the seizure and distribution among the peasants of the private and state lands, the destruction of industry by the Bolsheviks who have tried by forcible measures to establish Socialism in an economically backward country, the gradual and growing consciousness on the part of the peasant of his own decisive rôle in its destinies. Russia has become even more a country of peasants and of agriculture than she was before 1917. In consequence of what Russia has been

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through—world war, revolution, civil war, foreign interventions —the outcome of which, as well as of the whole "White" movement were determined by the attitude of the peasant toward them—his specific gravity has increased enormously, both subjectively, in his own eyes, and objectively, in the life of the nation.

In spite of the danger of prophesying, one can foretell even now that Russia will be reborn—indeed is already being reborn —as a great peasant democracy. In eastern Europe an enormous new Denmark is evidently destined to arise. The Soviet Government, in whose hands are the keys of the life of the great country, is vaguely conscious of this. It is disturbed by the inevitable internal and external development of the peasant democracy, and is trying to establish its own ascendancy by flirting with the peasantry, with the hope that at the price of trifling concessions it may retain the whole power in its hands. Everything indicates that the attempt will not be successful. The only question of importance is, how long the process of natural growth will take. The rock itself yields and crumbles under the living pressure of the roots of a growing tree.

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THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE PRELUDE TO 1914

By Simeon Strunsky

SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HENRY CABOT LODGE. Edited by Henry Cabot Lodge. 2 vols. New York: Scribner's, 1925.

ROOSEVELT AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. By Tyler Dennett. New York: Doubleday, Page, 1925.

FORTUNE took Theodore Roosevelt in her lap, showered gifts upon him during the course of nearly a generation, and ended by playing him a scurvy trick. Tragedy is obviously too strong a word; but irony does enter into the last five years of Roosevelt's record. It consists in the fact that to him was denied a share in the biggest event of his age. During the World War, Theodore Roosevelt was on the sidelines. Writing him from Paris towards the end of July, 1905, after Roosevelt's intervention in the Moroccan crisis and on the eve of the Portsmouth Peace Conference, Senator Lodge ventures to anticipate the verdict of posterity: "Your great work in world politics this summer, will be, when the history of our time is written, one of your most, if not your most, certain titles to a really enduring fame." That forecast might have been vindicated if less than ten years later the World War had not come around to reduce the events of 1905 to the dimensions of a prologue. The historian of the first quarter of the twentieth century will by no means overlook the war in Manchuria and the Algeciras Conference. But he will inevitably be in a hurry to move on to the main event. To Roosevelt, the sturdy fighter, fate assigned only a part in the preliminary bouts. She behaved much more kindly to many of his contemporaries of the year 1905. For Balfour, Lloyd George, the Kaiser, and for the impersonal forces behind the Russian and Japanese governmental systems of the first years of the century, she reserved rôles of high importance in the forthcoming drama. Even for William J. Bryan she kept in store a few exciting moments. But with Roosevelt and the World War it was as if some impresario had an option on the services of Edwin Booth, and booked him for a curtain raiser.

One of the instrumentalities employed by fate in playing its

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little joke on Roosevelt was the truth, held as self-evident by the American people, that the proper thing to do with ex-Presidents is to forget them. The presidency is the most exalted political office on earth. Consequently any man who has been President is unfit to render further service to his country. To be sure, Roosevelt was not forgotten after he left the White House. But he remained a force precisely because he remained a possible contender for a new term in the White House. When Finis was written to that prospect in 1916, Roosevelt ceased to be a power in any sense. The rôle of Elder Statesman, as all other countries know it, is alien to our political instincts. We elect, we vest with authority and responsibility, and we impatiently invite the outsider to hire a hall. To this ingrained principle, rather than to the Administration's jealousy of Roosevelt or its dread of mischief-making on his part, must be attributed the rejection of his request for permission to organize a volunteer division for service in France after our entry into the war. His friends were indignant. But the volume of protest was nothing to what might have been predicated on his former vast popularity. It may be that if the war had lasted longer, our traditional partyism would have given way and Theodore Roosevelt would have been called into the national service on the model of Europe's coalition governments, *unions sacrés* and *Bürgerfrieden*. Fortunately for the United States we were not reduced to that extremity.

The pathos of this dynamic American condemned to the rôle of spectator in the greatest show on earth since Waterloo ran deeper than what might be called a piece of accidental ill-luck. The event showed that Roosevelt's influence on his countrymen had suffered an immense decline. Either that, or else he had not succeeded, during the long years when he preached to delighted multitudes, in really impressing his own spirit and outlook on his fellow citizens. He writes to Lodge in January, 1916: "I am so out of sympathy with what seems to be the prevailing currents of American opinion that I keep my judgment suspended as regards the political wisdom of certain party moves." A fortnight later he writes: "I know that a year and a half ago, when I started to deal with the problems of the Great War and of Mexico, I had a practically solid opinion against me. I believe I now have an appreciable public opinion with me. It is, however, merely an appreciable minority. Whether it is five or fifteen percent I do not know." It is start-

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ling to think of Roosevelt as being, at any time, out of touch with his times and his countrymen. And there are phrases which suggest a sense of failure as he looks back. In June, 1915, he writes to Lodge: "I am afraid that Gardner is right about our people at the moment. The iniquitous peace propaganda of the last fifteen years has finally had its effects." But if you count fifteen years back from 1915 you are still in 1900 and you have covered a period during nearly two-thirds of which Theodore Roosevelt was—well, Roosevelt. Why was it that his continuous preachment of the anti-pacifist doctrine and the force of his own militant example availed so little against the advocates of the "soft" life? The suggestion occurs that Roosevelt, at the height of his power, imposed himself on his countrymen rather than convinced them; that all along he was out of tune with the basic sentiment in the country, and that this sentiment asserted itself once he had stepped from the scene at Washington.

The distinction between Roosevelt and national sentiment goes back to his big year in 1905. It is of the Roosevelt foreign policy rather than of America's foreign policy that we must speak in connection with the Russo-Japanese War and the Moroccan question. Mr. Dennett states this explicitly:

"In the course of our narrative, for the sake of literary smoothness, we have often used the terms 'America,' 'the American Government' and 'the United States' where we might with greater accuracy have continued to repeat the name Roosevelt. In truth, he was the Government. Congress had no part. Senators were rarely consulted. The President's cabinet made few contributions. The influence of the American diplomatic service, with the single exception of Ambassador Meyer (at St. Petersburg) was negligible."

But this does not mean merely that Roosevelt chose to make himself the sole governmental instrument for interpreting the popular will. The foreign policy of 1905 was not only personally guided and expressed but was personally determined. When war broke out between Russia and Japan in 1904, says Mr. Dennett, Roosevelt did more than give to Japan every support which was constitutionally within his sphere:

"He went even further and served notice on Europe that if a third power went to the aid of Russia he would join in support of Japan. The action may have been unconstitutional, but it was honest. . . . This was the big contribution of President

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Roosevelt to Far Eastern policy. It was not a permanent contribution for it did not have the support of the American people, and the next Administration lapsed into the old traditional policy.

Whether a single act or series of acts by a President of the United States, which has not the support of the American people and which lapses after him, can be called a real "contribution" to policy is perhaps an academic question. But Mr. Dennett does well to place in the proper perspective the rôle played by Roosevelt during the Manchurian war. Contemporary acclaim, as well as popular opinion since the Portsmouth Conference, has hailed Roosevelt as the peacemaker between Russia and Japan. But what Roosevelt wrote at the time to Lodge in strictest confidence is now a matter of common knowledge: the initiative for peace did not come from him. It came from the Japanese when the destruction of the Russian fleet by Togo had brought the auspicious moment. It was then that Takahira addressed himself to the President with the formula which greatly amused the President, namely that Roosevelt "on his own initiative" employ his good offices for bringing about peace negotiations.

This request was presented on May 31, 1905, and was the final step in a sequence of moves which began on April 5, at Paris when Foreign Minister Delcassé, alarmed by the Kaiser's threat in Morocco, expressed to the Japanese minister, Motono, his conviction that the Czar was in the mind to discuss peace provided Japan would refrain from bringing forward certain inadmissible demands. A fortnight later the Japanese Minister at Washington conveyed this information, via Secretary of War Taft, to the President who was away on a hunting trip in Colorado. On April 20, Roosevelt, via Taft, informed the Japanese Minister that in his opinion direct negotiations between Russia and Japan was the desirable procedure, subject only to the understanding that in any treaty of peace Japan must adhere to the principle of the Open Door in Manchuria and pledged itself to restore that province to China. It is Mr. Dennett's belief that if Roosevelt had been on the spot in Washington affairs would have moved more quickly, but the probabilities are that neither Russia nor Japan was ready to sit down and talk until the Czar's last card had been played in the form of that pathetic Russian fleet which was then lumbering half way around the world to meet its doom at Togo's hands at Tsushima.

Everybody wanted peace. Japan had attained her objectives.

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Russia was in revolutionary ferment. The Kaiser, who had worked hard to inveigle his Imperial cousin at St. Petersburg into the Manchurian adventure, in order to assure for himself a free hand with France, was now alarmed by the possible repercussions of the Russian revolutionary movement in his own country. France, harrassed by the Kaiser over Morocco, was anxious to have her Russian ally extricate itself from the Manchurian bog. England, though for no such pressing reasons, was willing enough to see the end of hostilities. The American people was largely swayed by the sanguinary nature of the struggle in Manchuria and wanted an end of slaughter. It may be said, then, that whoever was President in 1905 the Japanese request for America's good offices would have been laid before him. The alignment in Europe was such that the mediation of none of the neutral Continental Powers would have been welcome at Tokio—by the good old European practice, mediation had a way of expecting to be heavily paid for. Japan wanted no "honest brokers," and turned to Washington.

Not that Japan was unaware that in Roosevelt she had a good friend and in the American people a sympathetic audience. American sentiment from the outbreak of the war was with Japan, primarily because our public opinion was against the Russian autocracy and the methods that had so tragically been illustrated less than a year before in the Kishineff massacre. Roosevelt's own opinion of the Russian Government was short and sweet. "Russia," he wrote to Lodge in June, 1905, "is corrupt, treacherous, shifty and incompetent." To be sure, he goes on to say that Japan, too, is entirely selfish but "with infinitely more knowledge of what it wants and capacity to get it." It is in this characteristic admiration for "capacity," whether in nations or individuals, that we must look for the chief cause of Roosevelt's friendliness to Japan; just as it will explain the soft spot in his heart for the Kaiser. Naturally there was a realistic basis in Roosevelt's attitude towards the war and peace. He wanted to see a balance of power in the Far East and considered that such a balance would be established by a Japanese victory; the expulsion of Russia from the Far East was inconceivable. But personal sentiment played the chief part. He liked the Japanese because they were a masculine, militant, capable race. For the Russian people, though he distinguishes between people and government in Russia, he had no

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great respect. In the revolutionary movement of 1905 he detected the Tolstoyan influence, that "softness" which he abhorred. Russia was, on the whole, in the same category with the country from which Roosevelt coined his verb "to chinafy," and with Korea. In the case of the latter country Mr. Dennett is at pains to defend Roosevelt against the charge made after Portsmouth that he had callously consented to the destruction of Korean independence. Mr. Dennett argues that the Korean emperor had virtually sacrificed his country's independence by separate agreement with Japan before the Portsmouth Conference. But from Roosevelt's own words there is little doubt that he had no sympathy to spare for a people incapable of defending its own liberties. If the possession of Korea was necessary to keep Japan satisfied and maintain peace in the Far East, sentimentality should not be allowed to stand in the way.

It does not appear from the record that Roosevelt exercised any decisive influence in shaping the terms of peace at Portsmouth. The contest between Witte and Komura at Portsmouth centered about two points: the retention of the whole of Saghalien by Japan and the demand for an indemnity. On these questions it was feared at the time that a break would come, though we know now that both sides were too anxious for peace to resort to that extreme. Oddly enough, Roosevelt's intervention on either point had no effect. Privately he thought that Japan ought to have all of Saghalien and he wrote to Lodge that he would not blame Tokio if it renewed hostilities for that objective. Officially, however, he sought to bring the Czar to reason by urging a "substantial payment" for the return of the northern half of the island in lieu of an indemnity. For a moment the Czar consented. Then came reports of financial and military exhaustion in Japan, the backbone of St. Petersburg was stiffened, and in the end Russia got back northern Saghalien without compensation.

Roosevelt's rôle, then, in the Russo-Japanese War was not primarily that of a peacemaker—I have suggested that under any other President the peace overtures and negotiations would have run very much the same course—but as a friend of Japan who conceivably influenced the entire course of the war by ensuring for Japan a free field in the conduct of hostilities. We come back to the point stressed by Mr. Dennett as Roosevelt's principal contribution to world politics, the point with which

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Mr. Dennett begins his story. In July, 1905, Roosevelt wrote to his friend Cecil Spring-Rice, then First-Secretary of the British legation in St. Petersburg:

"As soon as this war broke out, I notified Germany and France in the most polite and discreet fashion that in event of a combination against Japan to try to do to her what Russia, Germany and France did to her in 1894, I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf. I, of course, knew that your government would act in the same way, and I thought it best that I should have no consultation with your people before announcing my purpose."

On such grounds Mr. Dennett speaks more than once of the United States, or rather of Roosevelt, as virtually a third partner in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It was an "honest" if extra-constitutional declaration of policy. But to the student of Roosevelt's psychology the incident is rich in speculation. How far did Roosevelt venture in the direction of bluffing? How far did he go towards violating his own favorite precept not to draw your gun until you are ready to shoot? His wrath over the provocative action of the California Legislature with regard to Japanese immigrants, uttered on more than one occasion, was stirred by the "besotted folly" of inviting Japanese enmity while insisting on a navy not strong enough "to shoot." Yet Roosevelt evidently was going far when he threatened to enter the Russo-Japanese war on the side of Japan. Possibly he might have converted the American people to such a course by capitalizing anti-Russian sentiment in this country, and, beyond that, by emphasizing the necessity of retaining the friendship of a nation that could make itself master of the Philippines whenever it chose. But on the other hand we must recall the "pernicious" pacifist propaganda that had for several years been having it all its own way, according to Roosevelt's own statement. We must seriously question whether the American people would have consented to go to war over a Manchuria of which, as Lodge wrote, not one American in a thousand knew the name. We are forced to conclude therefore that in this instance Roosevelt deviated from his own frontier formula. He did draw a gun without pulling the trigger. "I utterly disbelieve," he wrote to Secretary of State Knox in December, 1910, in comment on the latter's unsuccessful proposal for placing the Manchurian railways under international control, "in the policy of bluff. As

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regards Manchuria, if the Japanese choose to follow a course of conduct to which we are adverse, we cannot stop it unless we are prepared to go to war." Was Roosevelt really prepared to go to war in behalf of Japan in 1904? It is highly doubtful. The fact is, of course, that his never-draw-unless-you-shoot-formula, if strictly carried out, would eliminate all forms of discussion, of diplomatic pressure, from the sphere of international relations. National policy would be reduced to the alternative of silence or shooting. In practice he did not live up to his own principle.

He deviated from that principle during the Moroccan crisis. On June 25, 1905, when Roosevelt feared a German invasion of France, he told Baron Sternberg that "no one would understand or pardon wars entered into for frivolous reasons," and that in the case of war the support which would rally to the side of France would be "very formidable." Here again is a significant motion towards the holster without the assurance that American shooting in behalf of France or the European balance of power would follow immediately. It has been the contention of Roosevelt's admirers and Woodrow Wilson's opponents that the story of 1914–17 measured precisely the difference between Wilson and Roosevelt. Writing to Spring-Rice on October 3, 1914, Roosevelt maintains this thesis:

"If I had been President, I should have acted on the thirtieth or thirty-first of July, as head of a signatory power of the Hague treaties, calling attention to the guaranty of Belgium's neutrality and saying that I accepted the treaties as imposing a serious obligation which I expected not only the United States but all other neutral nations to join in enforcing. Of course, I would not have made such a statement unless I was willing to back it up. I believe that if I had been President the American people would have followed me." Possibly. From what we know of German psychology Roosevelt's determination to back up his threat by action would have received a severe testing. Yet that Roosevelt would have uttered the threat we may concede, once he had made up his mind about the wrongs of Belgium, which in the first days of the war he apparently did not.

At any rate, Roosevelt's warning to Sternberg in June, 1905, was efficacious. A fortnight later he writes to Lodge at Paris:

"I received a message of thanks from the German Government for my part in securing a conference between Germany

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and France with the other powers on the Moroccan question. This is a dead secret. But I became the intermediary between Germany and France when they seemed to have gotten into an impasse, and have already been thanked by the French Government through Jusserand. I suggested the final terms by which they could get together."

In the case of the Russo-Japanese War, Roosevelt had begun with a strong bias in favor of Japan, which did not prevent his later assuming the rôle of mediator. In the case of Morocco the attempt was made by the Kaiser to enlist his support on one side of the quarrel; the move failed and, *faute de mieux*, William II sought and obtained Roosevelt's good offices. On March 6, 1905, while the battle of Mukden was under way, Baron Sternberg invited Roosevelt to join the Kaiser in backing up the Sultan of Morocco against France. Roosevelt replied that America had no interest in the matter. The Kaiser was not discouraged and in April urgently requested of President Roosevelt to find out how far Great Britain would go in support of France. This favor was also refused, though in good humor, and when William II finally suggested a general conference on Morocco he was backed up by Roosevelt who thereby put himself in no friendly light from the Entente point of view. Nevertheless, at Algeciras he took his stand with France, whose thanks expressed through Jusserand were sincere. Lodge, writing from Paris, testifies to the intensity of French gratitude. Of the quality of William II's appreciation we may be more in doubt.

In a letter to Lodge, the President protests somewhat humorously against the too prevalent notion that he was under the thumb of the Kaiser. But there would seem to be little question that William II did exercise on Roosevelt something of that spell which the latter felt in the presence of all "strong" men and nations. The Kaiser was not "soft," he knew what he wanted, and he was very persistent in trying to get it. Ultimately, at Algeciras, Roosevelt's instincts came to his rescue, but Mr. Dennett admits that Roosevelt did not understand the German Emperor. Mr. Dennett blames it on the very poor quality of diplomatic service upon which Roosevelt had to depend; but that is not a complete answer, since Roosevelt was so much in the habit of drawing his information from non-diplomatic sources. How thoroughly he misunderstood the Kaiser is shown in a letter from the Colorado hunting trip to Secretary Taft in

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April: "Now, in my view this action of Germany in embroiling herself with France over Morocco is proof positive that she has not the slightest intention of attacking England." And yet Morocco was precisely an attempt to feel out the strength of the Anglo-French understanding, to break up that Entente, and so to prepare the way for what came to pass in 1914.

Manchuria and Morocco were more than interrelated. They were simultaneous episodes in a single action played out at the two extremes of the Eurasian Continent. The Czar had plunged forward against Japan with the hearty encouragement of the Kaiser who wanted a free hand to deal with the growing manifestations of Anglo-French friendship. When Russia had been beaten in the field and was rendered for the time being impotent by internal ferment, the Kaiser went to Tangier and set into motion the series of crises that mounted to a convulsion before which resources of diplomacy found themselves helpless in 1914.

In Manchuria and Morocco the action of Theodore Roosevelt was dictated by a spirit totally opposite to that dread of "entanglement" which has so haunted the dreams of his party since the World War. And it is odd that, within his party, men like Hiram Johnson and W. E. Borah who were closest in sympathy with Roosevelt in domestic affairs are now most closely associated with that policy of isolation of which Roosevelt would have nothing. The threat to bring in the United States on the side of Japan, the warning to Sternberg of "formidable" support for France in case she was attacked over Morocco, show a very lively recognition of America's interests in the European situation as part of the world situation. It may be, then, that if Roosevelt had been President after 1914 he would have asserted himself from the first more strongly than Woodrow Wilson did. But that is pure speculation, if by assertion we mean something more than strong words. Before proceeding to action he would have had to deal with that "soft" state of American sentiment for which Woodrow Wilson cannot be blamed since Roosevelt himself traced it back fifteen years to the beginning of his own activities at Washington.

Against Woodrow Wilson up to 1917 Theodore Roosevelt may conceivably be used as a text. Against Wilson after 1917 the charge will not hold. For if Wilson "took" the United States into the war, he must have done so by overcoming that "softness" of which Roosevelt so bitterly complained.

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THE UNREDEEMED ISLES OF GREECE

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

Two questions in which Greece has long been concerned have developed recently in a manner not at all in accord with her national aspirations. Cyprus, towards which Greece has cast longing eyes ever since she herself became an independent nation, was proclaimed a British Crown Colony on May 1, 1925. The annexation by Italy of Rhodes and the other islands of the Dodecanese has meanwhile been discussed in the Italian press in a manner to remove any idea that Italy might be considering ending her occupation, begun in 1912 as a professedly temporary and conditional measure; but no formal decree of annexation has yet been issued, despite the implications of a speech by Signor Mussolini in September a year ago, in which he declared 1924 notable as the year which had begun with an Italian Fiume, continued with an Italian Jubaland, and would end with an Italian Rhodes.

THE DODECANESE

The term Dodecanese—meaning the "Twelve Islands," used rather loosely of a scattered group of islands along the eastern shores of the Aegean—was not often heard until it became associated with one of the acts of Italy in the Tripolitan War against



Turkey in 1911–12. But the names of many of the individual islands in the group are familiar, especially Rhodes, long an outpost of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem and the site of the colossal statue of the Sun God which was one of the Seven Wonders of the World, and Patmos, the scene of the banishment of St. John, who there saw his heavenly vision. The other islands include Kasos, Karpathos, Kharki, Tilos, Symi,

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Nisyros, Astropalia, Kos, Kalymnos, Lipsos, and Leros, besides innumerable adjoining islets, mostly uninhabited. The whole population of the Dodecanese is not over 100,000, of whom less than a tenth are Turks, the rest being practically all Greeks. Even these figures do not show how completely Greek the islands are, as all but a few hundred of the Turkish population are found on the island of Rhodes, and even there they are outnumbered four to one by the Greeks. None of the islands are important economically, sponge fishing being the occupation of such of the inhabitants as are not content merely to raise enough produce for their scanty personal needs.

Italy occupied the Dodecanese "temporarily" in 1912 as a move in the war with Turkey, but agreed in the treaty of peace (which ceded Libya to Italy) to hand them back to Turkey as soon as the Turkish evacuation of Libya had taken place. The conclusion of the Turco-Italian war was followed immediately by the outbreak of the Balkan War, in which Greece occupied all the Greek islands remaining under Turkish sovereignty, but was prevented by the Italian occupation from seizing the Dodecanese. The outbreak of the Great War found Italy still in possession, and the islands were part of the grandiose rewards promised Italy by the secret Pact of London which brought her into the war. The natural unpopularity of the Italian occupation was accentuated by the inevitable hardships of war time, nor has Italian neglect of various local privileges enjoyed under the Turkish régime and restrictions on travel between the islands tended to diminish it. Article 122 of the abortive Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) gave Italy the Dodecanese and the detached island of Castellorizo, but a separate protocol signed by Tittoni and Venizelos promised that the islands (excluding Castellorizo) should be transferred to Greece in compensation for the latter's abandonment of certain other territorial claims. This separate agreement stipulated that the transfer should take place forthwith, except in the case of Rhodes, which, after a plebiscite, should go to Greece fifteen years after the (problematical) cession of Cyprus to Greece by Great Britain. Great Britain for a time protested against the continued Italian occupation. For example, in the House of Commons on February 25, 1924, the Prime Minister spoke as follows: "I find that in concluding with the Italian Government the agreement of April, 1920, regarding Jubaland, Lord Milner made a written reservation in the sense that this agreement could only become effective as part of the general settlement of all the issues raised at the Peace Conference. These issues, as the Italian Government have often been reminded, embrace the question of the Dodecanese, and the Italian Government have for their part recognized that the Treaty which they concluded with Greece on August 10, 1920, was the result of agreement between the Allies, and that the settlement of the Dodecanese question is not only the concern of Italy and Greece." ("Parliamentary Debates," Vol. 170, 1924, pp. 28–29.) Italy, however, considers that the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) relieves her from carrying out her arrangement with Greece, and the tendency at Rome is to act as though Italian sovereignty were complete and final. Incidentally, a fortified Italian naval base has been constructed at Leros, and another is contemplated for Rhodes.

As far back as 1887 Sir Charles Dilke, in his extraordinarily well-informed book, "The Present Position of European Politics," said of the Greeks: "It is difficult to say whether they more dislike the Austrians or the Italians, and their latest fancy is to declare that not only does Italy covet the Albanian coast, but that she has fixed her view on Rhodes." Time has proved that the forebodings of the Greeks were not unfounded.

CYPRUS

Cyprus, an island some 140 miles in length by about 40 miles at the widest point, lies at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, midway between the coast of Syria and the southern shores of Asia Minor. The descendants of its Greek and Phoenician

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settlers have known many masters. At the division of the empire of Alexander the Great, of which Cyprus had formed part, it fell to Egypt; in B.C. 58 it became a Roman province; and on the division of the Roman Empire it went with Byzantium. Richard Coeur de Lion conquered the island in 1191 and sold it to Guy de Lusignan, whose descendants ruled it until succeeded by Venice in 1489. The Turks took it from Venice in 1571 and held it for the next three centuries.

On June 4, 1878, Great Britain and Turkey signed what is known as the "Cyprus Convention," by which England was to be allowed to occupy Cyprus so long as Russia occupied the Transcaucasian provinces which she had taken from Turkey, and in return for a promise of aid in case Russia should attempt to extend her rule in Asia beyond the limits fixed by the treaty of peace signed by Russia and Turkey at Constantinople on January 27, 1878. Almost at once Cyprus was put under the British Colonial Office, but was always recognized officially as forming part of the Ottoman Empire. This anomalous situation continued until the outbreak of the Great War. On November 5, 1914, an Order in Council declared void the Turco-British convention of 1878 and proclaimed Cyprus's annexation. By the terms of this and other documents all Ottoman subjects resident in Cyprus on November 5, 1914, became subjects of Great Britain, except that any Ottoman subject who wished might retain his nationality provided he left the island within two months. Only a few persons took advantage of this latter provision.



The inhabitants of Cyprus, known usually as Cypriots, are mainly Greeks, and the language is a local dialect of Modern Greek. A census taken in 1921 showed the population to be 310,709, of whom only approximately one-fifth were Mohammedans (tantamount, for practical purposes, to defining them as Turks, though many of the so-called "Turks" in the Greek islands are often almost as Greek in blood as the "Greeks," being descended from converts), while the rest were almost all Orthodox Christians (*i.e.*, Greeks). In November of that year some 3,000 Armenian refugees arrived in Cyprus from Mersina, and a few hundred Greek refugees from Asia Minor were received in 1922. But although the country is fertile and under-populated the British Government has refrained from allowing to settle there any part of the great horde of Greek refugees and exchanged Greeks who have all but swamped the cities and countryside of Greece proper. In view of the admitted inadequacy of the population of Cyprus ("its sparseness is one of the causes of the slow rate of progress," wrote the correspondent of the *Near East*, of London, on May 26 last), the exclusion of Greek refugees can only be accounted for by the unwillingness of the British Government further to increase the predominantly Greek character of the island.

The four-fifths of the population who are Greeks have never hidden their desire for union with Greece, and deputations have often visited London to plead their cause. The Turkish minority, however, naturally prefer to remain under Britain. The proclamation of Cyprus as a Crown Colony, which took place at Nicosia on May 1, 1925, was received with dismay by the Greek Cypriots, who realized that it placed still further beyond their reach the goal of their nationalistic aspirations. After the reading of the proclamation, which took place in the public square in the presence of the heads of governmental departments and detachments of British troops, the Greek Archbishop, Kyrillos, handed the High Commissioner a protest, addressed to the

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Secretary of State for the Colonies, expressing the regret of the Greek population at this denial of their "ethnic rights." To this the Secretary of State for the Colonies replied on June 12 that "you must clearly understand that, as has already been pointed out to you on more than one occasion, the question of the union of Cyprus with Greece has been finally closed and cannot be reopened."

It was announced at the time of the proclamation that the representation of the non-Moslem population in the Legislative Council was to be increased by three. The Council having been composed of nine Greek and three Mohammedan elected members, and six named by the High Commissioner, the Greek population would in that case exercise a preponderant influence within the Assembly's rather limited field of competence. Later reports show, however, that the three new Greek members are to be counter-balanced by the addition of three British. As the Governor has a casting vote, the Greek members remain, as before, effectually check-mated.

Another matter to be adjusted has to do with the £50,000 which Great Britain has been contributing annually towards the £92,000 charged each year against Cyprus for the benefit of the share-holders of the Ottoman Loan of 1855. The Cyprus Treasury has always had to make up the balance, £42,000. Local agitation for Cyprus to be relieved of this annual tribute, which has prevented the development of public works, has received some support in England, but on May 11 last the Under Secretary of the Colonial Office announced in the House of Commons, in reply to a question, that no changes are contemplated in the existing financial arrangements of Cyprus.

To Greece the question of Cyprus is primarily one of racial sentiment, though the island's material resources and the field it offers for the surplus Greek population are of course not lost sight of. It also has an important bearing on the fate of Rhodes, and indirectly of the other islands of the Dodecanese, as noted above.

To Great Britain the importance of Cyprus is economic and strategic. Its agricultural produce includes raisins, fruit, wine, cotton and wheat, while its mineral reserves include asbestos, copper, chrome, etc. (The Cyprus Asbestos Company, a British concern, capitalized at £600,000, has recently been installing new plants and machinery.) In 1924 the exports of Cyprus reached a value of £1,231,703, while imports amounted to £1,243,356. Economic conditions are far from satisfactory, however, and for the first quarter of 1925 the imports exceeded the exports by over £92,000. Of the 1924 exports about 25 percent went to markets within the British Empire, while 40 percent of the imports were of British origin. From the strategic point of view Cyprus has lost much of its importance to England. The fear of Russian predominance in Asia Minor, which led to the agreement of 1878, is no longer a factor. And it has been pointed out that Cyprus, like other islands claimed by Greece but held by other powers, could readily be neutralized before being transferred to Greek sovereignty, as was done with the Ionian Island in 1864. That strategic considerations are no longer really vital is shown by the fact that in 1915 Cyprus was held out to Greece as one of her rewards if she would throw in her lot with the Allies. Subsequently, Great Britain promised France (who was alarmed at the growth of Greek power in the Mediterranean) not to cede the island without first obtaining the French Government's consent. But today Greek fortunes are at a lower ebb than they were ten years ago, and Paris would hardly offer objections if the British nation decided, in the words of Professor Toynbee, "to follow in Cyprus their own example in the Ionian Islands and the American example in Cuba, and to withdraw after arranging that the rights of the Turkish minority should be secured."

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COMPARATIVE TABLES OF ARMAMENTS

NATIONAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR ALL ARMED FORCES

(Including Army, Navy and Air Forces)

IN COMPARISON TO NATIONAL WEALTH

(Totals for mother countries and dependencies As of Mar. 31, 1925, for current fiscal year)

	Nat'l Wealth	*Appro-priations*	*Percent of Nat. Wealth*
U. S.....	$320,803,862,000	$553,861,346	.17
Br. Emp...	159,802,400,000	904,354,270	.56
France.....	74,037,673,000	254,485,150	.34
Italy.....	29,747,763,000	155,359,200	.52
Japan.....	32,178,725,000	218,500,000	.68
Russia.....	30,876,000,000	190,694,000	.62
Germany...	84,157,700,000	107,705,933	.13

IN COMPARISON TO POPULATION

(Totals for mother countries only, excluding colonies and colonial forces)

	Population	*Appro-priations*	*Per Capita*
U. S....	112,193,613	$553,861,346	$4.94
Gt. Br...	44,200,000	572,733,222	12.96
France...	39,560,000	254,485,150	6.43
Italy....	40,000,000	155,359,200	3.88
Japan...	59,300,000	218,500,000	3.68
Russia...	131,104,000	190,694,000	1.45
Germany.	63,350,000	107,705,933	1.70

APPROPRIATIONS IN PERCENT OF NAT'L WEALTH

(*Mother Countries and Dependencies*)



APPROPRIATIONS PER CAPITA

(*Mother Countries Only*)



The figures for Russia in the accompanying tables represent merely the best guesses possible, checked from all available sources. The figures for the other countries shown are drawn from official sources.

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NATIONAL ARMIES IN COMPARISON WITH POPULATION

(*i.e.*, Armies and Organized Army Reserves Only)

MOTHER COUNTRIES						MOTHER COUNTRIES AND DEPENDENCIES				
Population	*Active Army*	*Per 1,000 Pop.*	*Active Army & Reserve*	*Per 1,000 Pop.*		*Population*	*Active Army*	*Per 1,000 Pop.*	*Active Army & Reserve*	*Per 1,000 Pop.*
112,193,613	101,973	.91	374,388	3.34	*U. S.*	125,276,889	140,521	1.12	414,254	3.31
44,200,000	154,167	3.49	253,635	5.74	*G.Br.*] [*Br. E.*	445,112,000	386,202	.87	775,865*	1.74
39,560,000	449,012	11.35	5,220,000	139.45	*France*	93,288,900	629,012	6.74	5,500,000	58.96
40,000,000	347,935	8.70	3,972,935	99.32	*Italy*	41,927,366	385,435	9.19	4,010,435*	95.65
59,300,000	219,000	3.69	1,510,000	25.46	*Japan*	81,273,791	250,000	3.08	1,894,000	23.30
131,104,000	562,976	4.29	712,976	5.44	*Russia*	133,000,000	562,976	4.23	712,976	5.36
63,350,000	100,000	1.58	250,000	3.95	*Germany*	63,350,000	100,000	1.58	250,000	3.95

*Excludes Air Service which is under a separate Ministry.

PER THOUSAND POPULATION



PER THOUSAND POPULATION



It should be noted that the term "Organized Army Reserves" used above does not by any means include all the potential man power of a country. War veterans, as such, are not included (except in countries where they happen to form part of the organized reserve). But the fact that they represent potential reserves of trained men should be taken into consideration in comparing the figures for Powers like France, Italy and Japan which have compulsory service (and hence large organized reserves) and for Powers like the United States, Great Britain and Germany which have voluntary enlistment (and consequently small organized reserves, though possessing large available masses of men trained in the late war). The subject was discussed by Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July, 1925.

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THE IRAQ RECOMMENDATIONS

The task facing the special Commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to investigate the question of frontiers between Turkey and Iraq was described briefly in the last issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The Commission, composed of Count Paul Teleki, former Prime Minister of Hungary, M. af Wirsen, of Sweden, and Col. Paulis, of Belgium, has completed its extensive investigations on the spot and has presented its report[1] to the Council of the League. The Commission states that the Council had in no way limited its power of action; it might even have recommended a plebiscite, if it had not become convinced of the "insuperable practical difficulties" of such a course. Three alternative methods for disposing of the territory in dispute were suggested:

1. If Great Britain agrees to extend its mandate over Iraq (due to expire in four years) for a period of say twenty-five years, local self-government meanwhile being guaranteed the Kurdish population, the state of Iraq shall maintain its present territory, the northern boundary of which is the "Provisional Line" of October 29, 1924.

2. If the two conditions are not met, the disputed territory is to go to Turkey.



3. If neither of these courses recommends itself to the Council of the League, the territory shall be divided between Turkey and Iraq along the line of the Lesser Zab River. The western frontier of the territory thus awarded to Turkey would presumably be placed somewhat to the west of the Tigris River, the city of Mosul going to Turkey.

The fact that solutions 1 and 2 were offered by the Commission seems to indicate the belief that the population of the disputed territory wish on the whole to remain in Iraq, but only provided the mandate relationship to that territory is maintained by Great Britain. Solution 3 provides for the division of the disputed territory between the Turcophile-Kurds predominating north of the Lesser Zab River, and the Kurds south of that river whose affinities are with Persia. It is interesting to note that the Sykes-Picot line of 1916 followed the Lesser Zab River. The territory which would be allotted to Turkey under plan 3 is understood to contain the richer half of the Mosul oil fields. Incidentally, the completion of the Bagdad railway between Nisibin and Shargat, along the western bank of the Tigris, will involve carrying the line through Syrian territory unless the French should propose to Turkey an exchange of the northeast corner of Syria for territorial compensations elsewhere—for example, along the railway north of the Syrian port of Alexandretta.

1 "Question of the Frontier Between Turkey and Iraq" (League of Nations, C. 400, M. 147), 90 pp., with eleven maps in separate envelope.

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SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By William L. Langer

General International Relations

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1920–1923. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1925, 526 pp.

A volume preliminary to a series of annual international year-books, of which the first, covering events in 1924, is soon to appear. Its publication under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs indicates its authoritative and non-partisan nature.

THE WORLD AFTER THE PEACE CONFERENCE. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1925, 91 pp.

A successful attempt by a highly competent scholar to compare the world of 1920 with that of 1914, and to look forward from the detailed problems of today to the problems of the future.

THE LAWLESS LAW OF NATIONS. By STERLING E. EDMUNDS. Washington: John Byrne, 1925, 449 pp.

Thoughtful but destructive criticism of the present international system.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES. By WILLIAM S. CULBERTSON. New York: Appleton, 1925, 593 pp.

A study of importance for the understanding of international relations.

DER KOSMOPOLITISCHE GEDANKE. By THEODOR HARTWIG. Ludwigsburg: Verlag Friede durch Recht, 1924, 216 pp.

A good historical survey of the development of the cosmopolitan idea.

EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY, ITS RISE AND DECLINE. By SHIH SHUN LIU. New York: Longmans, 1925, 235 pp.

A scholarly examination.

A STUDY OF WAR. By ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD N. CUSTANCE. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1925, 223 pp.

A sound discussion from the political and military points of view.

LA SUPPRESSION DE LA GUERRE. By T. GIMINEZ-VALDIVIESO. Paris: Rhea, 1925, 302 pp.

A reconsideration of the arguments in favor of war, and of possible measures for suppressing it.

VOM VORIGEN ZUM NÄCHSTEN KRIEG. By GENERAL PAUL VON SCHONAICH. Berlin: Verlag der Neuen Gesellschaft, 1925, 184 pp.

An outspokenly pacifistic review of present tendencies.

A HANDBOOK TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By SIR GEOFFREY BUTLER. 2nd edition. New York: Longmans, 1925, 255 pp.

A well-known text, revised to include the fifth assembly and the Geneva Protocol.

SULLA SOCIETÀ DELLE NAZIONI. By SENATOR CARLO SCHANZER. Rome: Anonima Romana Editoriole, 1925, 236 pp.

Essays on the functions of the League by a former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

WHAT THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS. By H. WILSON HARRIS. London: Allen and Unwin, 1925, 125 pp.

A useful popular outline.

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INFORMATION ON THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE. By J. W. Wheeler-Bennett. London: Association for International Understanding, 1925, 75 pp.

A compact manual, containing all important documents.

International Relations of the United States

THE RECENT FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. By George H. Blakeslee. New York: Abingdon Press, 1925, 361 pp.

Lectures on various aspects of American foreign policy by a competent scholar.

THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR. By Capt. T. G. Frothingham. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925, 342 pp.

The second volume, compiled from official sources, covering the period 1915–1916.

AMERICANISM, A WORLD MENACE. By W. T. Colyer. London: Labour Publishing Company, 1925, 176 pp.

A virulent attack on the American outlook.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. By Frank C. Laubach. New York: Doran, 1925, 515 pp.

An historical and descriptive outline, chiefly from the religious angle.

Europe

LES ORIGINES IMMÉDIATES DE LA GUERRE. By Pierre Renouvin. Paris: Costes, 1925, 292 pp.

The most satisfactory account yet published of the negotiations immediately preceding the war.

À L'ORIGINE DU MENSONGE. By Lazare. Paris: Delpeuch, 1925.

The origins of the war from the revisionist standpoint.

LES CRIMINELS. By Victor Margueritte. Paris: Flammarion, 1925, 356 pp.

A sane review of European developments from 1870 to 1914.

ISWOLSKI IM WELTKRIEGE. Edited by Friedrich Stieve. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1925, 265 pp.

Important documents from the Russian archives dealing with Franco-Russian relations during the war.

HISTOIRE ÉCONOMIQUE ET FINANCIÈRE DE LA GUERRE. By G. Olphe-Galliard. Paris: Rivière, 1925, 502 pp.

A much needed study of the economic aspects of the war.

THE NEUROSES OF NATIONS. THE NEUROSES OF GERMANY AND FRANCE. By C. E. Playne. London: Allen and Unwin, 1925.

A study in the national psychology of pre-war Europe.

LA PAIX MALPROPRE. By Alcide Ebray. Milan: Società Editrice Unitas, 1925.

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LES ROIS DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE. By P. E. Gueyden. Paris: Perrin, 1925, 2 volumes.

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The first part of the French official history, carrying the story to August 24, 1914.

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A unique sociological approach to the study of the background of the Fascist movement.

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An important contribution toward an understanding of the political and racial aspects of the land reforms in Czechoslovakia.

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A Polish professor's enquiry into the legal standing of Dantzig as an international entity.

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The most important contribution on Russian strategy yet published.

VOM ABSOLUTISMUS ZUM RÄTEFREISTAAT. By Manfred Langhans. Leipzig: Hirshfeld, 1925, 160 pp.

A very satisfactory outline of Russian constitutional development since 1918.

RUSSIA IN DIVISION. By Stephen Graham. New York: Macmillan, 1925, 293 pp.

Random but useful observations on conditions and problems in the border states of Russia.

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Source material from the communist press on the religious persecution in Russia.

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An important report on the Tsar's murder by the investigating official of the Kolchak Government.

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The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE TRUTH ABOUT KITCHENER. By Victor W. Germains. London: Lane, 1925, 344 pp.

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An exhaustive scholarly work.

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An historical study by the famous Viceroy.

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An unusually penetrating study of the causes of unrest, by a former Governor-General of Bengal.

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THE MOSLEM WORLD IN REVOLUTION. By W. W. Cash. London: United Council for Missionary Education, 1925, 160 pp.

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A valuable diary of the revolution by an eye-witness.

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A well-documented and thoroughly reliable history of the nationalist movement since the days of Arabi.

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A suggestive essay, though not of any great originality.

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An entertaining account of conditions in Eastern Asia and Russia, by a keen observer.

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Suggestive essays on English, German and American imperialism.

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The 162nd edition of this standard genealogical and diplomatic reference book.

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These hearings concern loans to Latin American countries.

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